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INTRODUCTION
In the courts and legal academy, interest in the Civil War has
increased greatly in the last decade, and it is not hard to understand
why. The 9/11 attacks were by far the most spectacular and deadly
military attacks on the mainland United States since the Civil War.
Both the conflict against al Qaeda and the Civil War were untradi-
tional; in both, it was contested whether they amounted to "war" in
the sense used in the Constitution and public international law, and
what effect that had on government powers and individual rights.
Lines between combatants and noncombatants were blurry in both
conflicts, often intentionally so. Because significant aspects of both
conflicts occurred on U.S. soil and involved American citizens (the
Civil War much more so, obviously), the federal courts were from the
outset asked to rule on the legality of executive and congressional
actions.
The Supreme Court has issued four important decisions regard-
ing the war on terror: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld1 Rasul v. Bush,2 Hamdan v.
Runsfeld,3 and Boumediene v. Bush.4 In all four, the Court found and
1 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (upholding military detention in the United States of a
U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan fighting for the Taliban because Congress had
authorized it, but finding that the Due Process Clause required more procedural pro-
tections than the military had granted to date).
2 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding, contrary to its previous consideration of the
statute, that Congress's general habeas corpus act gave U.S. courts jurisdiction to
entertain habeas petitions from noncitizens detained outside their territorial jurisdic-
tion-here, persons held at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, U.S. military facility-as
unlawful enemy combatants).
3 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that the military commission trial of the man
alleged to have been Osama bin Laden's bodyguard and driver violated U.S. statutes
requiring substantial equivalence of procedure in military commissions and courts-
martial and requiring adherence to the international laws of war).
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enforced novel constitutional, statutory, or international rights for
alleged terrorist enemies of the United States. In all four, the Justices
relied on precedents and authorities from the Civil War and engaged
in detailed debate about their meaning. The scholarly literature
about war-on-terror legal issues is rife with references to Civil War
precedents. Two which have been very prominent in the post-9/11
debates are the Supreme Court's decisions in the Pize Cases5 and Ex
parte Milligan.6 The former held that President Lincoln had the
authority to invoke belligerent rights akin to those in international
wars-that is, the rights and powers that the laws of war allow sover-
eign nations to use in their mutual conflicts-to blockade the ports of
seceded states in the spring of 1861 against Confederate and neutral
shipping, without Congress having first declared or otherwise noticed
the beginning of a war between the states.7 (Enemy vessels or cargo
seized validly under the international laws of war were referred to as
"prizes" of war, because they generally accrued to the financial benefit
of the captors-hence the "Prize Cases.") The Court rejected claims by
U.S. citizens resident in Virginia that individual constitutional rights
prohibited the seizure of their property; the Court held that, war
existing defacto, the U.S. government could treat them as military ene-
mies without any rights because they resided in enemy territory.8 The
Pize Cases featured prominently in Justice Thomas's dissents in both
Hamdi and Hamdan, and in internal memoranda of the Bush Admin-
istration's Department of Justice-said to stand for the proposition
that the President has illimitable constitutional power to choose how
to respond to attacks on the United States.9
4 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that Congress's removal of jurisdiction over
habeas petitions of noncitizens detained at Guantanamo as unlawful enemy combat-
ants was an unconstitutional deprivation of the right of access to the writ). For more
on these four cases, see Andrew Kent, Supreme Court Holds That Noncitizens Detained at
Guantanamo Have a Constitutional Right to Habeas Corpus Review by Federal Civilian
Courts, Am. Soc'v Irr'L L. INSIGHTs, June 20, 2008, http://www.asil.org/insights0806
20.cfm.
5 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
6 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
7 See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668-71.
8 See id. at 672-74, 680.
9 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 684 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 581, 584, 588 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Coun-
sel, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Authority for Use of Military
Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States (Oct. 23, 2001), availa-
ble at http://wwwjustice.gov/olc/docs/memomilitaryforcecombatus10232001.pdf;
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel
& RobertJ. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Re: The President's Constitutional Authority
18412010]
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The second case, Milligan, held unconstitutional the military
commission trial of an Indiana resident, not enrolled in the Confeder-
ate armed forces, who was accused of plotting in Indiana to attack
federal facilities to steal weapons and liberate Confederate prisoners
of war.10 In a reversal of its posture in the Prize Cases, the Court
rejected the Executive's claim that the laws of war overrode any other-
wise applicable individual constitutional rights and allowed military
jurisdiction over Milligan and his coconspirators. The meaning and
contemporary precedential value of Milligan was extensively debated
in Hamdi."1 Justice Kennedy relied on it in his opinion for the Court
in Boumediene and his important concurrences in Hamdan and
Rasul.'2 Milligan and its sweeping rhetoric-"The Constitution of the
United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at
all times, and under all circumstances"I 3-has been repeatedly
invoked in recent scholarship to show the almost self-evident uncon-
stitutionality of post-9/11 national security policies of the Executive
and Congress. Another Civil War-era legal authority which has
received extensive attention in post-9/11 litigation and scholarship is
the Union Army's codification and applications of the international
laws of war.14
to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them
(Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm.
10 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 118-31.
11 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521-23, 530 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at
566-68, 570-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 584-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769, 794 (2008); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at
645 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
13 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120-21.
14 An authoritative source for the Army's interpretation of the laws of war is the
treatise, first published in 1886, by the assistant judge advocate of the Army, Colonel
William Winthrop, which excerpted and commented on military orders and legal
opinions by the Army's lawyers during the war. See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW
AND PRECEDENTS (Washington, D.C., W.H. Morrison 1886) (two volumes). Winthrop
was cited over thirty times by the Justices in the four post-9/11 war-on-terror cases.
Another important source of the Civil War military's views of the laws of war is the so-
called Lieber Code. Issued in 1863 as General Orders No. 100, this codification of the
laws of war for the Union Army was drafted by Francis Lieber (a Columbia University
professor and influential pro-Union publicist), reviewed by a board of Army officers,
and approved by President Lincoln. See General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter
Lieber Code], reprinted in FRANCIs LIEBER, INSTRUCrIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office
1898), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdf/Instructions-gov-
armies.pdf. The Lieber Code was cited in the two most important opinions in Hamdi,
1842 [VOL. 85:5
THE LAWS OF WAR DURING THE CIVIL WAR
With all this attention to legal precedents from the Civil War, one
might expect that their meaning and significance would by now be
well understood. But the opposite is the case. Contemporary courts
and commentators generally have at best incomplete, and at worst
fundamentally misconceived, views about war powers doctrines of the
Civil War era.
In contrast with the Supreme Court's small output of war-on-ter-
ror decisions, the Court during and after the Civil War decided over
300 cases arising from the war. Each decision was a small part of a vast
and complicated series of legal debates that ended up spanning
decades. Detailed debate about the legality of war measures of the
U.S. government was a daily occurrence in Congress, the administra-
tion, and the press before the Confederates had ever fired on Fort
Sumter. Once Lincoln initiated the Union's military responses in
April 1861, the volume and intensity of debate increased exponen-
tially and lower federal courts became involved. By March 1863, when
the Prize Cases came down, the legality of the blockade had been thor-
oughly mooted for two solid years and upheld in Congress, the lower
federal courts, and the most authoritative northern journals and
papers. By late 1866, when Milligan was decided, questions about the
jurisdiction of military commissions over U.S. citizens had been front-
page news for over five years. Understanding Milligan, the Prize Cases,
and other war powers decisions of that era requires a great deal of
background knowledge about legal and policy debates arising from
the war. They have proved to be quite difficult to understand for
modern readers.
The past is a foreign country, as the saying goes. And the relevant
past, knowledge of which allows one to understand Milligan, the Prize
Cases, and the rest of the Court's corpus of work about the war, is truly
a terra incognita. Both decisions involved the interaction of the inter-
national laws of war, the constitutional rights of individuals, the consti-
tutional war powers of the U.S. government, and the jurisdiction of
federal courts. Conventional understandings today about these legal
regimes and their mutual interactions often bear little relation to the
Civil War generation's.
Today, a judicially enforced Constitution is seen as a kind of uni-
versal providence. The Supreme Court recognized that the 9/11
attacks and Congress's Authorization for the Use of Military Force put
the United States in a state of "war" against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
is discussed frequently in recent legal scholarship, and has been lauded in the popu-
lar press as "Lincoln's laws of war" that "Bush attempted to destroy." John Fabian
Witt, Lincoln's Laws of War, SLATE, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2210918.
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affiliated groups and individuals. 15 In Hamdan, the Court even bound
the U.S. government to comply in this conflict with so-called Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.16 Notwithstanding, the
Supreme Court held that even these military enemies of the United
States-who it had already protected by at least some parts of the
international laws of war-have a U.S. constitutional right to invoke
the habeas jurisdiction of federal courts to challenge the constitution-
ality of their detention or trial by the U.S. military.17 Today the clear
trend in the Court and legal academy is "globalist"-viewing the reach
of the Constitution's protection of individuals as unaffected by geog-
raphy, citizenship, or hostility to the United States'1 and construing
the document as if it were an international human rights instru-
ment.19 The Bush Administration's claims that federal courts lacked
jurisdiction to hear habeas cases filed by noncitizens detained at
Guantanamo Bay as military enemies and that these detainees lacked
constitutional rights because of their presence outside the sovereign
territory of the United States were considered shocking and even "un-
American. "2 0 The very words of condemnation used by critics of these
15 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593, 599 n.31.
16 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629-30. Common Article 3, which provides certain
baseline humanitarian protections in "armed conflict[s] not of an international char-
acter," is "common" to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949. See, e.g., Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135.
17 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 ("We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitu-
tion has full effect at Guantanamo Bay."); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525
(2004) (plurality opinion) ("[Aibsent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains
available to every individual detained within the United States."); Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1942) ("[The Government] insists that petitioners must be denied
access to the courts, both because they are enemy aliens or have entered our territory
as enemy belligerents, and because the President's Proclamation undertakes in terms
to deny such access to the class of persons defined by the Proclamation, which aptly
describes the character and conduct of petitioners. [But] neither the Proclamation
nor the fact that they are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of peti-
tioners' contentions that the Constitution and laws of the United States constitution-
ally enacted forbid their trial by military commission.").
18 SeeJ. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Histoical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95
GEO. L.J. 463, 469 (2007).
19 See Eric Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March ofJudicial Cosmopolitanism,
2008 CATO SUP CT. REV. 23, 33-34.
20 See Countdown with Keith Olberman (MSNBC television broadcastJune 22, 2007)
(statement of Prof. Neal Katyal, Hamdan's attorney), transcript available at http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19415 7 86 ("I mean, the administration's argument is that
Guantanamo is an [sic] legal black hole where they can do whatever they want to
those people. That's a fundamentally reprehensible idea. That's why you know,
1844 (VOL. 85:5
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legal claims-the administration was attempting to construct a "'legal
black hole' "21-suggest the depth of the assumption of access for all
to judicially enforced constitutional rights. Given this modern
assumption, it is natural to read Milligan's grandiose description of a
universal Constitution 22 as confirmation that the Court of the Civil
War era had the same views.
But that would be a mistake. The Civil War Court's true view of
the scope of the Constitution in wartime was much more accurately
described by Charles Sumner, the influential abolitionist and "radical"
U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, than by Milligan's famous rhetoric.
In 1861 and 1862, building on earlier speeches given by his friend and
mentor John Quincy Adams-Adams had explained to startled
southerners how slavery could lawfully be destroyed by Congress's
exercise of belligerent rights during wartime 23-Sumner expounded a
theory about the operation of the Constitution and international law
in times of peace and war on the rights of individuals. According to
Sumner, "[r] ebels in arms are public enemies, who can claim no safe-
guard from the Constitution, and they may be pursued and con-
those noted liberals, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of defense,
Roberto-you know, Robert Gates, are saying, Close Guantanamo now, because that
is really fundamentally un-American to say, These people have no rights whatsoever,
being held at Guantanamo.").
21 Kate Zernike, McCain and Obama Split on justices' Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2008, at A23 (quoting Sen. Barack Obama).
22 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866) ("The Constitution of the
United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers
with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances.").
23 In 1836 Adams spoke in the House of Representatives:
[T]here are two classes of powers vested by the constitution of the United
States in their Congress and executive government: the powers to be exer-
cised in time of peace, and the powers incidental to war . . .. [T]he powers
of peace are limited by provisions within the body of the constitution
itself.... [T]he powers of war are limited and regulated only by the laws and
usages of nations.
J Q. Adams' Speech on the Texan and Indian Wars and Slavery, 6 LIBERATOR (Boston) 97
(1836). The speech was widely reprinted. See, e.g., Speech ofJohn Quincy Adams, NAT'L
ENQUIRER (Phila.), Aug. 3, 1836, at 1. On other occasions, Adams again explained to
his southern colleagues that while in peacetime Congress lacked authority to limit or
abolish slavery in the states, during a foreign invasion, a large-scale slave insurrection,
or a "civil war," the federal government or an invading foreign government could,
under its "war power," and "according to the laws of war," emancipate slaves in certain
circumstances as a war measure. John Quincy Adams, Remarks in the House of Rep-
resentatives (April 14-15, 1842), reprinted in THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY 3, 4 (William
Lloyd Garrison ed., Boston, R.F. Wallcut 1861).
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quered according to the rights of war,"24 that is, the international laws
of war. "[T]he Constitution is made for friends who acknowledge it,
and not for enemies who disavow it; and it is made for a state of a
peace, and not for the fearful exigencies of war," Senator Sumner
explained.25 When Congress and the President invoked their consti-
tutional power to wage war, the U.S. government's actions were, he
said, subject to "no limitation except the rights of war."2 6
Note Sumner's suggestion that the international laws of war in
some way displace constitutional limitations on government power
when applied to wartime enemies. The Court in Milligan seemingly
scoffed at this idea, rejecting the government's assertion that military
jurisdiction was proper under the "laws and usages of war" because
Milligan and his coconspirators had allegedly plotted to attack U.S.
Army facilities in Indiana, a loyal state threatened by Confederate
guerillas from Kentucky and elsewhere and its own home-grown
traitors:
It can serve no useful purpose to inquire what those laws and
usages are, whence they originated, where found, and on whom
they operate; they can never be applied to citizens in states which
have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts
are open and their process unobstructed.27
In this passage Milligan seems to speak just of residents of the loyal
states of the Union having an immunity from being subject to the laws
of war. But the Court elsewhere in Milligan seems eager to emphasize
the Constitution "covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances." 28 And yet I maintain
that the Court's true view in Civil War cases was much closer to Sum-
ner's than what is suggested by these passages in Milligan.
To read Milligan but understand that the Court accepted most of
Sumner requires immersing oneself in the legal and political materi-
als of the Civil War era: congressional debates; legal opinions of exec-
utive officers like the Attorney General and President; contemporary
24 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2964 (1862) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 2189-90.
27 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121.
28 Id. at 120-21 (emphasis added); see also id. at 118-19 ("No graver question was
ever considered by this court, nor one which more nearly concerns the rights of the
whole people; for it is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with
crime, to be tried and punished according to law.... [If the civil laws] are ineffectual,
there is an immunity from punishment, no matter how great an offender the individ-
ual may be, or how much his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of the
country, or endangered its safety." (emphasis added)).
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pamphlets, speeches, and books by academics, politicians, editors, and
other opinion leaders; and the briefs and decisions in the mammoth
number of cases arising from the Civil War that the Supreme Court
decided during the period from the war through the end of the nine-
teenth century. It also requires recovering mostly forgotten
frameworks for deciding, first, how the Constitution, customary inter-
national law, and the larger U.S. legal system interacted and, second,
for whose benefit, and at what times and places, individual rights
under the Constitution were available.
After this Introduction, Part I introduces certain foundational
principles of law that shaped how lawyers of the Civil War generation
understood the novel situations presented by the Great Rebellion.
The Constitution was not the universal providence of the oppressed of
the world that it is imagined to be today. At the Founding and
through the time of the Civil War, the Constitution and laws of the
United States did not provide protections to or create obligations for
most noncitizens, including all who remained outside the country or
who were military enemies of the United States. Only U.S. citizens
and resident or sojourning noncitizens who owed "allegiance" or
"obedience" to the government and its laws were within the "protec-
tion" of the Constitution and other municipal law and could seek to
enforce those rights through the courts. The United States interacted
with foreign nations, nonresident noncitizens, and military enemies
not through domestic legislation and courts, but through the execu-
tive branch conducting policy based on discretion and, where applica-
ble, international law. In peacetime, treaties and the customary law of
nations were applicable sources of international law; during war, a
subset of the law of nations prevailed, namely the laws of war (also
known as the usages of war, belligerent rights, and the like).29
For a U.S. citizen, the protection of the Constitution and other
municipal laws was not permanent, but nearly so. Generally, protec-
tion was understood to continue even when a citizen levied war
against the United States or adhered to its military enemies-even
29 See 2 WINTHROP, supra note 14, at 1 ("By the general term Law of War is
intended those principles and usages which, in time of war, define the rights and
obligations, and regulate the relations, not only of enemies-whether or not in
arms-but also of persons under military government or martial law and persons sim-
ply resident or being upon the theatre of war."); William Whiting, Re-Construction of
the Union: Letter to the Union League of Philadelphia Uuly 23, 1863), in 1 REBEL-
LION RECORD Sure. 739, 742 (Frank Moore ed., New York, G.P. Putnam 1864) (using
"the laws of war" and "the belligerent law of nations" as synonymous terms).
18472010]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
when a citizen committed treason.30 A citizen in arms against his
country could, under this theory, claim a right to be treated not as a
military enemy but as a criminal-to be indicted and tried, if at all,
only in civilian court where he or she would be entitled to all applica-
ble procedural protections of the common law and Constitution. Of
course even citizen-criminals could be pursued with deadly force
when they violently resisted the laws of the United States. But they
would remain subject by default to civilian rather than military juris-
diction, with its requirements of a presumption of innocence and
rules that barred punishment absent a finding of individualized culpa-
bility by the courts. When the Civil War began, it was strongly held in
many quarters that the U.S. government could only respond to it as a
law enforcement matter and that no rebel could be attacked,
detained, or tried without solid reason to believe he was individually
culpable.
Part II examines the legal uncertainty at the beginning of the war
about the legal nature of the secession and insurrection; the legal
rights of the rebels; and the legal powers of the U.S. government to
respond. Was the insurrection crime, war, both, neither? Did seces-
sion create a new and independent nation-the Confederate States of
America (CSA)-or was secession void and of no effect? Were the
rebels in arms citizen-traitors, citizen-enemies, foreign enemies, or
something else entirely? And what of the inhabitants of seceded states
who had not actively participated in rebellion; was the conflict "per-
sonal"-only directed against active rebels-or was it "territorial," akin
to a nation-to-nation conflict in which all the citizens of each contend-
ing party are the enemies of each other? Could the United States
respond to the insurrection as a "belligerent," using the powers of
war; as a "sovereign," using only law enforcement powers; or both?
Or, if secession were a constitutional right, as the rebels claimed,
would any U.S. government response constitute unconstitutional
"coercion"? Who was empowered to decide all of these difficult legal
questions, and under what body of law? All of this was up for grabs in
1861 and 1862. The Supreme Court did not decide a case about any
of these questions until spring 1863, in the Prize Cases.
Parts III and IV show that, contrary to the suggestion in some
modern scholarship, the legal theories concerning the nature of the
conflict and the legal rights of residents of the CSA adopted by the
Executive, congressional leaders, elite northern opinion, and ulti-
mately the Supreme Court (in the Prize Cases and other decisions)
30 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 ("Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies . . . .").
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were not novel,31 strained,32 "frightening,"33 or a "license [for] presi-
dential dictatorship,"34 much less simply wrong.3 5 Nor were the legal
theories adopted somehow sui generis, either to the specific facts of
the Civil War or because they treated international law as crucial to
understanding constitutional war powers.36
In 1864, the Monthly Law Reporter observed that Americans had
never had occasion before this to study the Constitution in the aspect
in which this gigantic rebellion presents it . . . . [W]e now are com-
pelled to read the Constitution anew in the light of this great fact."37
Previously unnoticed and unexamined powers, and previously obscure
legal relationships implicit in the constitutional design, were discov-
ered in the wartime years-but nearly every discovery was decried as
an unconstitutional innovation by some segments of Congress, the
press, the state legislatures, and the courts. Supporters of the war
from across the political spectrum became tired of the constant
refrain that war measures violated the Constitution.38 In 1863, Lin-
coln wrote with much understatement that " the Constitution is not in
its application in all respects the same in cases of rebellion or invasion
involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace and
public security."39 According to Governor Oliver Morton of Indiana,
31 See Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive
Action and judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 53, 77-78, 88
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
32 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1787,
1847 & n.277 (2005).
33 David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (2006).
34 Sanford Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional? Do We!
Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 1145-48.
35 See, e.g., HAROLD HONGju KoH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 85
(1990) (referring to Lincoln's order to blockade Southern ports and apply the inter-
national laws of prize to the conflict with the rebels as one of his "well-chronicled
usurpations of constitutional authority").
36 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 273-75 & n.290 (1985); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DIPLOMAcY 75-76 (1990); Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional
Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 863, 919-20 (2006);
Lee & Ramsey, supra note 31, at 92.
37 The Legal Status of the Rebel States Before and After Their Conquest, 26 MONTHLY L.
REP. 537, 537 (1864).
38 Senator Lyman Trumbull berated some of his colleagues because "in this Sen-
ate, time and again, the Constitution [is] interposed for the protection of armed
rebels," CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d. Sess. 3360 (1862), an absurdity as Trumbull
and many others saw it.
39 Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, to Erastus Corn-
ing and Others (June 12, 1863) [hereinafter Letter from Lincoln to Coming], in 2
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a key Lincoln ally in a state with strong antiwar, Democratic
tendencies:
Some politicians seem to ignore the fact that there is a vast dif-
ference between war and peace, and insist that war shall be carried
on just as we carry on peace. They do not comprehend that war,
from its very nature, involves the exercise of powers, which, in times
of peace, are unnecessary, and are prohibited. . . . War and peace
are antagonistic states, and each has its conditions, privileges, and
immunities, which are antagonistic to those of the other; and while
our Constitution is formed, and provides mainly for peace, yet it
recognizes and provides for the possibilities of war. 40
The Constitution grants Congress and the President very broad-
sounding powers to carry on war and suppress insurrections, 41 but
generally does not specify what, if any, limits exist on their exercise or
when they might be invoked. The task of fleshing out the govern-
ment's approach to the war-the task of reading the Constitution
anew in light of the war-was taken up by leading members of Con-
gress, legal academics, newspaper editors, members of Lincoln's cabi-
net, U.S. Army lawyers, and the President himself. Part IV details how
the theories described by Charles Sumner (and many others) came to
prominence and then ultimate acceptance by the three branches of
government.
The theory that was developed undermined certain older concep-
tions about constitutional protection and allegiance, but was arguably
the only way to reconcile conflicting legal regimes with each other
and with the unprecedented facts of the war. The United States was
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: COMPLETE WoRK 345, 349-50 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds.,
New York, Century Co. 1894).
40 SPEECH OF Gov. OLIVER P. MORTON AT THE UNION STATE CONVENTION HELD AT
INDIANAPOLIS, IND., FEBRUARY 23, 1864, at 14 (1864).
41 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 10-15 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; .. . define and punish ...
Offences against the Law of Nations; . . . declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; . .. raise and
support Armies; ... provide and maintain a Navy; ... make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval forces; [and] provide for calling forth the Mili-
tia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions
. . . ."); id. art. II, §§ 2-3 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States [and] take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . ."); id. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legis-
lature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.").
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clearly engaged in war; the armies assembled were among the most
powerful the world had ever seen. Unless it intended to give in to
secession, the United States would have to exercise the type of
destructive military powers usually reserved for international wars. As
was its right, the United States denied the validity of the rebellion and
asserted that secession had no legal effect. The states were still part of
the Union and residents of the CSA were still U.S. citizens. Obedi-
ence was still owed. The rebellion was, therefore, criminal, and the
overriding war aim was to restore the preexisting constitutional rela-
tions of peacetime and the dominion of the law. The U.S. govern-
ment would-must-exercise war powers, but also civil, law
enforcement powers. It addressed the rebels as a belligerent in war
and as a sovereign seeking submission to law. Rebellion was both war
and crime. The United States would not choose between these legal
frameworks; it would adopt both at once.
Sumner and others articulated a "dual" theory of the conflict and
of the U.S. government's powers: when responding to war-like attacks
by its own citizens, the United States had the discretion to choose how
to respond: either as a "sovereign" or a "belligerent." The "rebels in
arms" were "criminals" because they were committing treason and also
"enemies because their combination has assumed the front and pro-
portions of war."42 The U.S. government, it was argued, may choose
"to proceed against them in either character, according to controlling
considerations of policy." Then here is the rub: "If we treat them as
criminals, then we are under the restraints of the Constitution; if we
treat them as enemies, then we have all the latitude sanctioned by the
rights of war;" indeed, "the rights against enemies, founded on war ...
are absolutely without constitutional limitation." 43 The choice of
means was discretionary; the applicable legal regime flowed from the
choice of means made by the U.S. government.
This has become known as the theory of the "dual status" or
"double character" of the Civil War.44 Most aspects of this theory were
mooted and adopted by lower federal courts in 1861 and 1862, in
cases concerning maritime prizes, habeas corpus petitions, and crimi-
nal prosecutions for treason and piracy. All of this set the stage for
the Supreme Court, in 1863 in the Prize Cases, to validate the dual
status theory of the war.
42 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2189-90 (1862) (statement of Sen.
Sumner).
43 Id. (emphasis omitted).
44 See 1 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 300 (7th ed. 1991);
JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 224 (rev. ed. 1963).
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Part V begins with a close reading of the Prize Cases and explores
aspects of the decision missed when one does not approach it with the
context provided by the dual-status doctrine and related legal and
political concepts. The Part shows that the Court in the Prize Cases
and numerous other decisions adopted the dual-status legal frame-
work enunciated by Sumner and others and applied it to dozens of
different factual and legal situations raised by the Civil War. The Part
ends by reconsidering Milligan.
I. LAW OF THE FOUNDING AND ANTEBELLUM PERIODS
This Part discusses certain foundational principles of law that
shaped how lawyers of the Civil War generation understood the novel
situations presented by the Great Rebellion. A series of interrelated,
constitutive legal frameworks existed since before the Founding, con-
cerning the legal status of aliens, the obligations and benefits of alle-
giance to the U.S. government, the territorial and personal scope of
individual rights against U.S. government power, and the important
conceptual distinctions between domestic and international law and
between civil and war powers.45 The Anglo-American common law
and the law of nations were their primary sources. The U.S. Constitu-
tion recognized these principles and frameworks in its structure and
in certain parts of its text, but for the most part they were implicit and
assumed. "Interpreting the Constitution in light of background prin-
ciples known to the Founders is nothing new."46 In fact, it is quite
common to interpret constitutional principles as partial incorpora-
tions of "aspects of the common law or law of nations."47
At the Founding and in the antebellum era, the U.S. Constitution
was emphatically not the universal providence of the oppressed of the
world that it is imagined to be today. The globalist vision seen in
Boumediene and the writings of many influential legal scholars today48
is deeply inconsistent with the way the Constitution was understood in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Constitutions, including
the U.S. Constitution, were "municipal"-domestic-law, and as such
did not provide protection to military enemies and most noncitizens,
45 Kent, supra note 18, at 486.
46 Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 58 (2009).
47 Id. (providing examples). For other examples, see AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 121, 329-33 (2005), using the common law to understand
provisions of the U.S. Constitution; MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION's TEXT IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRs 223-28, 346-55 (2007), using the law of nations to understand provi-
sions of the U.S. Constitution.
48 See Kent, supra note 18, at 463, 481-85.
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including all who remained outside the country.49 One of the most
important constitutional questions of the Civil War was how the CSA
and its residents fit into these frameworks. The CSA thrust off alle-
giance to the United States, claimed to have become a foreign nation,
and treated residents of the loyal states as enemy aliens who were
wholly outside the protection of the law. The U.S. government did
not concede the independence of the CSA, of course, but was at war
with it; and, in handling the terrifyingly violent consequences of the
South's repudiation of allegiance, the U.S. government needed to
determine whether or when residents of the CSA might still be U.S.
citizens within the protection of the Constitution, laws, and courts of
the United States. The Union's legal theories are discussed in Part IV,
below. This Part sets out the antebellum framework within which law-
yers and other citizens of the Civil War era understood the legal ques-
tions and worked out their theories.
A. Allegiance and Protection
Only U.S. citizens and friendly aliens residing or traveling within
the United States were under the "protection" of the municipal-that
is, domestic-laws of the United States.50 The class of people pro-
tected by the Constitution and other municipal law was limited to
those who owed allegiance or obedience to the U.S. government.
Only persons within protection because of their allegiance had stand-
ing to invoke the protection of the courts; were shielded by rights
under the domestic constitution and laws; and were entitled to call
upon the government for physical protection from harm, for example
when traveling abroad.51 And only persons within allegiance and pro-
tection were liable to punishment under a nation's domestic criminal
laws.5 2 Allegiance and protection were therefore said to be recipro-
cal.5 3 Professor Hamburger has recently demonstrated that this
49 See, e.g., ALEXANDER ADDISON, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
THE VIRGINIA ASSEMBLY (1800), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING
THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1805, at 1055, 1070 (Charles S. Hynemen & Donald S. Lutz
eds., 1983) ("The restrictions of the [U.S.] constitution are not restrictions of exter-
nal and national right, but of internal and municipal right.").
50 See Kent, supra note 18, at 486. Municipal law-also known as the law of the
land-included the Constitution, most statutes of Congress, state constitutions and
statutes, and the common law.
51 See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1826-29,
1833-40 (2009).
52 See id. at 1838-39.
53 See, e.g., Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293, 325 (1863) ("The Government owes the
duty of protection to the people in the enjoyment of their rights, and the people owe
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framework, derived from English common law and the law of nations,
was understood in the United States to be one of the conceptual foun-
dations upon which the U.S. and state constitutions were adopted dur-
ing the Founding period.5 4
U.S. citizenship was what paradigmatically carried with it alle-
giance and protection. But an alien from a friendly nation could,
when visiting or residing within the United States, be bound to a "tem-
porary allegiance" and therefore entitled to temporary protection of
the Constitution and laws. 55 Besides U.S. citizens and friendly aliens
in the United States under temporary allegiance, all other people
were not under the protection of the municipal laws, including the
U.S. Constitution's protections of individual rights.5 6 So an alien
outside the United States; an alien whose home country was at war
with the United States, regardless of the individual's physical location;
and, again regardless of the individual's physical location, an alien
whose home country was not at war with the United States but who
had, by his individual conduct, showed himself to be hostile to the
United States, had no protection of the laws or access to the courts.57
the correlative duty of obedience and support to the Government. The one is depen-
dent upon the other."); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 93 (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin 2d ed. 1829) (noting "the
reciprocal compact of allegiance and protection"). For a full discussion, see
Hamburger, supra note 51, at 1834-46.
54 See Hamburger, supra note 51, at 1844-47, 1976. The foundational nature of
these principles is seen in the legal decisions and discussions of the Civil War era,
discussed in Parts IV and V below, where they continue to be used to determine who
has rights under the U.S. Constitution.
55 See id. at 1898-1901. Consistent with this, friendly aliens in the United States
who owed temporary allegiance had access to the protective writ of habeas corpus and
other individual constitutional rights, so long as they remained in the United States.
See id. at 1888; Kent, supra note 18, at 486.
56 See Kent, supra note 18, at 486.
57 See, e.g., Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385, 399 (1863) ("The restrictions
in the constitution upon the powers of the government were designed to protect the
people of the United States, and not aliens resident abroad. The protection received
by aliens, residing abroad, with reference to their property here, is due to interna-
tional comity, and not to the constitution of the United States."); 33 ANNALS OF CONG.
1042 (1819) (statement of Rep. Baldwin) (referring to British subjects executed by
General Andrew Jackson during a U.S. military raid into Spanish-owned Florida and
rejecting the claim that "the Constitution and laws of the country" had been violated
because "neither have any bearing on the case of these men. They were found and
executed outside of the territorial limits of the United States, where our laws or Con-
stitution have no operation, except as between us and our own citizens, and where
none other could claim their benefit and protection."); id. at 1044 (statement of Rep.
Baldwin) ("[Jackson] has violated no Constitutional provision. It was not made to
protect such men; they are no parties to it; owe it no obedience; and can claim no
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The United States treated them based on the standards of interna-
tional law-the customary law of nations and treaties during peace-
time and, in wartime, a subset of the law of nations, variously known as
the laws of war, the usages of war, belligerent rights, and the like.5 8
B. Municipal and International Law
Generally speaking, the national government was understood to
exercise two basic types of power or jurisdiction: (1) domestic or
municipal, and (2) external or extraterritorial, also referred to as
"national" or "international." To simplify for the sake of clarity,
domestic affairs were governed by domestic law and international
affairs, insofar as they were governed by law rather than policy, were
governed by international law.59 A sharp distinction between the law
governing foreign affairs and domestic affairs appears to have been
common ground among American courts, political officials, and com-
mentators.60 A nation's domestic, legislative regulatory power was
understood to be territorially limited; for most purposes, its power
and obligation stopped at the international border.6 1 Within its terri-
tory, the national legislature established civil government to regulate
the peacetime affairs of its citizens. A core tenet of the theory of
republican government was that the rights and duties during peace of
U.S. citizens in the United States could only be regulated by the
national government through preexisting legislation of Congress.
protection from it."); id. at 693 (statement of Rep. Smyth) (discussing the same inci-
dent and contending that the Constitution and laws of the United States "were
formed for the people of the United States. They have no force in Florida [then
Spanish territory]. . . . Nor do those laws protect enemies in time of war."). After
serving in the House, Henry Baldwin was appointed by President Jackson to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
58 See Kent, supra note 18, at 486.
59 See id. at 499-501. Note that the federal government could control the domes-
tic effects of international law and relations with foreign nations and people through
mechanisms such as legislation and judicial proceedings. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 8, cls. 10-11; id. art III, § 2. On the federal government's control over the domestic
effects of international law, see generally Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated
Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEx. L. REV. 843,
930-38 (2007).
60 See Kent, supra note 18, at 499-501.
61 See id. at 491. This was a function of the law of nations and international com-
ity, as well as other factors. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825)
("No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect
equality of nations.... It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose
a rule on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate on itself
alone.").
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Neither unbridled executive discretion nor bare judicial lawmaking
(over crimes) was constitutionally permissible.
In the international realm, these concepts were reversed. Legisla-
tion and other municipal laws could not bind foreign countries and
foreigners outside the United States. The executive branch had pri
macy in this international state of nature62 and conducted foreign
relations guided principally by discretion and international law.63
The customary law of nations and laws of war gave substantial flexibil-
ity to the Executive because the substantive rules were so much more
permissive than they are today.64
C. War and the Alien
While lawfully domiciled or peaceably passing through the
United States during peacetime, an alien was generally deemed to owe
"temporary allegiance" to the government and therefore was under
the temporary protection of that sovereign's constitution and laws. 65
This understanding was deeply rooted in American fundamental law
well before the Founding era,6 6 and continued to be through the
nineteenth century.67 The temporary allegiance-and therefore the
62 See Kent, supra note 59, at 887-89 (describing how the international system
and man's state of nature, as described by Locke and others, were analogized).
63 Congress could, of course, restrict by legislation many foreign affairs activities
of the Executive. Congress has the authority to declare war, raise and maintain
armies and navies, authorize letters of marque and reprisal, regulate captures on land
and water, make rules for the government of the armed forces, regulate foreign com-
merce, and the like.
64 On the permissive view of the law of nations towards war, including the view
that self-defense power is essentially unlimited and offensive war a legitimate instru-
ment of statecraft, see Kent, supra note 59, at 886-91.
65 See Hamburger, supra note 51, at 1847 ("Not only did all citizens have a right to
protection, but also, if foreigners came to the country in a manner that created a
presumption of allegiance to the government and its law, they too had a right to
protection. Other foreigners, however, even if visiting, had no right to protection.");
Kent, supra note 18, at 503 (describing how, during the American Founding period,
friendly alien residents or visitors were generally understood to be "under the protec-
tion of the sovereign's municipal laws so long as they are within the country").
66 See Hamburger, supra note 51, at 1898-1901; Kent, supra note 18, at 486,
502-04.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1898) ("Chinese
persons, born out of the United States, remaining subjects of the emperor of China,
and not having become citizens of the United States, are entitled to the protection of
and owe allegiance to the United States, so long as they are permitted by the United
States to reside here; and are 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' in the same sense as
all other aliens residing in the United States."); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228, 242 (1896) (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The term 'per-
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protection too-ended when the alien left the country. Another way
of saying the same thing is that aliens outside the United States had
no rights under the U.S. Constitution.6 8
If an alien's home country went to war with the United States, the
alien became an "enemy alien" to the United States and hence out of
the protection of the laws. 6 9 This operated by legal presumption. An
alien temporarily within protection and owing allegiance to the gov-
ernment of the United States because of nonhostile, prewar presence
here, was presumed to owe an overriding allegiance to his or her
home country and therefore was, as against the United States, pre-
sumed during war to be an enemy "in law" or enemy "by law" simply
by virtue of citizenship. And afortiori, aliens outside the United States
were also presumed to be alien enemies. Whether inside or outside
the United States, an alien presumed by law to be an enemy who actu-
ally engaging in hostile actions against the United States was also an
enemy "in fact." And whether aliens "were presumptively or actually
in hostility, their enemy status left them without any right to protec-
tion, including the protection of the laws," such as the U.S. and state
constitutions.7 0 The rule that an alien enemy had no standing in
son,' used in the Fifth Amendment, is broad enough to include any and every human
being within the jurisdiction of the republic. A resident, alien born, is entitled to the
same protection under the laws that a citizen is entitled to. He owes obedience to the
laws of the country in which he is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled to
the equal protection of those laws."); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
724 (1893) ("Chinese laborers, therefore, like all other aliens residing in the United
States for a shorter or longer time, are entitled, so long as they are permitted by the
government of the United States to remain in the country, to the safeguards of the
constitution, and to the protection of the laws, in regard to their rights of person and
of property, and to their civil and criminal responsibility."); Carlisle v. United States,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 153-54 (1872) ("All strangers are under the protection of the
sovereign while they are within his territories, and owe a temporary allegiance in
return for that protection."); 1 WILLIAM CHARLES WHITE, A COMPENDIUM AND DIGEST
OF THE LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 78 (Boston, Munroe, Francis & Parker 1809) ("Alle-
giance and protection are correlatives; Inasmuch, therefore, as an alien owes only a
local and temporary here, the law gives both his person and property a protection,
only commensurate with that allegiance.").
68 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370 ("[A]s the prince affords
his protection to an alien, only during his residence in this realm, the allegiance of an
alien is confined, in point of time, to the duration of such his residence, and, in point
of locality, to the dominions of the British empire."). See generally Kent, supra note 18,
at 486 (discussing the distinction between resident and nonresident aliens).
69 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Brock, 11 Mass. (10 Tyng) 119, 122 (1814) ("An enemy
to our sovereign shall not have the use or advantage of his laws.").
70 Hamburger, supra note 51, at 1864; see also ADDISON, supra note 49, at 1071
("[A]1ien enemies have no rights."); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 68, at *372-73
("[A]lien enemies have no rights, no privileges, unless by the king's special favor,
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court during wartime was frequently reiterated by American courts71
and the most influential antebellum treatise writers.72 Lacking both
during the time of war."). It was possible for nonhostile alien enemies to receive the
permission of the government to enter or remain here during a war, and if granted,
this license excepted the alien enemy from most of these harsh rules and instead put
him or her under the protection of the local laws and he or she owed temporary
allegiance. See, e.g., Crawford v. The William Penn, 6 F. Cas. 778, 779 (C.C.D.NJ.
1815) (No. 3372) ("The general rule of the common law of England is, that an alien
enemy cannot maintain an action in the courts of that country, during the war, in his
own name. . . . This rule appears to be inflexible, except where the alien enemy is
under the protection of the king; as where he comes into the kingdom after the war,
by license of the sovereign; or being there at the time of the war, is permitted to
continue his domicil."). For noncombatant or otherwise unthreatening enemy aliens,
the implicit permission of the government to remain in the country and exercise
municipal rights was often assumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. The
President's failure to exercise his power granted by the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, ch.
66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577, 577, to detain and deport any alien enemy, appears to have been
assumed to be implicit permission to remain. See Kent, supra note 18, at 530-31.
71 See, e.g., The Adventure, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 221, 228 (1814) (indicating that
British subjects cannot make a claim in a U.S. prize court during the war between the
United States and Great Britain); Johnson v. Thirteen Bales, 13 F. Cas. 836, 838
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1814) (No. 7415) (applying the following common law rule to bar British
alien enemies from making a claim in prize court: "This claim to the protection of our
courts does not apply to those aliens who adhere to the king's enemies. They seem
upon every principle to be incapacitated from suing either at law or in equity. The
disability to sue is personal. It takes away from the king's enemies the benefit of his
courts, whether for the purpose of immediate relief, or to give assistance in obtaining
that relief elsewhere."); Ex parte Newman, 18 F. Cas. 96, 96 (Story, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 10,174) ("[A]n alien enemy ... has no legal standing in
court to acquire even inchoate rights."); Levine v. Taylor, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 8, 9
(1815) ("That the plaintiff is an alien enemy may be pleaded in disability of his per-
son. As long as the war continues, he cannot maintain any action in our courts.");
Cruden's Ex'r v. Neale, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 338 (1796) (holding that alien enemies are
excluded from our courts ofjustice during the hostilities); Wilcox v. Henry, 1 Dall. 69,
71 (Pa. 1782) ("An alien enemy has no right of action whatever during the war.");
Wall v. Robson, 11. S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 498, 502 (Const. Ct. App. 1820) ("[I]n
time of war no action can be maintained by an alien enemy . . . .").
72 See 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 68 (New York, 0. Halsted
2d ed. 1832) (noting the doctrine that an enemy lacks persona standi in judicio);
THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 116 (Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T. John-
son 2d ed. 1830) ("[A]n alien enemy cannot sustain a suit in the courts of the United
States."); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQurn' PLEADINGS § 51, at 52 (Boston, Lit-
tie, Brown & Co. 10th rev. & corrected ed. 1892) ("An alien friend has a right to sue
in any court; an alien enemy is incapable of suing while he remains an enemy, at least
unless under very special circumstances."); HENRY WHEATON, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF
MARITIME CAPTURES AND PRIzES 211 (New York, R. M'Dermut & D.D. Arden 1815)
(stating that an alien enemy is "totally ex lex" and lacks "persona standi injudicio" even
in courts applying the law of nations, unless granted a specific exception by the
government).
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standing and any enforceable rights, an alien enemy could not seek a
writ of habeas corpus.73 A fortiori, the same was true for an alien who
was in fact hostile, such as a combatant in the foreign nation's mili-
tary-when captured, a prisoner of war.74 Prisoners of war had "no
municipal rights" that courts or other branches of government in the
United States would recognize.75
Because the obligations and benefits of the law were reciprocal,
certain privileges and exemptions did flow to aliens, even enemy
aliens, who were not under temporary allegiance and protection.
Being outside protection of the laws meant also that the alien was "not
accountable at law."76 They could not sue to contest their treatment
or otherwise protect themselves with law, but also could not be crimi-
nally prosecuted under this country's domestic criminal laws for war-
time conduct.77
73 See Hamburger, supra note 51, at 1864, 1893; Kent, supra note 18, at 527-30.
74 See Hamburger, supra note 51, at 1888 ("[H]abeas was not available to aliens
outside allegiance and protection and, indeed, could never be given to some of them,
notably prisoners of war, whose status was incompatible with allegiance. They did not
owe allegiance and therefore did not have the protection of the law."). See generally
Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 947 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) ("The courts of
England . . . will not even grant a habeas corpus in the case of a prisoner of war,
because the decision on this question is in another place, being part of the rights of
sovereignty. Although our judiciary is somewhat differently arranged, I see not, in
this respect, that they should not be equally cautious."); GEORGE HANSARD, A TREATISE
ON THE LAw RELATING To ALIENS, AND DENIZATION AND NATURALIZATION 101 (London,
V. & R. Stevens & G.S. Norton 1844) ("[A]n alien enemy while prisoner of war is not
entitled under any circumstances to be discharged upon a habeas corpus; and he
cannot maintain any action at all."); SERGEANT, supra note 72, at 285 ("Prisoners of
war ... are not entitled to the privilege of a writ of habeas corpus . . . .").
75 Lockington's Case, Bright (N.P.) 269 (Pa. 1813), in 5 Am. L.J. 92, 97 (1814)
(holding that enemy alien merchant was entitled to habeas corpus review of his deten-
tion, but noting that a prisoner of war would not be entitled to use habeas because
they have "no municipal rights to expect from us"), aff'd Lockington v. Smith, 15 F.
Cas. 758 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 8448), in 5 AM. L.J. 301 (1814). The reciprocal treat-
ment and exchange of prisoners of war were frequently the subjects of negotiation by
high diplomatic or military officials of the United States and the foreign enemy gov-
ernment. It was unthinkable that courts would have jurisdiction to determine the
legality of their detention, conditions of confinement, or the like.
76 Hamburger, supra note 51, at 1861.
77 Id.; cf Holland v. Pack, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 151, 153 (1823) (describing Indians of
a tribe at war who were prisoners of war and treated "not as offenders against the laws
of this state or of the United States"); RAWLE, supra note 53, at 141 ("The citizen who
unites himself with a hostile nation, waging war against his country, is guilty of a crime
of which the foreign army is innocent; with him, it is treason, with his associates it is,
in the code of nations, legitimate warfare.").
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Military actions such as killing and destruction of property, com-
mitted by soldiers duly enrolled in a government's military service,
were protected by the combatant's privilege, unless those actions vio-
lated the laws of war.78 But an alien combatant who was not attached
to a sovereign's military or who waged war in an unlawful manner
(such as by intentionally attacking civilians) had no protection from
punishment under domestic criminal law or the international laws of
war.
D. The Antebellum Law of Treason and Rebellion
Under general principles of Anglo-American law in the Founding
and antebellum periods, a citizen could not be deemed out of protec-
tion of the laws even when committing an egregious breach of alle-
giance such as adhering to the United States's military enemies or
levying war against the United States. The traditional rule was that
such an individual was subject to criminal prosecution for treason or
lesser crimes-and when prosecuted was entitled to all concomitant
procedural and substantive rights under the constitution or laws 7 9-
but could not be subject to military detention or trial. A citizen could
78 Enemy aliens lawfully enrolled in their home country's military, and who
waged war lawfully, were when captured subject to only nonpunitive detention as pris-
oners of war and protected by the combatant's privilege from being criminally
charged for any ordinary and lawful acts of warfare. The term "combatant's privilege"
(or synonymous terms like "belligerent's privilege") refers to the right of lawfully
enrolled military combatants to kill or commit other harmful acts against the enemy
in war which, if committed in peacetime or by a person not enrolled in the armed
forces, would constitute municipal crimes like murder or arson. This customary rule
was codified for the Union Army during the Civil War in the Lieber Code: "So soon
as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier's oath of fidelity,
he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual
crimes or offenses." See Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 57; see also id. art. 82 ("Men,
or squads of men, who commit hostilities ... without commission, without being part
and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the
war . . . are not public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the
privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or
pirates."). Lieber's codification of the combatant's privilege is still today cited as a
basis for the same rule in the modern laws of war. See, e.g., GARY D. SOLls, THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 42 (2010).
79 The U.S. Constitution, for example, imposes procedural protections, height-
ened proof requirements and limits on punishment in treason cases, see U.S. CONsT.
art. III, § 3, and generally provides many criminal procedural protections, see, e.g., id.
art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (petitjury); id. amend. V (grand jury, due process, no double jeop-
ardy, privilege against self-incrimination).
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be a "traitor" but could not be an "enemy," that is, someone out of the
protection of the law.80
This protection of the law was not all positive for the traitorous
citizen: a traitor levying war against the United States ran the risk that
the United States would not treat him as a lawful belligerent, meaning
that he would lack the combatant's privilege for acts of violence dur-
ing combat and, when captured, would not be entitled to be treated as
a prisoner of war. Moreover, citizens owing allegiance who engaged
in insurrection or war against the United States could be opposed by
military force, if necessary. No one had a constitutional immunity
from the U.S. government fighting fire with fire.8 '
II. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY AT THE OUTSET OF THE CIVIL WAR
Even before the Civil War began, legal debates had erupted about
the constitutionality of secession, the status of seceded states and the
80 A few state court cases arising from the War of 1812 against Great Britain help
illuminate these antebellum understandings. The cases involved U.S. citizens, not
enrolled in the armed forces of any nation, who were arrested by the U.S. military in
the United States on charges of spying or otherwise aiding British forces. See Smith v.
Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815); In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1813). For analysis of the current relevance of these cases, see Larson, supra note 36,
at 884-85; Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants":
Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1567 (2004). Under
U.S. and international law, the British were enemies of the United States, see Act of
June 18, 1812, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755, and U.S. citizens' actions were certainly forms of
providing aid or comfort to them. In other words, their alleged conduct was cogniza-
ble as treason in domestic U.S. courts. In each case, the New York state court held
that the detention by the military was illegal. As is often the case with premodern
judicial decisions, the exact basis of the holdings is somewhat unclear. A statute of
Congress allowing military trial for alleged spies was, at that time, limited in applica-
tion to noncitizens, so by inference military trial of the U.S. citizen detainees was
banned by Congress. See Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, § 2, 2 Stat. 359, 371. It (also)
appears that both courts held or assumed that some other form of law, perhaps the
Constitution or the common law, did not allow citizens-who were presumptively in
allegiance and under the protection of the United States and its laws-to be tried for
treason by the military. See Wuerth, supra, at 1580-83.
81 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 45 (1849) ("[U]nquestionably, a
State may use its military power to put down an armed insurrection, too strong to be
controlled by the civil authority. The power is essential to the existence of every gov-
ernment, essential to the preservation of order and free institutions . . . . The State
itself must determine what degree of force the crisis demands. And if the government
of Rhode Island deemed the armed opposition so formidable, and so ramified
throughout the State, as to require the use of its military force and the declaration of
martial law, we see no ground upon which this court can question its authority. It was
a state of war; and the established government resorted to the rights and usages of war
to maintain itself, and to overcome the unlawful opposition.").
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remainder of the Union, and the constitutional power of the national
government to oppose secession. Abraham Lincoln was elected Presi-
dent in November 1860, but the lame-duck James Buchanan would
serve until early March. In November, South Carolina and Georgia
began taking steps to secede and raise military forces.82 Buchanan's
Attorney General, Jeremiah Black, delivered a formal legal opinion
that secession was unconstitutional and limited military force could be
used in aid of the criminal justice authorities if federal property or
personnel were threatened or laws defied.83 Black concluded, how-
ever, that if federal courts closed and executive officers resigned, leav-
ing no criminal processes to be aided by the use of troops, any further
military activity ordered by the President or Congress would be
"wholly illegal" and "simply making war" upon the seceded states and
their people. 84 These "hostilities carried on by the Central Govern-
ment" against a seceded state "would be ipso facto an expulsion of such
State from the Union," and because it treated the state "as an alien
and an enemy, she would be compelled to act accordingly." 5 Under
this perverse rule, the national government must concede defeat and
independence to rebelling states-precisely what they wanted-the
instant the rebellion gathered enough force to shut down federal
courts and offices.
In December 1860, South Carolina declared it had seceded from
the Union and sent troops to seize federal property. That same
month, federal judges and other officials began to resign their offices
and Georgia called for a convention to form a new nation from the
southern states.86 Buchanan essentially did nothing. By the begin-
ning of February, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana,
and Texas had also seceded and their governments raised indepen-
dent military forces and seized federal arsenals, forts, post offices, ves-
sels, and other property.87 That month saw the creation of the
Confederate States of America (CSA); the convocation of the Con-
gress of the CSA; and the election of Jefferson Davis of Mississippi as
the provisional president. 8 "Our separation from the old union is
82 See E.B. LONG & BARBARA LONG, THE CIVIL WAR DAY By DAY 12-13, 17 (1971).
83 See Power of the President in Executing the Laws, 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 516, 518,
520-22 (1860).
84 See id. at 522-23.
85 See id. at 525.
86 See LONG & LONG, supra note 82, at 11-17.
87 See id. at 11-30; see also, e.g., General Political Intelligence, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23,
1861, at 2 (reporting the seizure of the federal arsenal at Little Rock, Arkansas, by
soldiers acting under orders from the governor).
88 LONG & LONG, supra note 82, at 31-33.
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complete," Davis said, and any force which attempted to oppose inde-
pendence would "smell Southern powder, feel Southern steel."89
Before Lincoln was inaugurated on March 4, the CSA had military
officials on the ground in South Carolina directing preparations to
attack the lone federal outpost there, Fort Sumter.90 The Confeder-
ates bombarded Fort Sumter on April 12, and it surrendered the next
day.91
A. Was the Insurrection Crime, War, or Both?
Aroused by the attack, popular opinion in the North supported
military measures to reestablish the Union. But many people who
rejected Black's vision of a helpless federal government nevertheless
thought that the legal framework concerning allegiance, protection,
and treason required that the insurrection be treated as a purely
domestic affair to be handled by limited military force in aid of law
enforcement, governed by "municipal" laws and rules including indi-
vidual rights provisions of the Constitution.
Lincoln, of course, rejected the constitutionality of secession and
believed he had the authority and duty to use force to restore the
Union. In a proclamation on April 15, responding to Fort Sumter, he
described an obstruction of the laws in certain southern states by pri-
vate criminal conspiracies that exceeded the power of the criminal
justice system to handle.92 He announced that the militia and regular
military units would enforce the laws of the United States; appealed to
"all loyal citizens" in all parts of the country to assist in restoring the
rule of law; and promised to protect the persons and property of
"peaceful citizens in any part of the country."93 But this policy embod-
ied in the proclamation-to assert continued sovereignty over all of
89 Important from Montgomery; Speech of Hon. Jefferson Davis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1861, at 8. Having cut itself free from the "dead body" of the North, Davis said, the
South would make its independence recognized "by treaty or arms." General Political
Intelligence, supra note 87.
90 Just after Lincoln's inauguration, the Congress of the CSA approved legislation
for "the establishment and organization of the army of the Confederate States." See
Congress of the C.S.A., N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 15, 1861, at 1.
91 LONG & LONG, supra note 82, at 56-57.
92 See Proclamation No. 3, 12 Stat. app. 1258, 1258 (Apr. 15, 1861) (stating that
the laws of the United States "are opposed" in seven states "by combinations too pow-
erful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the pow-
ers vested in the Marshals by law").
93 Id.
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the states, refuse to recognize their secession, and to enforce criminal
laws by means of military force-contained the seeds of expansion.94
Four days later, on April 19, Lincoln inaugurated a more aggres-
sive strategy. In the interim, Jefferson Davis had declared that he
would issue letters of marque to allow seizure of enemy (northern)
shipping.95 Rebels attacked federal facilities in Virginia, Arkansas,
and elsewhere, and large-scale prosecession violence was breaking out
in Baltimore.96 Lincoln's April 19 proclamation still described the
problem facing the federal government as the obstruction of civil law,
but this time named it "an insurrection" and indicated that this insur-
rection was coherent and organized, not the work of unaffiliated
bands of outlaws.97 The President stated that he pursued "the same
purposes before mentioned," including the restoration of civil law and
protection of "the lives and property of quiet and orderly citizens."98
But this seemed not precisely true. For Lincoln now announced a
blockade of the ports of seven states in insurrection, to be enforced by
the U.S. Navy against domestic and foreign vessels, 99 and stated that
his legal authority derived from both "the laws of the United States
and the law of nations."100 The Supreme Court would later suggest
that by this blockade proclamation the President's view of the conflict
94 Jefferson Davis soon referred to Lincoln's proclamation as a "declaration of
war" because it denied the legality of the CSA. See LONG & LONG, supra note 82, at 67.
95 Id. at 60-61.
96 Id. at 61-62.
97 See Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. app. 1258, 1258-59 (Apr. 19, 1861) (stating
that "a combination of persons engaged in such insurrection" were taking illegal
action "under the pretended authority" of certain named "States").
98 Id. at 1259.
99 Lee and Ramsey explain:
"Blockade" in the nineteenth century was a term of art under the interna-
tional laws of war. . . . It encompassed the use of armed force to interdict
seaborne passage to and from the ports and coasts belonging to . . . the
enemy. The naval forces enforcing a valid blockade had the right to stop
and search all ships, whether friendly, enemy or neutral, bound for, or
departing from, the enemy's ports or coastline. They could capture vessels
and cargoes they identified as "contraband of war," that is, susceptible of
military use. They could also capture any vessels and cargoes that attempted
to run the blockade, regardless of whether they were contraband.
Lee & Ramsey, supra note 31, at 60.
100 Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. app. at 1259; see also Proclamation No. 5, 12 Stat.
app. 1259 (Apr. 27, 1861) (expanding the blockade to cover Virginia and North Caro-
lina). At the time of the Civil War, "it was generally accepted that a blockade could
only be asserted in a state of war because it meant the use of coercive force to deny
both the enemy and neutral nations the peacetime right of free commercial inter-
course." Lee & Ramsey, supra note 31, at 60.
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had shifted from seeing it as "personal" (against individual rebels) to
"territorial" (against the CSA and its component states and people)
and his response had shifted from law enforcement (governed by
municipal law) to a policy of "war" (governed by international law).
There was no clear demarcation noticeable at the time. The Pres-
ident and Congress, when it reconvened in July, pursued policies of
war and law enforcement simultaneously. Some war policies treated
all residents of the CSA as enemies, merely because of their residence,
while others used war powers only against culpable individuals. The
dual nature of the government's approach to the conflict flowed natu-
rally from the fact that it was a civil war. The preexisting relationship
of protection and obedience that a legitimate government has with
rebels in a civil war is, of course, entirely absent in a foreign war. As a
result, war aims are different in civil and foreign wars. Both Lincoln
and Congress agreed from the outset that the purpose of the war was
to reestablish the status quo ante, that is, a peaceful Union with civil
laws obeyed and enforced by civil means and the constitutional rights
of all citizens respected.10 1 Acts of rebellion inevitably constitute vio-
lations of criminal laws. The legitimate government understandably
wants to both deny the independence of the rebelling districts and
use all means at its disposal to end the revolt, and therefore employs
the tools of law enforcement. But because of the vast scope of the
rebellion, it could not be put down without war, and war by its nature
harms both the guilty and the innocent.
So while Congress enacted new criminal statutes to more effectu-
ally punish culpable individuals,10 2 it also authorized or endorsed
actions against the people of the CSA as a whole, such as the Presi-
dent's policy of waging commercial war against the entire Confeder-
acy by blockade. Congress authorized the President to proclaim states
or parts of them to be in insurrection, thereby making illegal all com-
101 See An Act to Increase the Present Military Establishment of the United States,
ch. 24, § 6, 12 Stat. 279, 281 (1861) (suggesting a purpose to bring the revolted states
and people back into the Union and reestablish the temporarily displaced "constitu-
tional authority of the Government of the United States"); An Act to Provide for the
Suppression of the Rebellion Against and Resistance to the Laws of the United States,
ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281, 281 (1861) (suggesting that until the laws of the United States
could be enforced again "by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings," the Presi-
dent would be authorized to use military means against the rebels); An Act to Provide
for the Payment of the Militia and Volunteers Called into the Service of the United
States, ch. 2, 12 Stat. 255 (1861) (approving Lincoln's calls for militia and regular
troops); see also Proclamation No. 3, 12 Stat. app. at 1258 (announcing that the new
troops would be used "to cause the laws to be duly executed").
102 See, e.g., Act of July 31, 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284 (punishing individuals who
conspired to overthrow the U.S. government).
2010] 1865
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
mercial dealings between them and residents in loyal states, upon his
finding that the "insurgents claim to act under the authority of any
State or States, and such claim is not disclaimed or repudiated by the
persons exercising the functions of government in such State or States
... nor such insurrection suppressed by said State or States."' 0 3 The
President soon issued such a proclamation. Having established the
complicity of the state governments in the insurrection, 04 the entire
population of the insurgent states became "enemies" of the United
States, though they still were U.S. citizens. By this new statute, the
President's proclamation pursuant to it, and his previous blockade
proclamation, which had invoked powers available in international
wars under the laws of war, the vessels and cargoes of any resident of
the insurgent states could be seized on the high seas and forfeited to
the United States. 0 5
At the same time that the war was tending toward a territorially
defined struggle between the populations of each section of the coun-
try, the President took actions which treated as military enemies cer-
tain people in loyal northern states. In late April, Lincoln famously
authorized his General-in-Chief to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
in Maryland, a Union state, because both unorganized mobs and
organized bands of armed men were attacking federal troops and
property and threatening to cut off Washington, D.C. from the rest of
the North. 0 6 Even when the arrestees had apparently acted as part of
organized military units, the military arrests were enormously contro-
103 Act of July 13, 1861, ch. 3, § 5, 12 Stat. 255, 257.
104 As early as his April 19 and April 27 proclamations on the blockade, Lincoln
had noted the potential complicity of state governments, referring to crimes commit-
ted "under the pretended authority" of certain named "States" (April 19) and "by
persons claiming to act under authorities of the States of Virginia and North Caro-
lina" (April 27). See Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. app. 1258; Proclamation No. 5, 12
Stat. app. 1259. In hisJuly 4 address, Lincoln referred to the CSA as an "illegal organ-
ization" which had initiated a "war" against the United States. Abraham Lincoln, Mes-
sage to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861) [hereinafter Lincoln, Message to
Congress], in 2 ABRAHAM LINCoLN: COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 39, at 55, 55.
105 But still some war measures proceeded on the basis of individual culpability
rather than collective association by residence in seceded states. The Confiscation Act
of August 1861 (First Confiscation Act) directed the President to seize or capture as
prize the real and personal property of rebels wherever found; but whereas the block-
ade proclamation made enemies out of every resident of the CSA no matter the per-
son's individual conduct or loyalty, the Confiscation Act required a showing that the
property was knowingly or intentionally used to aid insurrection. See An Act to Confis-
cate Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes, ch. 60, § 1, 12 Stat. 319, 319 (1861).
106 See Order from President Abraham Lincoln to Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott (Apr.
25, 1861), in 2 AsRuHAM LINCOLN: COMPLETE WORKs, supra note 39, at 38, 38
(directing the general to prevent the government of Maryland from arming people to
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versial. 07 Over the course of 1861, Lincoln would authorize the sus-
pension of habeas corpus in militarily important areas of many other
Union states, including Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New
York, Massachusetts, and Missouri. 08
B. Legal Theories Available to the U.S. Government
In the Civil War, the targets of the U.S. government's lethal force,
military detention, property confiscation, or other coercion were U.S.
citizens or resident foreigners. Prior to the war, all of them would
have had enforceable rights under the Constitution and laws of the
United States because of the reciprocal nature of their allegiance to
the United States and protection by the government and the Constitu-
tion and laws. Therefore when the conflict began, questions arose
about whether they retained some or all of their prewar constitutional
rights. The answer depended upon the legal status of the CSA. Had
secession made it an independent nation, foreign to the United
States, all residents of the CSA would have lost the protection of the
Constitution. But the Lincoln administration and Congress denied
fight against the United States and authorizing "in the extremest necessity, the sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus").
107 In the case of John Merryman of Maryland, Chief Justice Taney and Lincoln
came to loggerheads when the U.S. military, on Lincoln's orders, refused to produce
Merryman in Taney's courtroom for a habeas corpus hearing, and Taney issued a
blistering decision declaring that the President had acted unconstitutionally by pur-
porting to suspend the writ on his own authority. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas.
144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). See generally BuRRus M. CARNALIAN, Acr OFJUSTICE
51-53 (2007); HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECr UNION 168-69 (1973); CARL B.
SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD
1836-64, at 844-50 (1974). Merryman was a Lieutenant of the Baltimore County
Horse Guards, and apparently led armed bands in the burning of bridges and
destruction of telegraph lines in Maryland in order to cut of Washington, D.C. from
the rest of the Union. See CARNAHAN, supra, at 51. Even though Lincoln demolished
Taney's constitutional reasoning in his masterful "all the laws but one" address, see
Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 104, and even though Taney's impetuous
actions in Merryman were almost certainly driven by disgraceful, extrajudicial
motives-his support for slavery and secession and desire to undermine the Union
war effort, see BRIAN McGINY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT 65-91 (2008); SWISHER, supra,
at 850-52-the Merryman decision is celebrated by many civil libertarians as a paragon
of devotion to the rule of law. See, e.g., Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz,
With All Due Deference:Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1605,
1613-14 (2004).
108 See, e.g., Order from President Abraham Lincoln to Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott
(Apr. 27, 1861), in 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 39, at 39, 39
(authorizing the commanding general to suspend the writ of habeas corpus anywhere
along the military line from Philadelphia to Washington, D.C.).
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that secession was legal and used military force to reverse it. The CSA
and its northern sympathizers complained when the U.S. government
at first refused to consider captured Confederate soldiers and sailors
legitimate prisoners of war and instead instituted some criminal pro-
ceedings for treason and piracy.109 Many southerners and antiwar
northerners also complained that various war measures-those that
sovereign nations used against each other in public international wars,
such as maritime blockade and property confiscation, including the
emancipation of slaves'" 0-infringed the alleged individual constitu-
tional rights of the rebels, rights they retained, it was argued, because
the U.S. government had denied that they were foreign enemies and
so was required to treat them as citizens within protection of the
municipal law."' There were also disputes about the legal authority
under which the occupying Union army could govern captured Con-
federate territory. 112
The U.S. government's negative view of secession was clear: it was
simply illegal and void. That much was certain. But it was difficult to
articulate the Union's affirmative positions in any kind of detail.
Tricky legal questions were intermingled with equally knotty diplo-
matic, military, and domestic political considerations.' 13
109 See CARNAHAN, supra note 107, at 61-70; RANDALL, supra note 44, at 65-66,
92-94; SWISHER, supra note 107, at 868-76; see also The Privateer Savannah; Arguments
on Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1861, at 3 (reporting arguments in a case over
whether rebels were lawful belligerents).
110 Both confiscation acts allowed the confiscation of slaves and other real and
personal property of rebels through quick in rem proceedings. See First Confiscation
Act, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319 (1861); Second Confiscation Act, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 (1862).
For discussion of the operation and constitutionality of the acts, as well as their use to
free slaves, see ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN'S EMANCIPATION PROCIAMATION 40-46,
59-60, 70-72, 125-29 (2004); HYMAN, supra note 107, at 159-60; RANDALL, supra note
44, at 69-72, 275-80, 347-51, 361, 369-74, 383-85. See generally DANIEL W. HAMILTON,
THE LIMITS OF SOVEREICNY (2007) (concerning the law and policy of Union and CSA
property confiscation).
111 It was also routinely alleged that the Union's war measures infringed constitu-
tional rights of the states. For instance, when Lincoln requested troops to put down
the revolt, in a proclamation issued on April 15, 1861 just after Fort Sumter fell, gov-
ernors of states of the upper South like North Carolina-which had not yet seceded-
and borders states like Missouri-which teetered at the brink of secession before
remaining in the Union-denounced the call for troops and their use against the
insurrection as unconstitutional. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 297 (1995).
112 See GUELZO, supra note 110, at 40-46; HYMAN, supra note 107, at 163-68.
113 Because the overriding diplomatic concern was to prevent foreign recognition
of the independence of, and aid to, the CSA, see CARNAHAN, supra note 107, at 43, the
United States tried to insist that the insurrection was a purely local affair. But it had
already become apparent that military considerations required the Union to exercise
powers of war. The legality of all of this, especially the blockade's interference with
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Having rejected Jeremiah Black's view of the Constitution, the
U.S. government needed a new one to take its place. Between 1789
and 1861, the United States experienced no domestic violence of suf-
ficient scale and scope to be considered a civil war. Notwithstanding
the lack of any directly comparable prior conflict, U.S. courts and
commentators had nevertheless found some occasions to analyze the
legal distinctions between mere armed resistance to the laws or rebel-
lion, on the one hand, and civil war, on the other. This occurred in a
few cases concerning America's Revolutionary War against Great Brit-
ain and litigation arising from one of the many wars of independence
which emergent Central and South American nations fought against
their European colonial masters during the first half of the nine-
teenth century.
The law of nations drew a distinction between civil war and lesser
forms of internal violence. As a federal court explained in 1818:
"[W] hen one portion of an empire rises up against another, no longer
obeys the sovereign, but, by force of arms, throws off his authority,
and is of sufficient strength to compel him to resort to regular hostili-
ties against it, a state of civil war exists, as distinguished from rebel-
lion."114 When an internal conflict assumed the proportions of civil
war, third party nations could and often did declare a policy of neu-
trality and recognize each side as lawful belligerents exercising rights
under the law of nations and laws of war.1 15 Some respected authori-
ties on the law of nations and laws of war suggested that it might be
neutral commerce, could only be defended to neutral powers by conceding that the
United States was at war, not just dealing with domestic criminals. Complicated
domestic politics also made it difficult to articulate an appropriate and consistent
legal view of the conflict. The U.S. government determined to end the insurrection
as quickly as possible. This could only be accomplished with massive military force.
But Lincoln thought, correctly, that the border states would view the United States as
the aggressor if it immediately initiated a large-scale mobilization and deployment of
military force. Because the border states were slave states, it was imperative that they
not believe that Lincoln intended to quickly march a huge army southwards to smash
the slave system. And keeping the border states in the Union was viewed by Lincoln,
again correctly, as essential to success in the conflict, for geographic, manpower, and
ideological reasons.
114 Juando v. Taylor, 13 F. Cas. 1179, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1818) (No. 7558); see also
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONs § 292, at 424 (Joseph Chitty trans., Phila-
delphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1858) (1758) ("When a party is formed in a state,
who no longer obey the sovereign, and are possessed of sufficient strength to oppose
him,-or when, in a republic, the nation is divided into two opposite factions, and
both sides take up arms,-this is called a civil war." (emphasis omitted)).
115 See, e.g., The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 337 (1822) ("The
Government of the United States has recognized the existence of a civil war between
Spain and her colonies, and has avowed her determination to remain neutral between
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mandatory for the government to accord belligerent rights to its
revolting opponent in a civil war."16
But other important authorities, including a Supreme Court deci-
sion by ChiefJustice Marshall and the widely respected treatise on the
law of nations by the Swiss diplomat Vattel, supported a slightly differ-
ent proposition, that when responding to an internal rebellion or civil
war, a government may at its discretion act as either a sovereign
(under municipal law), a belligerent (under the international laws of
war), or both.11 7 In other words, the government might employ ordi-
nary criminal prosecutions, military powers governed by the laws of
war, or both to subdue the rebels. For the Lincoln Administration in
1861, additional legal support for the theory that governments had
both belligerent and sovereign rights turned out to be surprisingly
close at hand, in the person and writings of Henry W. Halleck, who
rejoined the U.S. Army in fall 1861 as a major general,118 just a few
months after his treatise on international law, written during a
the parties. Each party is therefore deemed by us a belligerent nation, having, so far
as concerns us, the sovereign rights of war . . . .").
116 See VATTEL, supra note 114, §§ 293-294, at 424-25 ("A civil war breaks the
bands of society and government, or, at least, suspends their force and effect: it pro-
duces in the nation two independent parties, who consider each other as enemies,
and acknowledge no common judge. Those two parties, therefore, must necessarily
be considered as thenceforward constituting, at least for a time, two separate bodies,
two distinct societies.... This being the case, it is very evident that the common laws
of war,-those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honour, which we have already
detailed in the course of this work,-ought to be observed by both parties in every
civil war."); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (Philadelphia,
Carey, Lea & Blanchard 1836) (stating that during civil war, contending sides have
"all the rights which war gives to public enemies").
117 See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 272-73 (1808) (stating, in a case
arising from the seizure of a vessel and cargo by a French privateer as part of France's
response to the rebellion of its colony, Santo Domingo: "[A] dmitting a sovereign who
is endeavouring to reduce his revolted subjects to obedience, to possess both sover-
eign and belligerent rights, and to be capable of acting in either character, the man-
ner in which he acts must determine the character of the act. If as a legislator he
publishes a law ordaining punishments for certain offences, which law is to be applied
by courts, the nature of the law, and of the proceedings under it, will decide whether
it is an exercise of belligerent rights, or exclusively of his sovereign power; and
whether the court, in applying this law to particular cases, acts as a prize court, or as a
court enforcing municipal regulations."); VATTEL, supra note 114, §§ 290, 294, at 423,
425 (stating that in internal conflicts, including civil wars, the sovereign may crimi-
nally prosecute rebels under municipal laws, but suggesting that clemency is the wiser
course).
118 See CURT ANDERS, HENRY HALLECK'S WAR 33-34 (1999).
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sojourn in private law practice, had been published.119 There was a
clear limit, however, to the relevance of these authorities. They
announced rules of international law, but in the United States the
Constitution was the supreme law of the land, and many argued that it
would be violated if the government exercised belligerent rights and
treated rebelling U.S. citizens as military enemies.120
119 Halleck initially commanded the vast Department of the West and in July 1862
would be promoted to be General-in-Chief, the highest rank in the Union Army. Id.
at 143-44. His treatise would eventually go through multiple editions and printings
and be one of the two or three most authoritative American works on the laws of war
into the twentieth century. His 1861 edition stayed close to the teachings of Vattel
and decisions of Marshall: where a rebellion has grown large enough to "assume[ ]
the character of a public war, as defined and recognized by the law of nations, it is the
general usage of other states to concede to both parties the rights of war." H.W.
HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW OR RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN
PEACE AND WAR § 25 (New York, D. Van Nostrand 1861) (emphasis omitted). These
belligerent rights did not displace the established government's power to prosecute
rebels under domestic criminal law. Instead, Halleck wrote:
[B]elligerent rights may be superadded to those of sovereignty, that is, the
contending parties may exercise belligerent rights with regard to each other
and to neutral powers, while, at the same time, the established government
of the state may exercise its right of sovereignty in punishing, by its munici-
pal laws, individuals of the insurgent or revolting party, as rebels and traitors.
Id.
120 It happens that this view has resurfaced recently in debates about enemy com-
batant detention post-9/11. It is said in recent scholarship that "[u]nder the constitu-
tional law of treason, any person who is potentially subject to an American treason
prosecution must be tried in a civilian court and may not be detained by the military
as an enemy combatant or subject to military tribunals." Larson, supra note 36, at
867. This constitutional rule was allegedly "consistently recognized" in Anglo-Ameri-
can law "[u]ntil the twentieth century." Id. at 873. Similar assertions were made in
the amicus brief of U.S. Criminal Scholars and Historians submitted in support of the
habeas corpus petition of Ali Saleh al-Marri to be released from military detention in
the United States. Al-Marri is a national of Qatar who recently admitted that-as the
U.S. government had long alleged as the basis for his military detention-he entered
the United States in September 2001 at the direction of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to
plan and carry out terrorist attacks. See Associated Press, Former 'Enemy Combatant'
Pleads Guilty in Ill., USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
nation/20094-30-enemy-combatantN.htm. According to the brief, the "American
constitutional tradition" and " [c]ommon law history" establish that a citizen or nonci-
tizen within the United States can be held by military authorities instead of the civil-
ian justice system "only if he owes no duty of allegiance to the United States"-and
even then, only if he was an "open combatant[ ]." Brief of Amici Curiae U.S. Crimi-
nal Scholars and Historians Advocating Reversal in Support of Petitioners at 4-5, al-
Marri v. Wright, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-7427).
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III. THE WAR OF IDEAS: THE LAWS OF WAR DISPLACE THE
CONSTITUTION WHEN THE UNITED STATES ACTS MILITARILY
AGAINST ENEMIES
In summer 1863, the solicitor of the War Department, William
Whiting, wrote in a widely publicized letter to the Union League of
Philadelphia, that "[t]wo wars are still waged between the citizens of
the United States-a war of Arms and a war of Ideas." 121 This was
even more true in 1861 and 1862, before the Supreme Court had
decided the Prize Cases and before Whiting and like-minded states-
men, pamphleteers, professors, and other theorists of the war powers
of the Union had fully developed and promulgated their views.
From early in the Civil War, northern supporters of the adminis-
tration picked up the theories of Marshall, Vattel, Halleck, and John
Quincy Adams and began to articulate that the U.S. government had
the right to choose whether to respond to the rebellion with methods
of war, peace (law enforcement), or both. Because secession was
unconstitutional and failed to void the allegiance owed to the United
States, rebels could be punished by the criminal law, including the law
of treason. It was universally agreed that when the U.S. government
suppressed rebellion through the criminal justice system, rebels were
protected by all applicable rights of U.S. citizens. The United States
could not demand allegiance (by enforcing its domestic criminal
laws) without granting protection. But law enforcement could not
alone suppress the Confederate armies. The war powers of Congress
and the President needed to be invoked. But war waged against U.S.
citizens was, under some traditional understandings, theoretically
impossible, because citizenship carried with it constitutional protec-
tion from being treated as military enemies. During 1861 and 1862,
an increasing number of lower federal courts and prominent states-
men and theorists rejected this idea that the Constitution was a shield
for traitors but not a sword for the legitimate government. They
argued that rebellion on such a massive scale caused rebels to forfeit
the protection of the Constitution and other municipal laws. The war
powers of the U.S. government, and the legal regime accompanying
them-the laws of war-displaced constitutional rights of rebels,
whenever and wherever the government chose to respond to the
rebellion by military means. And they also held that rebels could be
subjected to the criminal law even though, on the field of battle, their
armies were treated as belligerents by the U.S. military. These doc-
trines-developed in a welter of media such as speeches in Congress,
121 Whiting, supra note 29, at 739.
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newspaper editorials, pamphlets and broadsides, legal briefs, military
orders, private letters, and decisions in the lower federal courts-cor-
responded with the views and policies of the President, and were even-
tually adopted by the Supreme Court.
A. The Union's Lawyers, Statesmen, and Theorists
The Union was lucky to have a group of immensely talented law-
yers, statesmen, and commentators to articulate its legal positions.
Many of these men were of such stature and brilliance that they
remain well known today; others have been obscured by time, but
were no less impressive when it mattered. The roster included the
President and his cabinet-Lincoln, Chase, Seward, Stanton;122 offi-
cials in the War Department and Army-Lieber, Halleck, Holt, Whit-
122 President Lincoln was himself a brilliant constitutional lawyer and his cabinet
contained several giants of the law. Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase was one the
dominant figures of his age. Lincoln described him as "about one and a half times
bigger than any other man I ever knew." G. Edward White, Reconstructing the Constitu-
tional jurisprudence of Salmon P. Chase, 21 N. Ky. L. REv. 41, 41 (1993) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Before the war, Chase was Governor of and a U.S. Senator from
Ohio and a devoted abolitionist lawyer. From 1861 to 1864 he served at Treasury, and
then for nine years, until his death, as Chief Justice of the United States. See generally
JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGRAPHY (1995). "Among Republicans, only
Charles Sumner, William H. Seward, Thaddeus Stevens, and Abraham Lincoln
equaled [Chase's] contemporary stature." Michael Les Benedict, Salmon P. Chase as
jurist and Politician, 21 N. Ky. L. REV. 133, 133-34 (1993). Like Chase of Ohio, Seward
of New York served his home state as governor, U.S. Senator, and abolitionist lawyer
in the antebellum period. He then was Secretary of State from 1860 to 1869. See
generally Doius KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIvALs (2005). Before the war, Edwin M.
Stanton, a Democrat, was a successful lawyer and briefly a pro-Union Attorney Gen-
eral for President Buchanan. From 1862 to 1868, he was an extraordinarily effective
Secretary of War. President Grant appointed him to the Supreme Court in 1869, but
Stanton died before taking his seat. See generally BENJAMIN P. THOMAS & HAROLD M.
HYMAuN, STANTON (1962).
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ing;123 members of Congress-Sumner, Stevens, Trumbull;124 and
journalists-Garrison, Greeley.125
It was universally understood that only because the rebel enemies
were U.S. citizens was it even debatable whether they had individual
constitutional rights. 26 It was inconceivable that foreign combatants
123 Lieber and Halleck are described above. See supra notes 14, 119. Joseph
Holt-a pro-Union, antislavery Democrat, native of Kentucky-served as Postmaster
General and briefly, Secretary of War, under President Buchanan. In 1862, Lincoln
made him Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army-its chief lawyer. By all accounts
he was tremendously efficient and incisive. Lincoln tried to make him Attorney Gen-
eral in 1864, but Holt declined. See GOODWIN, supra note 122, at 675; HYMAN, supra
note 107, at 190-92. William Whiting was a prominent Harvard-trained Boston lawyer
when, in 1862, Lincoln asked him to become solicitor of the War Department. When
the war began, Whiting had started speaking and writing about the constitutional
powers of the President and Congress to invoke belligerent rights under the laws of
war to put down the Rebellion. His opinions were immediately influential in Wash-
ington; his thoughts became pamphlets and then a book, which grew over time, as
events unfolded. Eventually entitled War Powers of the President and the Legislative Powers
of Congress in Relation to Rebellion, Treason and Slavery, it went through forty-three
printed editions in eight years of war and Reconstruction, and "its leading doctrines
... received the sanction of the highest courts in the land." MEMOIR OF THE HON.
WILUAM WHITING 7 (Boston, David Clapp & Son 1874); see also HYMAN, supra note
107, at 193-94.
124 Sumner is described above in the Introduction. See generally DAVID HERBERT
DONALD, CHARLEs SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1960). Thaddeus Ste-
vens was a powerful member of Congress from Pennsylvania from 1859 to 1868 and
Chairman of Ways and Means during the war. A lawyer for the oppressed before
coming to Congress, once in Washington Stevens was, like his ideological ally in the
Senate, Charles Sumner, an indomitable Republican "radical," fierce proponent of
total war against rebels and slavery, a determined advocate for confiscation of rebel
property, emancipation of slaves, enlistment of black soldiers in the Union Army,
black suffrage, and adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. See
generally HANS L. TREFOUSSE, THADDEUS STEVENS: NINETEENTH-CENTURY EGALITARIAN
(1997). Lyman Trumbull-U.S. Senator from Illinois (1855-1873), chair ofJudiciary
during the war, former justice of the Illinois Supreme Court-was highly respected
for his legal skills and judgment. He was an important spokesman for radical Republi-
can wartime policies like confiscation and emancipation, though he himself, a once
and future Democrat, did not identify as a radical. See HAMILTON, supra note 110, at
29-31.
125 William Lloyd Garrison, an uncompromising Massachusetts abolitionist, edited
the country's leading antislavery newspaper, the Liberator (1832-1865). See generally
HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY
(1998). Horace Greeley founded and edited the New York Tribune, the most influen-
tial newspaper in the country in the 1850s and 1860s. See generally ROBERT CHADWELL
WILuIAMS, HORACE GREELEY: CHAMPION OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2006).
126 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 943 (1862) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull) ("There would be no difficulty in determining our rights as against them if
they were an independent nation; but what makes the difficulty is the relation which
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in an international conflict against the United States would receive
protection from the Constitution, even if present within the United
States.127 Certainly noncitizens outside the United States-even if not
enemies-could not possibly have any protection from the Constitu-
tion.128 As shown in Part I, during the Founding and antebellum peri-
the persons in arms against the Government bear to it, that is as enemies, and at the
same time as citizens. That is what seems to embarrass some minds."); CONG. GLOBE
ApP., 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 140 (1862) (statement of Sen. Doolittle) (contending that
the Constitution forbids confiscation in the nature of an attainder for treason, but
"where citizens have gone abroad to foreign countries, and have there, outside of our
jurisdiction, engaged in acts of hostility to us . .. it would be within our power to
declare persons guilty of such acts in foreign countries beyond our jurisdiction no
longer citizens of the United States, alien enemies, and to escheat their lands to the
United States, and their assigns forever."); id. at 122 (statement of Rep. Allen of
Ohio) ("If the people of the seceding States were aliens, and we had a right to deal
with them as such under the law of nations, we would have a right to capture their
property wherever found. . .. [But w]e cannot treat loyal Union-loving citizens as
enemies, because they reside in disloyal States.").
Because it was often simply assumed that foreign enemies fighting the United
States lacked any constitutional rights, analogizing the rights of Confederates in arms
to those of foreign enemies was a shorthand way of stating that rebels in arms had no
constitutional rights. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1557, 1560 (1862)
(statement of Sen. Trumbull) (stating that the United States could exercise the same
belligerent rights against CSA forces as when "waging war against a foreign nation").
127 See, e.g., Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 40 ("There exists no law or body of
authoritative rules of action between hostile armies, except that branch of the law of
nature and nations which is called the law and usages of war on land."); CONG. GLOBE,
37th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2964 (1862) (statement of Sen. Sumner) ("If the enemies
against whom we are now waging war were not our own fellow-citizens-if they were
aliens unhappily established for the time on our territory-there would be no fine-
spun question of constitutional immunities.... [I]f the war on our part were ... in
subordination to those provisions of the Constitution which were devised for peace, it
is evident that our Government would be unable to cope with its enemy. It would
enter battle with its hands tied behind its back. Of course, in warfare with people of
another country, Senators would not require any such self-sacrifice."); cf WILLIAS
WHITING, THE WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CON-
GRESS IN RELATION To REBELLION, TREASON AND SLAVERY 47 (Boston, John L. Shorey
1862) ("To determine what are the rights of different nations when making war upon
each other, we look only to the law of nations. The peculiar, forms or rights of the
subjects of one of these war-making parties under their own government give them no
rights over their enemy other than those which are sanctioned by international law.
In the great tribunal of nations, there is a 'higher law' than that which has been
framed by either one of them.").
128 See supra note 68; see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1768 (1864)
(statement of Rep. Broomall) ("Our Government is indeed one of limited powers, but
only so with respect to its own citizens. Toward other nations its powers are absolute.
It is limited in its administration of civil law; but as a belligerent it is under no more
restraint that Russia or France [i.e., absolutist governments]. The limitations of con-
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ods, it was a longstanding principle of the common law and the law of
nations, understood to be incorporated into the Constitution, that
foreigners were outside the protection of the Constitution and laws-
unless by temporary allegiance during peaceful presence in the
United States, with the consent of the government, they came tempo-
rarily under protection. They were dealt with under international not
municipal law. These foundational principles were accepted fully by
the Civil War generation and guided the North's thinking about the
constitutional status of the citizens who were waging war against the
United States. As U.S. citizens, rebels owed allegiance to the U.S. gov-
ernment and were, if the antebellum theory held, entitled to the pro-
tection of the Constitution, laws, and courts. But that antebellum view
did not survive the first year of war.
1. Rebels in Arms
The principle that foreign combatants engaged in war against the
United States had no rights under the Constitution or other munici-
pal laws was generally assumed to apply to rebels in arms during the
Civil War. For instance, in an influential speech in spring 1862, Sena-
tor Sumner contended that "[r]ebels in arms are enemies, exposed to
all the penalties of war, as much as if they were alien enemies."129 The
problem of protection/allegiance was addressed by countless authors
and speakers who contended that violent rebellion caused the forfei-
ture of constitutional rights:
[N]o man can, at the same time, be our enemy, deserving our
utmost wrath, and a friend, entitled to our support and protection.
Rebels in arms against the Constitution, must not be spoken of as men
having constitutional rights.... [W]hile the loyal citizen retains all his
constitutional and legal rights, as in peace, the armed rebel, ha[s]
stitutional Government have no outside application whatever."); Charles Sumner, Our
Domestic Relations; Or, How to Treat the Rebel States, 12 ATLANTic MONTHLY 507, 508
(1863) (stating that California and New Mexico, while still Mexican territory because
the treaty of peace and cession of 1848 had not yet been ratified, was "beyond the
jurisdiction of our Constitution" and "there was no constraint from the Constitution"
on the U.S. military occupation).
129 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2190 (1862) (statement of Sen. Sumner);
see also id. at 2964 ("Rebels in arms are public enemies, who can claim no safeguard
from the Constitution, and they may be pursued and conquered according to the
Rights of War."); Charles F. Blake, Prerogative Rights and Public Law, 25 MONTHLY L.
REP. 129, 141-42 (1863) (regarding the "belligerent rights" of the U.S. government,
stating that "[ulpon the men in arms against the government, it is permitted to
employ the usual machinery of war. Whatever would be lawful against a foreign
enemy, is lawful against them.").
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voluntarily withdrawn from the protection of the Constitution and
submitted himself to the arbitrament of war.1 3 0
This view was so widely shared that I have been unable to find a single
court decision in which a member of the military of the CSA sought,
by habeas corpus or otherwise, to enforce alleged constitutional or
other municipal rights in a U.S. court during the war. Notwithstand-
ing the suggestions in ChiefJustice Taney's Merryman decision, civilian
courts simply had no power to liberate an enrolled enemy soldier
from U.S. military control during the war.13 1 Loyalists of all ideologi-
cal stripes agreed that rebels had forfeited their constitutional rights.
It was accepted by abolitionists and radicals,13 2 moderate and con-
130 GROSVENOR P. LOWREY, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: A DEFENCE UPON LEGAL
GROUNDS OF THE PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION AND AN ANSWER TO EX-JUDGE CUR-
TIS' PAMPHLET 17 (New York, G.P. Putnam 1862).
131 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, §§ 1-2, 12 Stat. 755, 755 (providing that
the President may suspend the writ of habeas corpus; that when it is suspended, a
statement that the person is held by the U.S. military is a sufficient answer to a writ;
and providing judicial processes for eventual release or criminal trial of detainees
held by the Executive "otherwise than as prisoners of war" in loyal states); CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1861) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("The judi-
cial tribunals have no right or power to interfere with the Army in the exercise of its
power in suppressing an insurrection, by issuing writs of habeas corpus or otherwise [in
areas where the President has exercised power delegated by Congress to call out
troops to suppress insurrection.] [P]ersons captured by the military authorities in
insurrectionary districts may still be retained as prisoners by the military power, with-
out interference from the courts till their cases are finally disposed of, notwithstand-
ing they may, for purposes of safety, or other reasons of State, be brought within
districts where the judicial power is in full operation."); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st
Sess. 339-40 (1861) (statement of Sen. McDougall) ("[W]e have war, and there is a
law of war. . . . There is a system of laws for peace, another for war. The right to the
writ of habeas corpus is one of those that has no relation to the condition and necessi-
ties of war. It might be called a peace right. . . . It is, therefore, an established rule of
law that the writ of habeas corpus does not run against a prisoner of war.").
132 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1881 (1862) (statement of Sen.
Hale) ("I think the time has come when Congress should ... show to armed rebels ...
that the Constitution and laws made for the protection of the rights of persons and
property were made for the protection of those who were true to their allegiance, and
not for the protection of those who threw it off and were fighting against it, and
would subvert the Constitution and would destroy the country."); CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 316 (1864) (statement of Rep. Stevens) ("[H]aving committed trea-
son, renounced their allegiance to the Union, discarded its Constitution and laws,
organized a distinct and hostile government, and by force of arms having risen from
the condition of insurgents to the position of an independent Power de facto, and
having been acknowledged as a belligerent by both foreign nations and our own Gov-
ernment, the Constitution and laws of the Union are abrogated so far as they are
concerned, and .. . as between the two belligerents, they are under the laws of war
and the laws of nations alone."); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1768 (1864)
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servative Republicans concerned with maintaining legal forms and
due process during the war,133 conservatives from border states,' 34
and even many Democratic opponents of Lincoln's war policies.13 5
Even staunch opponents of viewing the conflict as a "war" generally
(statement of Rep. Broomall) (contending that rebels had "repudiate[d] allegiance"
to the Constitution and "appealed from the Constitution and laws of the country to
the laws of war," and therefore have no right to "the protection of the Constitution
and laws"); Whiting, supra note 127, at 697 ("None of these rights, guaranteed to
peaceful citizens by the Constitution, belong to them after they have become belliger-
ents against their own government. They thereby forfeit all protection under that
sacred charter which they have thus sought to overthrow and destroy." (emphasis
omitted)); Gen. Butler's Contraband of War, 31 LIBERATOR (Boston) 131 (1861) (likely
written by Garrison) ("[Rebels] have renounced the Constitution and the laws, are
levying war against them, and against the nation which ordained, and its government
which administers them. Protection and allegiance are correlative. The denial of one
cancels the obligation of the other."); Letter from Robert Dale Owen to William H.
Seward, Sec'y of State (Aug. 27, 1863), in 3 THE AMERICAN ANNUAL CYCLOPEDIA AND
REGISTER OF IMPORTANT EVENTS OF THE YEAR 1863, at 838, 838 (New York, D. Appleton
& Co. 1864) [hereinafter Letter from Owen to Seward] (stating that the rebels by
their actions "forfeit[ed] their constitutional rights" and have "the same rights, and
the same rights only, as alien enemies invading the United States . . . [under] the
rights of war").
133 For instance, Edgar Cowan, a respected attorney and U.S. Senator from Penn-
sylvania, stated that
taking a prisoner of war, whether it be a foreign soldier taken upon our soil
with arms in his hands, or a citizen of our own who has cut himself away
from the Government and severed his allegiance, is precisely the same thing.
Nobody ever supposed it was necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
in order to justify the military for such a proceeding.
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 341 (1861) (statement of Sen. Cowan). As Sena-
tor Lyman Trumbull of Illinois put it, "[tlhat we have the right to exercise belligerent
rights towards the persons and property of those in arms against the Government,
and who are fighting for its overthrow, even the opponents of this bill [confiscating
property of Confederates] admit." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1560 (1861)
(statement of Sen. Trumbull).
134 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3350 (1862) (statement of Sen.
Wright) ("The Senator from Kentucky ... puts the question whether a man has not
his right, under the Constitution, to be tried; whether every man is not entitled to all
the rights and privileges secured by the Constitution. Yes, sir; he is if he is an obedi-
ent citizen; but if he is a traitor he is not. If he is in rebellion against his Government,
he is not entitled to the protection of the Government.").
135 See, e.g., ADDRESS OF THE DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO
THE PEOPLE OF INDIANA 11 (Indianapolis, Elder, Harkness & Bingham 1863) (on file
with author) ("[T]he Democratic policy in conducting this war between a kindred
people [would be] fighting and putting down armed rebels [and] love and kindness
toward those not in arms," and "calling on the people of the South to abandon the
leaders, return to the protection of the old flag, under all the guarantees of the
Constitution.").
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agreed as a practical matter that rebel combatants could be treated as
military enemies because they conceded that deadly force was appro-
priate in law enforcement as well as combat.136
Though initially somewhat controversial in loyal states, the U.S.
Army's application of the laws of war to guerrilla fighters in both loyal
and rebel states became widely accepted.137 The definition of gueril-
las was reasonably clear under the laws of war: combatants who were
not formally enrolled in the military of a sovereign nation and whose
methods of combat violated the laws of war-by failing to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population, failing to be part of a regular
chain of command, attacking civilians, committing robbery, granting
no quarter to enemy soldiers, and the like.138 The treatment of gueril-
las shows that all combatants serving the enemy were entirely out of
protection of the Constitution and laws. Lawful methods for handling
guerillas included: capture and trial by military commission for the
136 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 134 (1862) (statement of Rep.
Yeaman) (describing the conflict as "a gigantic effort. . . to enforce the nation's laws
against citizens of the nation in rebellion" and stating that "[t] he President has called
out the posse comitatus of the nation to assist him; and if rebels are killed in his
attempt to arrest them, and to enforce the law, it is their own fault"); CONG. GLOBE,
37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3350 (1862) (statement of Sen. Powell) ("The Constitution of
our fathers and the laws not only in the United States, but in all the States, guaranty to
every man, high or low, rich or poor, guilty or innocent, patriot or traitor, the protec-
tion of the Constitution and the laws. . .. [T]he vilest traitor, the guiltiest murderer,
the most contemptible thief, is entitled to all the guarantees that the Constitution and
the laws throw about him. . . I grant you if he has arms in his hands, is arrayed in
battle against you, you may slay him; but then it is war."). Because everyone agreed
that rebels in arms could be killed or otherwise opposed militarily, it might make little
practical difference how one precisely viewed their legal status. See CONG. GLOBE,
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1767 (1864) (statement of Rep. Broomall) (stating that the coun-
try was involved in "civil war" as distinguished from "insurrection," which states were
governed by the "usages of war" and the "civil power," respectively, and that "[u]nder
both systems the insurgents may be shot down in being taken").
137 See, e.g., RANDALL, supra note 44, at 175 (noting "little adverse comment" about
trial by military commission in the loyal state of Missouri of civilians who burned
bridges, destroyed telegraph wires, "furnished information to the enemy, or engaged
in sniping and bushwhacking"). Guerilla warfare was prevalent in border states with
mixed populations of different loyalties-Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Arkansas.
138 See, e.g., GEORGE B. DAvis, OUTUNES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (New York,
Harper & Bros. 1887) (defining guerillas as "persons who .. . commit acts of hostility
without the authorization of their government, or who carry on their operations in
violation of the laws of war" (citation omitted)); HALLECK, supra note 119, at 386
("Partizan and guerrilla troops, are bands of men self-organized and self-controlled,
who carry on war against the public enemy, without being under the direct authority
of the state. They have no commissions or enlistments, nor are they enrolled as any
part of the military force of the state . . . .").
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crime of unprivileged belligerency or for substantive misconduct such
as murder or robbery;1 3 9 capture and summary execution; 14 0 or cap-
ture and detention as regular prisoners of war, even though not enti-
tied to that status.141 If their unit has engaged in certain war crimes,
guerillas might instead be denied quarter and simply killed on
sight.142
2. Noncombants
The application to the civilian population of the South of bellig-
erent powers under the laws of war was quite controversial. 143 Some
critics of the war contended that only enemies in arms, and not civil-
139 See, e.g., 2 WINTHROP, supra note 14, at 68-69; cf Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 215,
§ 1, 13 Stat. 356, 356 ("[T]he commanding general in the field, or the commander of
the department, as the case may be, shall have power to carry into execution all
sentences against guerilla marauders for robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault with
intent to commit rape, and for violation of the laws and customs of war.").
140 See, e.g., Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 82, quoted in supra note 78; 2 WIN-
THROP, supra note 14, at 11 (stating that guerillas are "regarded as criminals and out-
laws, not within the protection of the rights of war, or entitled, upon capture, to be
treated as prisoners of war, but liable to be shot, imprisoned, or banished, either
summarily where their guilt is clear or upon trial and conviction by military
commission").
141 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 138, at 242 (stating that guerillas' "acts are unlawful,
and when captured they are not treated as prisoners of war, but as criminals" (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
142 See Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 62 ("All troops of the enemy known or
discovered to give no quarter in general, or to any portion of the army, receive
none."); id. art. 63 ("Troops who fight in the uniform of their enemies, without any
plain, striking, and uniform mark of distinction of their own, can expect no quar-
ter."); id. art. 66 ("Quarter having been given to an enemy by American troops, under
a misapprehension of his true character, he may, nevertheless, be ordered to suffer
death if, within three days after the battle, it be discovered that he belongs to a corps
which gives no quarter.").
143 The southern population was reached various ways by U.S. government actions
justified by the laws of war against enemies. Lincoln's blockade treated the entire
population of seceded states as enemies. The U.S. Army imposed martial law when it
recaptured areas of seceded states, displacing civilian courts and government officials.
This occurred in the first month of the war when U.S. forces took Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, located across the Potomac from Washington, D.C. See LONG & LONG, supra
note 82, at 77. Congress, in July 1861, made illegal all intercourse-commercial or
otherwise-between residents of states declared by the President to be in insurrection
and residents of all other parts of the country. See supra note 103 and accompanying
text. Congress's Second Confiscation Act of 1862 directed the President to seize the
real and personal property of certain named groups, including persons who thereaf-
ter gave aid and comfort to the rebellion. See supra note 110. The statute used these
terms so broadly that many fairly ordinary interactions with the government or mili-
tary of the seceded states or CSA would likely be reached. Cf United States v. Klein,
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ians who happened to be resident in seceded states, could be sub-
jected to the war powers reserved for wars against foreign enemies.
The theory was that the protections of the Constitution might be lost
only if individually and voluntarily renounced. And while Confeder-
ates soldiers had clearly thrown off their allegiance and were in fact
trying to destroy by force the U.S. government and the Constitution,
mere civilians, it was argued, could not be presumed to be disloyal to
the degree necessary to lose constitutional rights.1 44 Others argued
that the laws of war held sway and municipal rights were displaced
only at the specific places and times where civilian courts were
obstructed by actual war; for U.S. citizens, the laws of war could only
be applied if necessary, and necessity would be strictly construed.14 5
Still others contended that it followed from the Lincoln Administra-
tion's position that secession was void and that the seceded states and
their people were still a part of the United States, that the laws of war
could not be applied.1 4 6
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 137 (1871) (stating that the Act covered "[a]lmost all the
property of the people in the insurgent States").
144 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1615-16 (1862) (statement of Rep.
Thomas) ("[N]o State can abdicate or forfeit the rights of its citizens to the protec-
tion of the Constitution of the United States or the privileges and blessings of the
Union which that Constitution secures and makes perpetual.... He only is the enemy
of the United States who is committing treason by levying war against the United
States, or giving aid and comfort to those who do. The loyal, faithful subject of the
United States, wherever on the soil of his country he may have his home, is not the
enemy of his country."); Reconstruction, 4 CONTINENTAL MONTHLY 684 (1863) ("The
subject who renounces his allegiance can claim no protection. . . . Allegiance and
protection are reciprocal and interdependent duties. . . . So that it might be quite
correct to declare, in reference to the Southern rebellion, that a rebel has no rights
which the United States is bound to respect."); id. ("[S] uch persons ... as voluntarily
wage war upon it [the Constitution], can be strictly called enemies .... [But a]s to all
men who have not participated in the rebellion, it is not easy to see how war, rebel-
lion, usurpation, or any power on earth can destroy their rights under the
Constitution.").
145 See, e.g., Blake, supra note 129, at 143 (conceding that "the government of the
United States may do against the rebels whatever is lawful against a public enemy,"
but limiting this freedom from municipal or constitutional restraint to the time and
place of actual war, when the civil courts are by necessity closed); see also B.R. CURTIS,
EXECUYTIVE POWER 28 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1862) (to the same effect as Blake).
146 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3349 (1861) (statement of Sen.
Powell) ("Even if they were alien enemies, we could not act thus unless we violated
every rule of Christian warfare. But, sir, they are not treated or regarded as alien
enemies; you claim them as a part of our people. They are entitled, then, to all the
provisions of the Constitution of your country, for I am sure no gentleman would be
so illogical as to maintain the position that they are under the Constitution, a part of
the Union, and are not entitled to all the panoply and all the shields that the Consti-
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These views did not prevail. The argument that civilians in
seceded states were not military enemies was undermined by at least
four political facts: duly elected representatives of the people had, in
each case, voted to secede; few residents of the Confederacy left their
home states and went North on account of their loyalty to the Union;
instead the people of the Confederacy expressed enthusiastic support
for the war in countless ways; and the CSA and various seceded states
took officials actions to treat residents of the Union and loyalists in
the South as military enemies. 1 4 7 These facts were woven into argu-
ments based on constitutional and international law by the Union's
war powers theorists. Daniel Gardner, a New York lawyer and author
of a treatise on international law, used a typical formulation, writing
that "the rebels, seeking to destroy our national Constitution and all
law, have forfeited all rights of person and property under the Union,
State and national laws they have repudiated." 4 8 Residents of the
seceded states who aided and abetted the war effort of the Confeder-
ate armies had also forfeited their rights under the Constitution and
laws.149 No longer protected by municipal laws of the polity, the
tution throws around the rights of the citizen."). Another view was that the CSA was
at least defacto, if not dejure, an independent nation and was entitled to the same
rights as all other sovereign nations.
147 For example, the CSA's Sequestration Act. See HAMILTON, supra note 110, at
82-139 (describing the Act, its legality, and its implementation).
148 DANIEL GARDNER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN REBELLION 6 (New
York, J.W. Amerman 1862); see also THE WAR AND ITS MANAGEMENT: SPEECH OF HON.
B. VAN HoRN OF NEW YoRK 5 (Washington, D.C., Scammell & Co. 1862) (addressing
the House of Representatives on January 23, 1862 and saying, "[T]he citizens of the
rebel States ... have cast aside the Constitution of their country, under which, when
loyal, they were entitled to protection, to all their rights guarantied to them by that
Constitution, and are no more entitled to our protection, being themselves outlaws by
their own wicked and treasonable acts."); TRAITORS AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS: SPEECH
OF THE HON. BENJAMIN F. WADE OF OHIO 3 (Washington, D.C., Scammel & Co. 1862)
(addressing the U.S. Senate on April 21, 1862 and stating that residents of seceded
states are "entirely absolved from the protecting aegis of the Constitution" and that
rebels and traitors "are beyond all law, they have repudiated all law, and the nation, in
defence of its Constitution, its Union, and its flag, may resort to any means that God
Almighty has put into their hands").
149 See DANIEL AGNEW, OUR NATIONAL CONSTITUTION: ITS ADAPTATION TO A STATE
OF WAR OR INSURRECTION 17 (Philadelphia, C. Sherman, Son & Co. 2d ed. 1863) ("In
time of peace [no "constitutional rights"] can be taken away, except by due process of
law. But how are they affected by a state of war? The rebels and their abettors are
citizens, who owe allegiance, but have cast it off. The civil authority is not adequate to
reduce them, and force is resorted to by authority of law. The Constitution now turns
against them, and the rights it guaranteed during peace, it now authorizes to be taken
away, if necessary to reduce them to submission."); see also Order from W.T. Sherman,
Commanding Major General, to Maj. R.M. Sawyer (Jan. 31, 1864), in 32 U.S. WAR
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United States had "the same rights of war against the 'Confederate
States' as we have against other nations, which rights are determined
by the laws of nations solely, and not at all by the Constitution of the
United States."150 The rebels had "forfeit[ed] their constitutional
rights" and have "the same rights, and the same rights only, as alien
enemies invading the United States . .. [under] the rights of war."15 1
In other words, the rebels had by their actions lowered themselves to
equivalent status to aliens engaged in international war with the
United States-a group paradigmatically without rights under the
Constitution. 52 And the rebellion had brought into play a new legal
regime-the regime of the laws of war-that heretofore in U.S. his-
tory had been reserved for foreign wars.153
DEP'T, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. 1, pt. 2, at 278, 279 (Washington, D.C., Gov't
Printing Office 1891) ("[T]he people of the South having appealed to war are barred
from appealing to our Constitution . . .. They have appealed to war, and must abide
by its rules and laws.").
150 See SPEECH OF CASSIUS M. CLAY BEFORE THE LAW DEPARTMENT OF THE UNIVER-
SIY OF ALBANY, N.Y. 15 (New York, Wynkoop, Hallenbeck & Thomas 2d ed. 1863) (on
file with author).
151 Letter from Owen to Seward, supra note 132, at 838; see also CONG. GLOBE, 37th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2190 (1862) (statement of Sen. Sumner) ("Rebels in arms are ene-
mies, exposed to all the penalties of war, as much as if they were alien enemies.");
Blake, supra note 129, at 142 (regarding the "belligerent rights" of the U.S. govern-
ment, stating that "[ulpon the men in arms against the government, it is permitted to
employ the usual machinery of war. Whatever would be lawful against a foreign
enemy, is lawful against them."); Whiting, supra note 127, at 694-95, 701 (stating that
the United States was authorized to treat a rebel as it would "an alien enemy" in
wartime); Letter from Orville H. Browning to Abraham Lincoln (Sept. 30, 1861), in
CARNAHAN, supra note 107, at 148, 153-54 (stating that the rebels "have no more right
... to claim the protection of the Constitution and laws of the former government,
than the citizens of a foreign state, at war with us would have a right to claim such
protection").
152 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE APP., 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 167 (1862) (statement of Rep.
Babbitt) (attacking as "wholly unfounded, and as contrary to the principles of
national and municipal law as it is to the principles of equity and common sense" the
"erroneous idea that rebels can claim for their property all the safeguards which the
Constitution has thrown around that of loyal citizens. I deny that they have a right to
interpose any such claim any more than would the subject of any foreign nation with
which we might be at war."); William M. Grosvenor, The Law of Conquest; The True
Basis of Reconstruction, 24 NEW ENGLANDER 111, 120 (1865) ("[The rebels] have no
longer any right of protection from our government or any right of citizenship under
it, and become defacto foreigners. Against them the government possesses full bellig-
erent rights under the laws of war.").
153 See generally The Laws of War, 22 Am. L. REG. 265, 271-72 (1874) ("The Constitu-
tion recognises and, for their appropriate uses, adopts 'the law of nations,' and these
include the laws of war. . . . The laws of peace, and the amendments to the Constitu-
tion for the security of life and property, apply in time of peace and in time of war
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Being a civil war, the conflict was also quite different from an
international war against a foreign foe. The Union looked forward to
a time when the people of the South would return to their allegiance
and hence their constitutional rights. 15 4 The purpose of the war was
reparative. And since the United States maintained throughout the
conflict that its sovereignty over the whole nation was undiminished, it
retained the right to hold rebels accountable under municipal crimi-
nal law during or after the war. Therefore, the developing war power
doctrine stated that the rebels had a "double character": "They are at
the same time belligerents and traitors, and subject to the liabilities of
both; while the United States sustains the double character of a bellig-
erent and sovereign, and has the rights of both." 5 5 If and when the
U.S. government criminally prosecuted its citizens, they were entitled
to the many procedural protections of the Constitution; if the govern-
where no war or state of war exists. But where war is actually flagrant, or a state of
war, the laws of war prevail." (emphasis and footnote omitted)).
154 See The Venice, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 258, 266-67 (1864) (argument of the United
States) (stating that when "the power of the enemy has been broken" in a rebel terri-
tory and "the supremacy of the Government is everywhere established," "the people
and property once subject to hostile control may be released from the law of war, and
restored to their rights under the Government"); Letter from H.W. Halleck, General-
in-Chief, to W.S. Rosencrans, Maj. Gen. (Mar. 20, 1863), in 3 U.S. WAR DEP'T, THE
WAR OF THE REBELLION ser. 3, at 77-78 (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office
1899) (suggesting that after the rebellion is put down in Tennessee, the state's "loyal
citizens" and those "who are willing to return to their allegiance" would be restored to
"the rights which they have heretofore enjoyed under the Constitution, and to the
protection which is afforded to persons and property by the glorious flag of the
Union").
155 The Amy Warwick, 1 F. Cas. 799, 803 (D. Mass. 1862) (No. 341), affd sub nom.,
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); see also CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.
2964 (1862) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (describing the "double character" of the
rebels, both "criminals" and "public enemies"); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.
943 (1862) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("We have toward these people in the rebel-
lious States a twofold right. There would be no difficulty in determining our rights as
against them if they were an independent nation; but what makes the difficulty is the
relation which the persons in arms against the Government bear to it, that is as ene-
mies, and at the same time as citizens. That is what seems to embarrass some
minds.. . . We may treat them as traitors, and we may treat them as enemies, and we
have the right of both, belligerent and sovereign, so far as they are concerned.");
Whiting, supra note 127, at 695 ("The United States are AT WAR with rebels, in the
strictly legal and constitutional sense of the term, and have therefore all the rights
against them which follow from a state of war, in addition to those which are derived
from the fact that the rebels are also subjects. . . . [In civil war, the government] has
the legal right to treat the insurgents both as subjects and as belligerents; and they
therefore may exercise the full and untrammeled powers of war against their subjects
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ment chose to treat them as enemies, the Constitution was inapplica-
ble and the laws of war held sway.156
B. A Theory of Extra-Constitutional, Lawless Power?
Critics contended that the Union's prevailing theory of war pow-
ers condoned total disregard of the Constitution during the war, or at
least "extra-legal" or "extra-constitutional" measures.157 (Some mod-
ern commentators still say the same thing.15 8 ) This was not only a
gibe by partisans for the Confederacy-though it was often that.
Thoughtful critics of war policies, like former Supreme Court Justice
Benjamin Curtis, one of the dissenters in Dred Scott, also worried that
the President (or sometimes Congress) had claimed the power to dis-
regard the Constitution. 159 To some extent, this worry stemmed from
assuming that Lincoln and other policymakers agreed with the incau-
tious language of certain Union supporters. As is true in any charged
political debate, some participants used extreme language-here, stat-
ing or implying that the Constitution could and should be violated to
156 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2189-90 (1862) (statement of Sen. Sum-
ner) ("If we treat them as criminals, then we are under the restraints of the Constitu-
tion; if we treat them as enemies, then we have all the latitude sanctioned by the
rights of war. ... [T]he rights against enemies, founded on war . .. are absolutely
without constitutional limitation."); id. at 2190 ("What is done against them merely as
criminals will naturally be in conformity with the Constitution; but what is done
against them as enemies, will have no limitation except the rights of war."); id. at 2964
("Rebels in arms are public enemies, who can claim no safeguard from the Constitu-
tion, and they may be pursued and conquered according to the rights of war.... All
rebels are criminals, liable to punishment according to penal statutes, and in all pro-
ceedings against them as such, they are surrounded by the safeguards of the Constitu-
tion."); Whiting, supra note 127, at 697 ("[I1f the government elects to treat them
[rebels] as subjects and to hold them liable only to penalties for violating statutes, it
must concede to them all the legal rights and privileges which other citizens would
have when under similar accusations; and Congress must be limited to the provisions
of the Constitution in legislation against them as citizens."); id. (noting that the Sus-
pension Clause, Due Process Clause, Takings Clause, Fourth Amendment, First
Amendment freedom of speech and press rights, and the Second Amendment right
to bear arms are said by some to remain rights of rebels as citizens, but "these provi-
sions [are] not applicable to a state of war." (emphasis omitted)); id. ("The clauses
which have been cited from the amendments to the Constitution were intended as
declarations of the rights of peaceful and loyal citizens, and safeguards in the adminis-
tration of justice by the civil tribunals.").
157 See, e.g., The Unconstitutional Acts of the Present Government, 61 KNICKERBOCKER
MONTHLY 157 (1863) (attacking Lincoln's war measures, principally the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation, as "despotic" and based on the principle that "the President can
override the Constitution").
158 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 34, at 1145-48.
159 See CURTIS, supra note 145, at 30.
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win the war.o60 But the prevailing view of statesmen and opinion lead-
ers in the North was that the war was fought to restore the Union and
the Constitution and therefore must be fought in conformity with
applicable constitutional restrictions.'61 What many Copperheads
and other war opponents failed to understand was that war often cre-
ates situations in which powers which would have been unconstitu-
tional in peacetime become constitutional.162 Also misunderstood
was the Union's theory that the laws of war governed the U.S. govern-
ment's uses of military power and, when they did, displaced previously
applicable individual constitutional rights. This was often character-
ized by ideological and political opponents as simply a claim that the
Constitution could be violated to win the war.163 It was not that,
though sometimes it sounded like it. Instead, the claim was that the
Constitution itself called into play a new legal regime during wartime,
the laws of war, which fleshed out the broad and vague constitutional
provisions granting war powers and provided the applicable rules
guiding the government's military measures.164 The legal theory
160 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 329 (1862) (statement of Rep.
Julian) ("The Constitution was made for the people, not the people for the Constitu-
tion. Cases may arise in which patriotism itself may demand that we trample under
our feet some of the most vital principles of the Constitution.").
161 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE APP., 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 167 (1862) (statement of Rep.
Babbitt) ("[T]here exists no legitimate power in any department of this Government
but by virtue of the Constitution; and the public safety can be secured only by the
observance of its provisions, which are sufficiently ample for the purpose.").
162 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 39-40 (quoting statements by Presi-
dent Lincoln and Indiana Governor Morton).
163 Modern scholars repeat this error. See CURRIE, supra note 36, at 273-74, 275
n.290 (criticizing the majority in the Prize Cases for relying on international law and
stating that its "argument that the ex post facto clause ... had no application ...
sounds almost like an assertion that the Constitution was off during the emergency-
a conclusion the Court would emphatically deny a few years later in Ex parte
Milligan").
164 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 378 (1861) (statement of Sen.
Baker) ("[T]he Constitution deals generally with a state of peace, and ... when war is
declared it leaves the condition of public affairs to be determined by the law of war, in
the country where the war exists. It is true that the Constitution of the United States
does adopt the laws of war as a part of the instrument itself, during the continuance
of war."); Whiting, supra note 127, at 697 ("[I]t must not be forgotten that the same
authority [the Constitution] which provides those safeguards, and guarantees those
rights, also imposes upon the President and Congress the duty of so carrying on war
as of necessity to supersede and hold in temporary suspense such civil rights as may
prove inconsistent with the complete and effectual exercise of such war powers, and
of the belligerent rights resulting from them. The rights of war and the rights of
peace cannot coexist."); The Restoration of the Union, 4 CONTINENTAL MONTHLY 444,
446 (1863) ("[P]ending a war, either foreign or civil, the Constitution itself confers
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underlying the Union theorists' many references to a seemingly sepa-
rate "Constitution of war," operating under the laws of war was not the
simple-minded notion that the Constitution as a whole somehow had
no application of any kind during wartime. The Constitution was
understood to be always binding and in effect, in the sense that it
created the U.S. government, empowered and limited its various
branches, and structured the relations between the branches. There
was only one Constitution. But this Constitution, "intended to endure
for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs,"165 allowed the government to exercise different
powers, subject to different limitations, at different places and times.
Some present-day constitutional concerns about individual rights
during wartime were not often heard during Civil War debates.
Though the idea that "some individuals are beyond the protection of
the law," including the Constitution, might today "seem illicit"1 66 or
even un-American, 167 it was widely accepted during the Civil War era.
To be sure, many critics of the Union's war powers theories objected
that residents of the CSA, especially civilians, must be deemed pro-
tected by the Constitution because of their U.S. citizenship and resi-
dence. But no one thought, for example, that foreign enemies would
be so protected. The Constitution was not a global human rights doc-
ument. Nor did the Civil War generation subscribe to another idio-
syncratic modern idea, that the U.S. government's conduct is per se
lawless if it is not subject to judicially enforceable restrictions. 168 This
kind ofjudicial supremacy did not take hold until after World War II.
C. The Work of Lower Federal Courts in 1861 and 1862
Judges of the lower federal courts were exposed to the Union's
legal theories about war powers by briefing and oral argument in liti-
extraordinary powers upon the Government-powers far transcending those which it
may properly exercise in time of peace. These war powers, however, great as they are,
and limited only by the laws and usages of civilized nations, are not extra-constitu-
tional; they are expressly conferred, and are quite as legitimate as those more moder-
ate ones which appropriately belong to the Government in ordinary times.").
165 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
166 Hamburger, supra note 51, at 1827.
167 See supra note 20.
168 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764-65 (2008) (suggesting that the lack
of judicially enforced constitutional rights at Guantanamo would allow "the political
branches to govern without legal constraint"); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
638 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (implying that the Constitution's separation of
powers would be undermined if the military could detain or try individuals "without
independent review," i.e., without Article III judicial review).
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gated cases and by the press's coverage of debates in Congress and
among scholars and publicists. By 1862, most of the core legal pro-
positions necessary to the Supreme Court's Prize Cases decision had
been established in judicial decisions by federal district court judges,
as well as a few Supreme Court Justices riding circuit. From court-
houses in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, St.
Louis, and elsewhere, federal judges' views about constitutional issues
related to the war were disseminated in four ways: published jury and
grand jury charges in treason and piracy prosecutions and decisions in
habeas corpus and prize litigation. Newspapers often reprinted these
decisions, ensuring that they would help inform the public debate.1 69
1. Decisions on Prize and Other Seizures
Starting soon after the blockade was announced on April 19,
1861, captured enemy and neutral vessels began arriving in ports on
the eastern seaboard. After putting the vessel and cargo under the
control of the U.S. district court, which had exclusive original jurisdic-
tion in prize cases, the U.S. government would cause proceedings to
be instituted to "condemn" the property. Persons who asserted own-
ership of part or all of the vessel or cargo (claimants, in the language
of prize courts) soon challenged the constitutionality of the blockade.
The U.S. district attorneys in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Balti-
more, Washington, and elsewhere had to articulate to the courts why
the President had the constitutional authority to order the use of a
military tactic reserved for times of "war." Prominent private lawyers
were retained to assist in some of the cases, including William Evarts,
who would go on to argue the Prize Cases before the Supreme Court
and, after the war, to serve as Attorney General of the United States,
Secretary of State, and a Senator from New York.
The administration was overwhelmingly successful before the
lower federal courts. In decisions upholding captures as lawful prizes
of war, lower courts fully accepted the developing theories of the
administration and its supporters about the belligerent rights of the
United States against rebels. The claimants made similar arguments
in every case. For instance, in mid-June, 1861, in the case of the Brit-
ish vessel the Tropic Wind, which had been seized for violating the
blockade of Virginia's ports, the owners argued that the blockade was
illegal. They started with the undisputed proposition that a blockade
is a belligerent right under the law of nations, and can only be
169 See, e.g., The Law Relating to Prize Vessels; Opinion ofJudge Betts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1861, at 5; The Privateer Savannah; Arguments on Both Sides, supra note 109.
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invoked when there is "a public war."170 Because the independence of
the Confederacy was not recognized by the United States or any for-
eign nation, and because only Congress "alone can declare or recog-
nize war," the insurrection was a mere "municipal" event and the
President lacked authority to characterize it as war in the international
sense. 171 Claimants in other cases made similar arguments, but as
U.S. citizens, contending that the Constitution allowed the govern-
ment to treat citizens levying war only as traitors subject to the civilian
justice system but not military force or other belligerent rights.172 It
was also urged that U.S. states had a constitutional right not to be
treated as an enemy by the central government.173
The most forceful rejection of these arguments came from Judge
Peleg Sprague of Massachusetts and Judge Samuel Rossiter Betts,174
sitting in Manhattan where a large number of prize cases were filed.
Decisions by both judges were reviewed and upheld by the Supreme
Court in the Prize Cases. The argument that only Congress could put
the United States in a state of public war was, wrote Sprague, "a mani-
fest error. It ignores the fact that there are two parties to a war, and
that it may be commenced by either."7 5 It also ignored the Treason
Clause of the Constitution, which Sprague noted contemplates that
"war" against the United States might be begun by domestic trai-
tors.17 6 Many federal judges confronting these arguments in prize
cases emphasized that the President had not sought war but that it
had been thrust upon the United States by the secession of the states,
by the formation of the CSA, and its military attacks on Fort Sumter
and elsewhere.177 When war came, the Commander-in-Chief Clause
170 United States v. The Tropic Wind, 28 F. Cas. 218, 218-19 (C.C.D.C. 1861) (No.
16,541A) (argument of Mr. Carlisle for claimants).
171 Id. at 219.
172 See, e.g., The Hiawatha, 12 F. Cas. 95, 97, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 6451).
173 Id. at 99-100.
174 Judge Betts's important August 1861 decision in The Hiawatha disposed of
common legal questions in nine consolidated cases, among them two that would go to
the Supreme Court. He also wrote at length on the legal issues involving the Consti-
tution and laws of war in other prize cases. See The Sarah Starr, 21 F. Cas. 462, 464
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 12,352), afjfd in part, The Aigburth, 1 F. Gas. 226 (Nelson,
Circuit Justice, C.C.S.D.N.Y 1863) (No. 106), and rev'd in part, The Sarah Starr, 21 F.
Cas. 471 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1863) (No. 12,353).
175 The Amy Warwick, 1 F. Cas. 799, 803 (D. Mass. 1862) (No. 341), affd sub nom.,
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
176 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. I ("Treason against the United
States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their Enemies
177 See The Sarah Starr, 21 F. Cas. at 464-65 ("The hostilities commenced upon the
United States by the seceded or Confederate States of the South have produced a
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placed on the President the duty to meet and repel it."7  According to
Judge Cadwalader of Philadelphia, "when hostilities actually waged
against the constitution and laws assume the dimensions of a general
war, [the President] must prosecute opposing hostilities, offensive as
well as defensive, upon such a proportional scale as may be necessary
to re-establish, or to support and maintain, the government."179 To
be clear, the rebels' actions had not themselves invoked the war pow-
ers of the U.S. government and allowed the application of rights
under the international laws of war. Rebels could not choose how the
government would respond to their provocations. It was the Presi-
dent's decision, or perhaps duty, to meet force with an appropriately
forceful response that brought into play new legal powers and legal
relations of a state of war.
Having initiated a war, residents of seceded states failed to con-
vince the judges that they had a constitutional immunity from being
attacked as military enemies and a right to be dealt with only as way-
ward citizens under domestic criminal law. Judges Sprague and Betts
also rejected two additional, related claims, offered in alternative to
the claim of peacetime constitutional rights. Assuming, for the sake
of argument, said the claimants, that the U.S. government could treat
its citizens as enemies, it followed that the United States (1) could not
also claim the right to the rebels' continuing allegiance and require
them to obey municipal laws, like the law against treason, and (2)
must grant the rebels "all the immunities" of lawful "international bel-
ligerents," like the right to use military force without being subjected
to criminal penalty. According to Betts:
The insurrectionists become enemies of the United States govern-
ment by open hostilities waged against it, without losing their sub-
jection to it individually as citizens. Government represses their
rebellion and treason legitimately by force of arms and war, because
the magnitude and force of the revolt is beyond the control of the
law and civil magistracy.180
state of war between the two communities, as consequent to which the United States
are authorized to employ against their enemies the means of resistance and attack
which are justifiable under the law of nations, by land or naval forces. A blockade of
the ports of their enemy is one such lawful means, and is incident to the war power,
and may be imposed by the president flagrante bello, without any act of the legislature
declaring it. . . ." (emphasis added)); see also The Hiawatha, 12 F. Cas. at 98 (referring
to "insurgent and rebel forces" who "carr[ied] on hostilities against the United
States); The Amy Wanwick, 1 F. Cas. at 803 (explaining the beginning of the Civil War
as attacks on forts and custom-houses by a "traitorous confederation").
178 The Amy Warwick, I F. Cas. at 803.
179 The Parkhill, 18 F. Cas. 1187, 1197 (E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 10,755A).
180 The Hiawatha, 12 F. Cas. at 100.
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Jeremiah Black's defeatist legal reasoning had been reversed. For
Black, as soon as courts and other civil processes could not function
because of the magnitude of the insurrection, the U.S. government
was constitutionally disabled from taking any other action and the
rebels had won their independence; and if the U.S. government acted
unlawfully by using military force anyway, then that too had the legal
effect of granting independence to the rebels and dissolving the
Union. Under Black's view, for the U.S. government it was 'heads'
they win, 'tails' you lose. By contrast, under the new rules emerging
from prize litigation and public debates in 1861 and 1862, the United
States, not the rebels, was in the legally privileged position. It could
put down rebellion by military force, treating rebels as public ene-
mies, and the rebels could not complain because their rebellion had
caused the problem. The United States could also continue to
employ law enforcement means as well, at its discretion, because it
retained the right to the allegiance of the rebels: "[Rebels] are at the
same time belligerents and traitors, and subject to the liabilities of
both; while the United States sustains the double character of a bellig-
erent and sovereign, and has the rights of both. These rights co-exist,
and may be exercised at pleasure." 181 The implications of the United
States's "double character" for the constitutional property rights of
rebels was, for them, a bit grim. The property of all residents of
seceded states became, under the laws of war, "enemy's property"
(sometimes called just "enemy property") which could be seized on
the high seas and condemned in prize courts, thereby transferring
title to the captors. Numerous residents of the CSA appeared before
federal district courts in prize cases pleading that they were in their
"private sentiments . . . loyal citizen [s] of the United States, opposed
to the Rebellion."182 Courts ruled again and again that this was no
defense to capture. 83 Subjects of neutral nations who had commer-
181 The Amy Warwick, 1 F. Cas. at 803.
182 The Prince Leopold, 19 F. Cas. 1334, 1335 (S.D.N.Y 1861) (No. 11,428).
183 See, e.g., The North Carolina, 18 F. Cas. 346, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 10,316A)
(residents of insurgent states are "public enemies" of the United States, even though
"denying that they were insurgents, and asserting that they were true and loyal citizens
of the State of Virginia"); The Hiawatha, 12 F. Cas. at 100-01 (holding that residents
of the insurgent states and districts are "enemies of the government, notwithstanding
their residence within the Union; and the property possessed and held by them thus
becomes property of the enemies of the government, subject to confiscation when
arrested at sea . . . because of their residence, without regard to their private senti-
ments"); see also, e.g., The Prince Leopold, 19 F. Cas. at 1335; The Parkhill, 18 F. Cas. at
1195; The Lynchburg, 15 F. Cas. 1173, 1174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 8637A).
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cial domicile in a rebel state also had their property condemned as
enemy's property.1 8 4
2. Piracy and Treason Prosecutions
At the beginning of the Civil War, there were a few prosecutions
of Confederates for piracy (privateering against U.S. shipping) and
treason. Threats of retaliation on captured U.S. soldiers or sailors ulti-
mately convinced the United States to treat captured rebels as prison-
ers of war,1 85 but before then some law was made by judicial decisions
and published petit and grand jury charges. It was established by
Judge Sprague and Justice Robert Grier, sitting on circuit, that the
federal courts must defer to the political branches' view whether the
CSA had the international rights needed to turn illegal piracy into
legal privateering under a sovereign's commission.18 6 In other words,
184 The Sarah Starr, 21 F. Cas. at 465-66 (involving a British subject domiciled in
South Carolina).
185 See CARNAHAN, supra note 107, at 65-67. Legal difficulties prosecuting treason
also help explain the limited use of this strategy against rebels. Consider the case of
Charles Greiner, a resident of Georgia, prosecuted in federal court in Philadelphia
for treason for allegedly "muster[ing] in military array" with Georgians in December
1860 and helping capture a U.S. fort. United States v. Greiner, 26 F. Cas. 36, 36 (E.D.
Pa. 1861) (No. 15,262). The court in this widely watched case held that the Sixth
Amendment barred the government from prosecuting Greiner anywhere but Geor-
gia, where the federal courts were of course closed indefinitely.
186 See United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1134, 1135-36 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No.
16,318) (charging that a privateer's commission was a defense to piracy only if "the
legislative and executive departments" viewed the rebelling territory as a sovereign
nation and instructing that "[t]he fact that a civil war exists for the purpose of sup-
pressing a rebellion is conclusive evidence that the government of the United States
refuses to acknowledge their right to be considered" a sovereign state); The Law
Against Piracy, 24 MONTHLY L. REP. 14, 18 (1861) (reprinting grand jury charge deliv-
ered in Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts on May 15, 1861 that charged
that the court could not recognize "any State or association of States, as having the
rights of a belligerent, or as carrying on legitimate warfare," when "other departments
of the government" characterize them "as rebels, and lawless aggressors," and use
force to subdue them).
Justice Samuel Nelson-who would write the dissenting opinion in the Prize
Cases--took a different view in a jury charge regarding Confederate privateers
indicted as pirates. Nelson agreed with Grier and Sprague that courts were bound to
accept the decision of the executive and legislature whether a nation was recognized
as independent, because it "involve [d] the determination of great public and political
questions, which belong the departments of our government that have charge of our
foreign relations." See United States v. Baker, 24 F. Cas. 962, 966 (Nelson, Circuit
Justice, C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 14,501). But unlike his colleagues on the federal
bench who instructed jurors that, as a matter of law, the United States had not recog-
nized the independence of the CSA, Nelson left the question open for the jury to
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whether the CSA was a foreign nation or not was a political question.
Grier also suggested that the United States could pursue a two-pro-
nged strategy against the Confederate forces: it could wage a "civil
war" against Confederates as "enemies,"187 and, at the same time,
retain the discretion to prosecute them in civilian courts as U.S. citi-
zens who had violated the municipal criminal laws.' 88
IV. THE SuPREME COURT ENTERS THE WAR
A. The Prize Cases
In March 1863, nearly two years after the attack on Fort Sumter,
the Court decided its first case about the government's conduct of the
war. 89 Known as the Prize Cases'90 because it concerned the Navy's
decide, even when the jury returned to ask "whether, if the jury believed that civil war
existed, and had been so recognized by the act of our government .. . it may influ-
ence their verdict." Id. In the Prize Cases, Nelson would insist that only Congress was
authorized to decide that the United States was at war and could therefore exercise
the powers a belligerent had under the laws of war. But in New York City in October
1861, that great question of constitutional law was for Nelson simply a fact question
for a jury.
187 Grand jury charges about treason in 1861 suggested that the federal judiciary
was receptive to viewing rebels as military "enemies" of the United States. Under one
traditional understanding of the law of treason, the "levying war" component of trea-
son referred to U.S. citizens and others in allegiance who attacked the U.S. govern-
ment, while the "adhering to the enemies" component applied only to citizens who
joined a foreign enemy which was attacking the United States. See United States v.
Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 22 (Field, CircuitJustice, C.C.D. Cal. 1863) (No. 15,254).
By charging grand juries under the "adhering" clause, see, e.g., Charge to GrandJury-
Treason and Piracy, 30 F. Cas. 1049 (C.C.D. Mass. 1861) (No. 18,277) (Sprague,J.);
SWISHER, supra note 107, at 859 (noting July 1861 grand jury charge of Justice John
Catron, sitting on circuit in St. Louis), judges might have signaled that rebels were
akin to foreign enemies and hence that the CSA was, or was similar to, a foreign
nation.
188 See Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1135-36. Justice Nelson did not fully accept the doc-
trines of the Union's theorists and the majority of his colleagues on the federal
bench. A grand jury in November 1861 previewed the legal theory found in his dis-
sent in the Prize Cases. According to Nelson, while a traditional international war
made all of the citizens of each belligerent country the public enemies of the other,
this was true only "in a qualified sense" in civil wars. Charge to Grand Jury-Treason,
30 F. Cas. 1034, 1035 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 18,271). In civil wars, the only persons
in the insurrectionary districts who may be considered and treated as "enemies" by
"the mother government" were those who did not "adher[e] to their allegiance" but
instead were "implicated in the rebellion." Id. In other words, combatants could be
treated as enemies, but civilians could not.
189 By the time the Court heard argument in the Prize Cases, over 540 vessels had
been seized pursuant to the blockade, see Report of the Secretary of the Navy (Dec. 1,
1862), in CONG. GLOBE APP., 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 11, 20 (1862), and over 800,000
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seizure of four vessels as prizes pursuant to the blockade ordered by
Lincoln, the decision was, as anticipated, an important moment in the
war.191 Two seized vessels and their cargoes were owned by residents
of Richmond, Virginia; one was taken on May 17, 1861, and the other
on July 10. A British vessel and cargo were captured leaving the block-
aded port of Richmond on May 20, and, finally, a Mexican vessel and
cargo were seized on June 23, trying to escape the blockaded port of
New Orleans.192 Property of the Virginians-who were U.S. citizens-
lawfully could be seized as enemy property if there existed a state of
public war and the United States could validly treat residents of
seceded states as public enemies.'93 The foreign vessels and cargo
lawfully could be seized for violating the blockade if there existed a
state of public war and the United States had complied with certain
formalities regarding blockades required by the law of nations.' 94
men were in arms for the Union within those parts of the United States where combat
was then or recently had been occurring, see Report of the Secretary of War (Dec. 2,
1862), in CONG. GLOBE App., 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 28, 28 (1862). This must have
influenced the Court's determination in the Prize Cases that a formal state of "war"
existed between the United States and the CSA.
190 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
191 The Court had three new Lincoln appointees-Samuel Miller, David Davis,
and Noah Swayne-but of the remaining six, all were Democrats, three were from
slave states (including ChiefJustice Taney), and five had recently sullied their reputa-
tions-at least as far as many Republicans were concerned-in the Dred Scott case. See
generally Lee & Ramsey, supra note 31, at 64 (describing the Justices who heard the
case).
192 See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 637-38 (reporter's summary); id. at 675-76,
678, 680 (majority opinion).
193 Professors Lee and Ramsey correctly note that the people of Virginia had not
yet gone to the polls and voted to secede on May 17, when one of the Virginian vessels
was seized. See Lee & Ramsey, supra note 31, at 75-76. Their suggestion that this calls
into question the legality of the seizure is not warranted, however. One month before
the prize seizure, Virginia's special convention for considering secession voted to
secede, and then instructed the prosecession governor to call out militia to resist fed-
eral encroachments on Virginia territory. See LONG & LONG, supra note 82, at 60.
The next day, April 18, the U.S. Customs House and Post Office in Richmond and two
U.S. vessels on the James River were seized by Virginia's forces. Id. at 61. Over the
next ten days, Generals Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston took command of Vir-
ginia troops; the federal arsenal at Harper's Ferry was seized; and the Virginia seces-
sion convention voted to accept Jefferson Davis's suggestion that Richmond become
the capital of the CSA. See id. at 61-66. In these circumstances, President Lincoln was
surely justified in treating Virginia as already in insurrection in his blockade procla-
mation of April 27. See Proclamation No. 5, 12 Stat. app. 1259 (Apr. 27, 1861).
194 The foreign neutral's vessels and cargo could have been seized for other rea-
sons, not presented by the facts of their cases, for example, for carrying contraband of
war.
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But by a 5-4 vote, the Court in the Prize Cases sustained the legality
of the President's blockade and accepted the dual-status doctrine.195
The first question addressed was whether the President had the
authority to institute a blockade that would be recognized as such by
the law of nations. This could be seen as two separate but related
inquiries. One arose under international law: did the blockade meet
the criteria of the law of nations? This was a potentially dispositive
issue because all the Justices agreed that, unless there existed a state of
public war as recognized by the law of nations, that law prohibited any
country from enforcing a blockade against neutral nations' ship-
ping.196 Therefore, the legal status of the conflict against the rebels
was a key point-was it "war" or domestic crime control? The second,
related inquiry sounded in constitutional separation-of-powers law:
before Congress came into session and ratified the President's earlier
war measures, did the President have the authority to treat the conflict
as a public war and institute a blockade recognized by the law of
nations? The dissent would have answered both questions in the neg-
ative, holding that, because of all the serious consequences of a state
of war under international law,19 7 the law of nations itself mandated
that the "the sovereign power" only could change peace to war,198 and
195 Justices Grier, Miller, Davis, Swayne, and Wayne composed the majority; dis-
senting were Chief Justice Taney and Justices Nelson, Clifford, and Catron.
196 See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 666.
197 As Justice Nelson explained:
The people of the two countries become immediately the enemies of each
other-all intercourse commercial or otherwise between them unlawful-all
contracts existing at the commencement of the war suspended, and all made
during its existence utterly void. The insurance of enemies' property, the
drawing of bills of exchange or purchase on the enemies' country, the remis-
sion of bills or money to it are illegal and void. Existing partnerships
between citizens or subjects of the two countries are dissolved, and, in fine,
interdiction of trade and intercourse direct or indirect is absolute and com-
plete by the mere force and effect of war itself. All the property of the peo-
ple of the two countries on land or sea are subject to capture and
confiscation by the adverse party as enemies' property, with certain qualifica-
tions as it respects property on land . .. all treaties between the belligerent
parties are annulled. The ports of the respective countries may be block-
aded, and letters of marque and reprisal granted as rights of war, and the law
of prizes as defined by the law of nations comes into full and complete oper-
ation, resulting from maritime captures jure belli.
Id. at 687 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
198 See id. at 688 (stating that the law of nations, "the same code which has
annexed to the existence of a war all these disturbing consequences has declared that
the right of making war belongs exclusively to the supreme or sovereign power of the
State. This power in all civilized nations is regulated by the fundamental laws or
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under the U.S. Constitution, the sovereign power charged with initiat-
ing or recognizing war was the Congress.1 99 The distance between the
dissent and majority was, in fact, relatively narrow; after Congress
authorized the President to act against the insurrection in July 1861,
the dissent was fully satisfied that public war existed and the U.S. gov-
ernment could exercise belligerent rights against the entire CSA. 200
All sides agreed that the law of nations allowed the same belligerent
rights to be applied in civil wars as in foreign wars.201
The majority noted that only Congress was empowered to "initi-
ate or declare a war" in the formal sense.202 But a formal dejure state
of war was not required tojustify resort to belligerent rights, including
the right to blockade. War might merely "exist defacto," and the fact
of war could occur without any initiative taken by the U.S. govern-
ment.203 A state of war could be created by enemy attack.204 And a
civil war, said the majority, "is never publicly proclaimed, eo nomine,
against insurgents."2 0 5 No branch of the U.S. government initiates it,
so the constitutional separation-of-powers concern of the dissent
never arose. For purposes of the law of nations, a civil war comes into
existence as a factual matter when an insurrection has become large
enough in terms of "the number, power, and organization of the per-
sons who originate and carry it on"20 6 and has forced the closure of
the civil justice system of the recognized government. 207 This had
occurred by April 1861. It followed that the President had acted con-
stitutionally when he instituted on his own authority the blockade.
The President was "bound" to respond to the crisis "in the shape it
presented itself;" 208 he had constitutional duties, as Commander-in-
municipal constitution of the country."); see also id. at 645-47 (argument of Mr. Car-
lisle for the claimants) (questioning whether the rebellion was a war).
199 See id. at 688-89 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (stating that only Congress, "the war-
making power of the Government," has constitutional authority to "change the legal
status of the Government or the relations of its citizens from that of peace to a state of
war").
200 Before that time, the dissent allowed that the U.S. government could wage
"personal war" against the individuals actually in rebellion; Congress's action had
been necessary to make it "a territorial civil war." Id. 694-95.
201 See id. at 667 (majority opinion).
202 Id. at 668.
203 See id. at 666.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 666.
207 Id. at 667. When "[t]his greatest of civil wars . .. sprung forth suddenly from
the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war," it existed as a matter of "fact,"
even though Congress had not yet "baptize[d] it with a name." Id. at 668-69.
208 Id. at 669.
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Chief, to defend against violent attacks on the country and
government.209
Modem commentators overlook that the Court considered the
separation-of-powers issue from two perspectives: that of the foreign
neutral nations, and that of residents of seceded states of the Union.
Because Great Britain and other nations had, soon after the fall of
Fort Sumter, proclaimed that a state of war existed between the
United States and "certain States styling themselves the Confederate
States of America,"210 the Court held that foreigners were "estopped
to deny" in a U.S. court "the existence of a war with all its conse-
quences as regards neutrals."211 In addressing the claims of the for-
209 Professor Vladeck has argued that the Prize Cases located the President's power
to blockade not in the Constitution but in two congressional statutes, dating from
1795 and 1807, which authorized the President to use militia or the armed forces to
put down "insurrection," "obstruction of the laws," and other domestic disturbances
that were too powerful for the criminal justice system. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Re-
Rethinking the Prize Cases: Some Remarks in Response to Professor Lee, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J.
85, 86-88 (2008) [hereinafter Vladeck, Re-Rethinking]; Stephen I. Vladeck, Note,
Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149, 178-80 (2004) (citing Act of
Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 and Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424). Notwith-
standing the compelling case he makes, I remain unconvinced. The Court's extensive
discussion of how the peacetime constitutional rights of U.S. citizens are displaced
during a public war contains no mention of congressional authorization. When U.S.
citizens are protesting that a president has unconstitutionally assumed the power to
start a war and has violated their individual constitutional rights, "Congress author-
ized it" would be just the type of persuasive response that a court might highlight.
Another objection to Professor Vladeck's thesis is that the Prize Cases was about
"war"-Did it exist? Had the President started it or responded to it? Who decides?
Did the powers or duties of the President differ in "civil war" as opposed to "foreign
war"? As discussed in Part II above, "civil war" was at the extreme end of a continuum
of domestic conflict; starting at the other end of the continuum, there was simple
crime, then crime too severe to be handled by law enforcement, then insurrection,
then rebellion, and then finally civil war. The statutes cited by Professor Vladeck
appear to give the President certain authorities in cases on that continuum which are
less severe than civil war. The statutes do not purport to boost the President's powers
into the "war" zone-i.e., to give him the authority to use all belligerent rights author-
ized by the customary laws of war against both combatants and civilians of the revolt-
ing part of the Union and against foreign neutrals, if necessary. Cf Thomas H. Lee,
The Civil War in U.S. Foreign Relations Law: A Dress Rehearsal for Modern Transformations,
53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 53, 63-64 (2008) (noting that seizure of the shipping of foreign
neutral nations is authorized only in a state of public war and that nothing in the
statutes cited by Professor Vladeck appears to give the President that kind of
authority).
210 This is the phrasing of the Queen of England's proclamation. See Prize Cases,
67 U.S. (2 Black) at 669 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Queen Victoria).
211 Id. This was certainly true of the British. The Mexican claimants in the Prize
Cases were also estopped to deny the existence of a public war, though Mexico's politi-
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eign neutrals, the Court did not discuss the merits of any questions
under U.S. municipal law, but simply scolded the foreign claimants
for "ask [ing the] Court to affect a technical ignorance of the existence
of a war, which all the world acknowledges to be the greatest civil war
known in the history of the human race."212 The Court then turned
to what it characterized as a separate inquiry: in wartime, what type of
property is considered "enemies' property" under the laws of war and
hence was subject to seizure.213 Under this heading, the Court con-
fronted most directly the individual constitutional rights claim of the
allegedly loyal Virginians. Here it was clear that the Court did not
cal status and its relationship to the United States were complicated. During much of
the war, the Mexican port Matamoros, on the Rio Grande across from Brownsville,
Texas, was "the entrep6t for [neutral] trade with. the South exchanging cotton for con-
traband." JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 387 (1988). Although the
United States was favorably disposed to Mexico's liberal government-the winning
side in the Guerra de Reforma, Mexico's "ferocious civil war" from 1858-61, see
ENRIQUE KRAUZE, MEXICO: BiocRAPHY OF POWER 169, 173-74 (Hank Heifetz trans.,
1997)-the Matamoros trade was an irritant. Mexico, like the European powers, had
declared itself a neutral in the armed conflict between the United States and the CSA.
See H. EXEC. Doc. No. 371, at 751-52 (1862). In early 1862, England, France, and
Spain intervened militarily in Mexico-ostensibly to collect outstanding debts. See
KRAUZE, supra, at 169, 173-74. Spain and England withdrew, leaving France to
attempt to conquer the country and install a new conservative government. See id. at
174. As the Supreme Court was hearing argument in the Prize Cases, French forces
were winning decisive victories; a year later, France would install Maximilian, a Haps-
burg archduke, as Emperor of Mexico. See id. at 175-76.
212 Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 669. The Court's not entirely explicit on this
point, but it appears that the majority only adjudicated the claims of foreigners under
the law of nations, not the U.S. Constitution. If true, that would be consistent with
the protection-allegiance framework under which nonresident foreigners acted
against by the U.S. government on the high seas would not be under the protection of
the Constitution. The foreign claimants did, though, have a right to the protection of
any applicable principles of the law of nations, because by constituting prize courts
and requiring that high seas captures by U.S. forces be adjudicated there, Congress
had implicitly mandated application of the law of prize, which, unless changed by
Congress, allowed neutral claimants to contest the legality of the seizure of their ves-
sels or cargoes.
The dissenting Justices and counsel for the Mexican claimants argued that,
because the law of nations required a declaration or other action by "the sovereign
power" to change peace to war and invoke international belligerent rights, it was nec-
essary to examine the municipal constitution of a nation to discern whether war was
properly initiated. See id. at 645 (argument of Mr. Carlisle for the claimants); see also
id. at 688 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Hence the law of nations required, here, inquiry
into the constitutional separation-of-powers question. Whether because it agreed
with this argument sub silentio, or more likely because the U.S. citizen claimants had a
right to have their constitutional claim adjudicated, the Court considered it in detail.
213 Id. at 671 (majority opinion).
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consider whether the Mexican and British claimants had individual
constitutional rights.2 14
The Court asked whether "the property of all persons residing
within the territory of the States now in rebellion [could lawfully] be
treated as 'enemies' property,' whether the owner be in arms against
the Government or not?"2 1 5 The Virginians invoked the antebellum
traditional framework of treason law:
The appellants contend that the term "enemy" is properly
applicable to those only who are subjects or citizens of a foreign
State at war with our own. They quote from the pages of the com-
mon law, which say "that persons who wage war against the King
may be of two kinds, subjects or citizens. The former are not proper
enemies, but rebels and traitors; the latter are those that come
properly under the name of enemies."2 16
This argument might have had some force a few years earlier, but by
1863, elite political and legal circles in the North had, as described
above in Part III, accepted that residents of the CSA had forfeited
their right to be protected by the Constitution or other municipal
laws. As the Court put it in reply to the Virginians: "All persons resid-
ing within [the seceded States] are, in this contest, liable to be treated
as enemies, though not foreigners. They have cast off their allegiance
and made war on their Government, and are none the less enemies
because they are traitors."2 1 7
The Virginian claimants also contended that the violent rebellion
and the secession of their state from the Union could not be attrib-
uted to them:
[T]he acts of the usurping government [of Virginia] cannot legally
sever the bond of their allegiance; they have, therefore, a co-relative
right to claim the protection of the [U.S.] government for their per-
sons and property, and to be treated as loyal citizens till legally con-
214 Their vessels and cargo were not seized because they were property of the CSA
(enemy property), but because theirs was neutral property caught violating a lawful
blockade by trading with the CSA. Furthermore, as discussed shortly, the Court ana-
lyzed whether residents of the CSA were still under "protection" of the Constitution
and other "municipal" laws, and whether the actions of state governments in seceding
could lawfully be attributed to residents who retained their "allegiance." These con-
cepts are entirely inapplicable to foreigners not resident in the United States, who
owed no allegiance and could claim no protection from the United States, its Consti-
tution, and laws.
215 Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 671.
216 Id. at 672.
217 Id. at 674.
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victed of having renounced their allegiance and made war against
the [U.S.] Government by treasonably resisting its laws.2 18
Phrased in more modern terms, the Virginians claimed that their indi-
vidual constitutional rights could not be waived or forfeited by any-
one's actions except their own. They also made the related argument
that secession was illegal and void, and the U.S. government still had
power under "municipal law" to punish crimes of U.S. citizens in
rebellion, and therefore that the "the law of the land" and the con-
comitant "protection" of the "Constitution and Laws of the United
States" should still govern seizure of their property, not the interna-
tional law of prize. 2 19 The Court rejected these arguments for consti-
tutional protection with impatience and a bit of hostility. Note the
triple exclamation points and ironic quotation marks:
This argument . . . assumes that where a civil war exists, the
party belligerent claiming to be sovereign cannot, for some
unknown reason, exercise the rights of belligerents, although the
revolutionary party may. Being sovereign, he can exercise only sov-
ereign rights over the other party. The insurgent may be killed on
the battle field or by the executioner; his property on land may be
confiscated under the municipal law; but the commerce on the
ocean, which supplies the rebels with means to support the war,
cannot be made the subject of capture under the laws of war,
because it is "unconstitutional!!' Now it is a proposition never
doubted, that the belligerent party who claims to be sovereign, may
exercise both belligerent and sovereign rights. Treating the other
party as a belligerent and using only the milder modes of coercion
which the law of nations has introduced to mitigate the rigors of
war, cannot be a subject of complaint by the party to whom it is
accorded as a grace or granted as a necessity. 2 20
In condensed form, the Court here refers to two years' worth of
public argument about whether the rebellion was crime, war, both, or
neither; whether "coercion" of seceded states was constitutional;
whether the United States could concede belligerent rights to the CSA
military in order to avoid bloody retaliation yet still maintain that
secession was illegal and the Union unbroken; and whether the U.S.
government could concurrently exercise both sovereign and belliger-
ent rights. The Court's dismissive attitude was not due to carelessness
or a failure to appreciate the weightiness of these legal questions.
This debate had already occurred and the legal views of the Copper-
heads and other opponents of the U.S. government's war-powers
218 Id. at 672.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 672-73 (citation omitted).
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claims had been rejected. The Union's theories had prevailed in the
war of ideas, and it was time that the losers accepted that and moved
on. 221
The Court did not display the same impatience with having to
answer the Virginian's contention that they were loyal and therefore it
was unfair to displace their constitutional rights by the laws of war.
The Court did reject the argument, however. Just as all citizens or
subjects of a nation are treated as enemies of the other in a foreign
war-because it would be impractical and dangerous to assume other-
wise and because their bodies can be enlisted in the armed forces and
their property used to wage war, even if they oppose it-so too would
all residents of the CSA be treated as public enemies of the United
States.222 No one would deny that this rule causes suffering for the
innocent in every war, and perhaps even more so in civil wars. But it
must be the rule.223
221 One recent commentator contends that the Court in the Pize Cases and other
Civil War decisions did not "abandon[ I] the traditional distinction under treason law
between 'enemies' and 'traitors,"' and that U.S. citizens and all others present in the
United States could not lawfully be treated as military enemies because of the alle-
giance/protection framework. See Larson, supra note 36, at 918-20; see also id. at 863
("[T]he Treason Clause prohibits the exercise of military authority over individuals
who are subject to the law of treason, a category that includes not only United States
citizens, but almost all persons merely present within the United States."). This is not
correct. As shown above in Part III, a wide swath of elite opinion in the North had
already concluded, by 1863, that all residents of the CSA had forfeited their right to
protection by attempting to cast off their allegiance through armed rebellion. The
Supreme Court stated its agreement with this view in the Prize Cases, and would reiter-
ate that agreement frequently in later decisions concerning the war.
222 See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 673.
223 The majority opinion in the Prize Cases ended with a striking image:
[This] is no loose, unorganized insurrection, having no defined boundary or
possession. It has a boundary marked by lines of bayonets, and which can be
crossed only by force-south of this line is enemies' territory, because it is
claimed and held in possession by an organized, hostile and belligerent
power.
Id. at 673-74. Though this may sound like a mere rhetorical flourish, the Court was
likely sending an important legal message to the U.S. government and, perhaps, to
the residents of the CSA as well. To the Lincoln Administration and Congress: the
war zone in which U.S. citizens may be treated as enemies without constitutional
rights will not be allowed to extend throughout the entire United States, but only to
those places on the other side of the rebels' bayonets. The Court was obviously not
articulating a precise rule, but was indicating that there were limits to the govern-
ment's power over individual liberties that corresponded roughly to the battle lines.
And to the South: put down your bayonets and you will no longer be subject to harsh
treatment as military enemies outside the protection of the laws.
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After the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court accepted as beyond dis-
pute that residents of the CSA were enemies and could be subjected
by the U.S. government to military force and other military coercion
under the laws of war as if they were foreigners in a foreign war.
When the United States acted against them in a military capacity, they
lacked any enforceable constitutional rights. After the Prize Cases, the
Court also accepted the related proposition that the U.S. government
could, in its discretion, choose to act as either a sovereign applying
municipal law to punish and deter persons who remained protected
by any applicable individual rights under the Constitution (or statutes
or treaties), or a belligerent, subject to the laws of war (and any stat-
utes or treaties applicable to wartime). In sum, the Court accepted
the dual-status doctrine in full.224
B. Wartime Decisions After the Prize Cases
1. Additional Decisions Concerning Maritime Prizes
The Court decided relatively few additional war cases before the
surrender of the Confederate armies in spring and summer 1865. In
United States v. Hallock,225 the Court reaffirmed the Prize Cases and con-
demned as enemy property that owned by a U.S. citizen resident in
New Orleans and seized on the high seas as prize of war. 226 Property
owned by citizens of Connecticut and New York was held not to be
enemy property-a rule that was obviously implicit in the Prize Cases-
but their property was condemned anyway for "illicit trading with the
enemy," that is, trading with residents of Louisiana. 227 In The Androm-
eda,228 the Court condemned a vessel and cargo owned by residents of
Texas and Louisiana-both individuals were "rebel enemies" whose
property could be seized under the laws of war as "enemy prop-
erty."229 The Baigony3 0 upheld the condemnation of a vessel and
cargo owned by British and French merchants living in New Orleans;
their property was "enemies' property, because of the employment of
224 See RANDALL, supra note 44, at 71 ("This 'double status' principle was not only
the basis of Union policy; it was fully affirmed by the Supreme Court .. . in the Prize
Cases."); cf EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PowERs, 1787-1957, at
231 (1957) ("[T]he Court held in the Prize cases in 1863 that the President was enti-
tied to treat the blockaded states as enemy territory and their inhabitants as 'enemies'
of the United States, and thereby put them out of their constitutional rights.").
225 154 U.S. 537 (1864).
226 Id. at 537.
227 Id.
228 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 481 (1864).
229 Id. at 488-89.
230 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 474 (1864).
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the vessel in the enemies' trade" between Havana, Cuba and
Louisiana.231
In The Circassian,232 a British steamer was libeled as a prize of war
for attempting to run the blockade to reach New Orleans in May
1862.233 The claimants argued that the capture of New Orleans by a
joint U.S. Army-Navy operation a few days before the seizure of their
vessel off the coast meant that the blockade was no longer legal under
"the law of nations," because blockades operate only against territory
of "the enemy," and New Orleans was no longer that.234 According to
the claimants, the people of New Orleans "were, at all times, Ameri-
can citizens," whose "rights" as citizens were reinstated by the over-
throw of rebel rule and the restoration of U.S. supremacy.235 The
Court disagreed. The Union forces' very brief possession of the actual
city of New Orleans did not terminate the blockade, it said, because
the entire coastal and riverine area around New Orleans, still in rebel
control, was being blockaded by the force which captured the Circas-
sian.236 A rule of the Prize Cases-agreed to by the dissenting Justices
also, the Court noted-still applied here, that the rebellion had
"assumed the character and proportions of civil war," in which the
U.S. government properly invoked belligerent rights.237
The Venice238 concerned a vessel owned by a long-term resident of
New Orleans who had retained his British nationality; his vessel was
seized on Lake Ponchartrain, Louisiana, in May 1862, just after U.S.
forces had occupied New Orleans and Confederate defenders fled
into the interior of the state.2 39  The Court reiterated what it
described as the law of the Prize Cases "concurred in by the dissenting
Justices": "The rule which declares that war makes all the citizens or
subjects of one belligerent enemies of the Government and of all the
231 Id. at 481.
232 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 135 (1864).
233 Id. at 135.
234 Id. at 143.
235 Id. at 144.
236 See id. at 149-50.
237 Id. at 148. In dissent, Justice Nelson stated that New Orleans was "our own
territory" containing "our own people," and when the U.S. forces recaptured it, "the
Constitution of the United States, which extends over every portion of the Union, and
is the supreme law of the land," brought about "restoration" of the U.S. government's
'ancient possession, authority, and laws." Id. at 158 (Nelson, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 159 (" [T] he moment the capture took place, and the authority of the United States
was established, the municipal laws of that government took the place of the interna-
tional law upon which the blockade rested.").
238 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 258 (1864).
239 Id. at 260.
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citizens or subjects of the other, applies equally to civil and to interna-
tional wars."2 4 0 Residents of the CSA could be treated by the U.S.
government as enemies even if "not actually engaged in active hostili-
ties against the Union."2 4 1 The U.S. government argued that the Brit-
ish claimant's long residence in New Orleans made Louisiana his
domicile and him "an enemy;" 242 the Court agreed. 2 4 3 Counsel for
the United States further contended that only the President could
decide when the power of the enemy in a particular locale had been
broken and "the people and property once subject to hostile control
may be released from the laws of war, and restored to their rights under the
Government."2 4 4 The Court held that the policy announced by Con-
gress, by the President in a proclamation, and by the commanding
Union general in New Orleans was that recaptured CSA territory
would be held under martial law as necessary, but that the inhabitants
would, in many other respects, no longer be subject to "treatment as
enemies." 2 4 5 In particular, private property would no longer be seized
as prize under the customary laws of war. The "general purpose"
under which the President and Congress waged the war was "the re-
establishment of the national authority, and the ultimate restoration
of States and citizens to their national relations."246
The Venice is significant for several reasons. It nicely illustrates
that the judiciary's application of the customary laws of war to
residents of the CSA occurred at the behest and under the direction
of Congress and the President; the judiciary was not ex proprio vigore
importing customary international law into the U.S. legal system. Sec-
ond, the case also shows how the Court's legal analysis was affected by
the fact that the conflict occurred within the United States and the
military enemies being attacked by the U.S. government were U.S. citi-
240 Id. at 274 & n.16.
241 Id. at 275.
242 Id. at 266 (argument of counsel).
243 Id. at 279 (majority opinion).
244 Id. at 267 (argument of counsel) (emphasis added). The argument of claim-
ant's counsel was not published, but it seems likely that he claimed entitlement, upon
the federal government's recapture of the city, to some municipal rights including
constitutional rights.
245 Id. at 277 (majority opinion).
246 Id. at 278. The Court ended with two important qualifications: first, that its
ruling said nothing about the continuing liability of persons and property to statutory
criminal penalties or confiscations; and, second, that the federal government could
continue to treat residents of areas recaptured as enemies in all respects if they,
unlike the claimant in this case, were "guilty of any actual hostility against the national
Government," that is, if they acted as military enemies before or after the federal
repossession of the area. Id. at 279.
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zens (or resident aliens owing temporary allegiance and hence under
protection of the laws). In this civil war, individual constitutional
rights were always hovering about, ready to emerge and be enforced
just as soon as the state of war ended in particular places or as to
particular people. As the U.S. lawyers put it, for all enemies there
would come a time when they would be "released from the laws of
war, and restored to their rights under the Government" of the
United States.247 The default legal status of the enemy in the Civil
War was under the protection of the Constitution. Therefore the judi-
ciary needed to closely examine U.S. wartime actions and policies so it
could discern when the war's displacement of constitutional rights
would end. This aspect of the legal analysis of the conflict makes it
wholly unlike international wars against foreigners and foreign
nations whose default legal position was out of protection of the
Constitution.
2. Courts Closed to Rebel Enemies During the War
In the 1864 case Mrs. Alexander's Cotton,248 the Court held that the
laws of war made a plantation owner an "enemy" and her cotton
"enemy property" because they were located within Confederate lines
in Louisiana. 249 The Court rejected the assertion that temporary
Union military control of the area had allowed loyal residents to
"resume their political and civil rights" and "rights of property, such as
[they] enjoyed before" the war.2 5 0 The Court was "governed by the
principle of public law"-that is, customary international law-"so
often announced from this bench as applicable alike to civil and inter-
national wars, that all the people of each State or district in insurrec-
tion against the United States, must be regarded as enemies, until by
the action of the legislature and the executive, or otherwise, that rela-
tion is thoroughly and permanently changed."251
The Court further held that enemies of the United States had no
standing to invoke the aid of courts in the United States while the war
lasted: "Mrs. Alexander, being now a resident in enemy territory, and
in law an enemy, can have no standing in any court of the United
247 Id. at 267.
248 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404 (1864).
249 Id. at 418.
250 Id. at 411-12, 418-21 (emphasis omitted).
251 Id. at 419. The Court held that U.S. naval forces had no authority to seize
property on land as "maritime prize," and that proceeds from the sale of Mrs. Alexan-
der's cotton should therefore be turned over to the U.S. Treasury under the Aban-
doned and Captured Property Act, the statute applicable to enemy property seized on
land. Id. at 420-23.
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States so long as that relation shall exist."252 While this rule is funda-
mental to understanding the full scope of the displacement of consti-
tutional and other municipal rights of U.S. citizens by the laws of war,
it is not often noted in scholarship or judicial discussions of Civil War
cases.
The Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts repeat-
edly held or stated that, as in prior wars,253 U.S. courts were closed to
enemies during the Civil War.2 54 This rule is rarely understood or
noted by contemporary scholars or courts.255 It is impossible to com-
252 Id. at 421.
253 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S. 452, 464 (1884) ("A state of war ... suspends
until the return of peace the right of any one residing in the enemy's country to sue
in our courts." (citations omitted)); Conrad v. Waples, 96 U.S. 279, 289-90 (1877)
("During the war, the property of alien enemies is subject to confiscation jure belli,
and their civil capacity to sue is suspended."); Masterson v. Howard, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
99, 105 (1873) ("The existence of war does, indeed, close the courts of each belliger-
ent to the citizens of the other . . . ."); Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 184
(1872) (applying to residents of Virginia and Kansas "[t]he principle of public law
which closes the courts of a country to a public enemy during war"); Caperton v.
Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 236 (1871) (noting the rule that enemies are "totally
incapable of sustaining any action in the tribunals of the other belligerent" and that
there is an "[a]bsolute suspension of the right to sue and prohibition to exercise it
during war, by the law of nations, but the restoration of peace removes the disability
and opens the doors of the courts"); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 536
(1867) (describing "the inability of an alien enemy to sue or sustain, in the language
of the civilians, a persona standi in judicio"); Elgee's Adm'r v. Lovell, 8 F. Cas. 449, 454
(C.C.D. Mo. 1865) (No. 4344) ("[A] man residing in the Confederacy, and subject to
its control, is, in law, a public enemy ... [and] he cannot, in our courts, maintain any
suit against citizens residing in loyal states."); Stiles v. Easley, 51 111. 275, 276 (1869)
("While hostilities continued, Easley, as the citizen of a hostile State [Virginia], was
disabled from suing in our courts; but this disability ended with the war."); Kershaw v.
Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561, 563 (1868) ("The rule is certainly well settled that during any
war, foreign or civil, an action cannot be prosecuted by an enemy, residing in the
enemy's territory, but must be stayed until the return of peace.").
The Supreme Court ruled that enemies could not themselves invoke the aid of
the courts, but that they could defend themselves in court if the United States
brought suit against them or their property, for example under the First or Second
Confiscation Acts. SeeWindsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876); Univ. v. Finch, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 106, 111 (1873); McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259, 267
(1870).
255 The misunderstanding might stem from the fact that many postbellum deci-
sions of the Court about the war involved civil claims brought by residents of the
former CSA, and even by former officers and soldiers of the Confederate military.
But both Presidents Lincoln and Johnson liberally issued individual and group par-
dons to rebels which removed their disability to invoke the power of the courts and
restored their other constitutional and civil rights. See, e.g., Erwin v. United States, 97
U.S. 392, 395 (1878) ("[N]or is any point raised against [Erwin's] status in court from
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prehend the true legal status of military enemies of the United States
during the Civil War-and later, as the Civil War jurisprudence
remained black letter law for decades afterwards-without realizing
that they could not seek aid from courts in the United States during
the conflict. The Supreme Court's blithe assumption in the twentieth
century that even Nazi saboteurs have a right to habeas review in Arti-
cle III courts in the middle of World War II, and the twenty-first cen-
tury Court's view that the Constitution positively requires habeas
review for noncitizens detained outside the United States as military
enemies in a congressionally authorized armed conflict, no matter
what Congress and the President say,256 were radical departures from
prior U.S. law and practice.
3. Vallandigham's Case
The Court decided one other war powers case during the war, Ex
parte Vallandigham257-and it was a significant one, regarding military
jurisdiction over civilians in the North. Clement Vallandigham was a
nationally known political figure-a leading Copperhead and Peace
Democrat, who represented a southern Ohio district in Congress from
1857 to 1862. He was arrested at home in Ohio in May 1863 on the
orders of the local commanding Union general and was quickly con-
victed by a military commission for uttering disloyal statements at
Democratic party rallies intended to undermine the Union war effort
his former connection with the rebellion as an officer in the Confederate army, the
disability thus created having been removed by the President's proclamation of par-
don and amnesty."). The most far-reaching was a Christmas pardon by President
Johnson. See Proclamation No. 15, 15 Stat. 711, 711-12 (Dec. 25, 1868). For the
other group pardons, see Proclamation No. 3, 15 Stat. 699 (Sept. 7, 1867); Proclama-
tion No. 37, 14 Stat. 758-66 (May 29, 1865); Pres. Proclamation No. 14, 13 Stat. 741
(Mar. 26, 1864); Proclamation No. 11, 13 Stat. 737 (Dec. 8, 1863). A large part of the
Court's work product about war issues concerned the effect of the various pardons
restoring civil and property rights. See, e.g., Lamar v. McCulloch, 115 U.S. 163, 164-65
(1885); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 153-54 (1877); Osborn v. United States,
91 U.S. 474, 475 (1875); Haycraft v. United States, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 81, 92 (1874);
Sprott v. United States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459, 467 (1874); Carlisle v. United States, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 151 (1872); Pargoud v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 156,
157-58 (1871); Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 155-56 (1871);
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 136 (1871); United States v. Padelford,
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542 (1869); In re Armstrong's Foundry, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 766,
769 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866).
256 See supra notes 4, 17.
257 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864).
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and spur resistance to military orders.258 The U.S. circuit court in
Cincinnati denied Vallandigham's habeas corpus petition.2 5 9 Val-
landigham had alleged that military detention was unconstitutional
because he was a civilian in a loyal state where martial law had not
been imposed. The U.S. government was ably represented by Aaron
F. Perry, an Ohio politician and private lawyer who in 1861 had
declined President Lincoln's offer to appoint him to the Supreme
Court.2 6 0 According to Perry, the Constitution contemplates times of
peace where civil jurisdiction under constitutional protections
prevails, but the Constitution also contemplates and allows the gov-
ernment to "meet war with war."26 1 " [T]he laws of war are a necessary
incident of a state of war," he argued, and are as constitutional in
wartime as "the laws of civil procedure are in times of peace."26 2 Fur-
thermore, no man can "throw off his allegiance, defy the government,
make war upon it, and, at the same time, claim its protection. When
he lifts his arm against the constitution, the arm may be cut off, with-
out giving him a right to complain of cruel and unusual punish-
ment."263 The circuit court upheld military jurisdiction to detain
based on a prior unreported decision by Justice Swayne sitting in the
258 See GUELZO, supra note 110, at 230-32; WiwIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS
BUT ONE 64-66 (1998); see also Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 244-45 (detailing
the specific charges).
259 See Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No. 16,816).
260 See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Aaron Fyfe Perry,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=POO02 4 1 (last visited May
3, 2010).
261 Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 901.
262 Id. at 910.
263 Id. at 902. The local U.S. Attorney, Flamen Ball, who also addressed the court,
claimed more than he needed to, invoking "the law of self-preservation" of the nation,
which is "higher than any written law, or written constitution." Id. at 917. His fiery
rhetoric likely hurt rather than helped the United States's case. Before civil counsel
for the United States appeared, the general who ordered the arrest, Ambrose Burn-
side, responded to the court that in this "state of civil war," where the several loyal
states within his military department were threatened with invasion, "all the rules of
modern warfare" would allow him to hang "a man from the enemy's country" who did
what Vallandigham did, and it was illogical that "our own public men" should be
given total immunity from military arrest for similarly damaging conduct. The Case of
Mr. Vallandigham, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1863, at 2. Whether the general intended it or
not, his response seems to have been a clever way to turn Vallandigham's fame against
him, by implying that ruling for the United States was the strictly legal course and that
freeing the detainee would represent genuflection to his public status.
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same circuit.2 64 The validity of the military commission trial was not
passed upon. 265
Vallandigham's case became a cause cilebre for critics who con-
tended that many of the administration's policies violated civil liber-
ties. The lower court's decision was sustained in the U.S. Senate by
the influential John Sherman of Ohio, who would later serve as Secre-
tary of the Treasury and Secretary of State. Vallandigham was justly
treated as a "public enemy," argued Sherman, because he went to a
part of Ohio where "open insubordination existed, and aided the pub-
lic enemy by acts calculated to fan the flames of insurrection."26 6
Before the Supreme Court became involved, in May 1863 President
Lincoln ordered Vallandigham released from prison and sent
"beyond [the] military lines" of the United States into the CSA.2 6 7
Then in June 1863 President Lincoln defended military jurisdiction
over Vallandigham and other civilians in an open letter to New York
Democrats that was reprinted in the New York Tribune and many other
newspapers and in a run of some 50,000 pamphlets. 268 The New York
Democrats addressed by Lincoln contended that military detention
and trial of civilians residing in northern, loyal states, and outside of
264 See SWISHER, supra note 107, at 927.
265 See Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 923 ("Whether the military commission for the
trial of the charges against Mr. Vallandigham was legally constituted, and hadjurisdic-
tion of the case, is not a question before this court. There is clearly no authority in
this court, on the pending motion, to revise or reverse the proceedings of the military
commission, if they were before the court. The sole question is whether the arrest was
legal . . . ."); id. at 919 ("The petitioner does not state what the judgment of the
military commission is . . .").
266 See Proceedings of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1864, at 8 ("Mr. Sherman said
... [that a] riot sprung up in the County of Holmes, and the rioters were arrested and
imprisoned, and under indictment upon charges of treason. Vallandigham went into
the adjoining county, and in the presence of a large concourse of excited persons,
some of them insurgents themselves, indulged in language evidently intended to
excite them to the commission of further crime, subjecting him properly to arrest by
military law, for openly aiding and abetting rebellion. . . . He was not merely talking
opposition to the Government, but aiding the public enemy. It is a distinction which
should not be ignored. . . . Mr. Sherman wished it distinctly understood that Mr.
Vallandigham's case was not put on the ground of the suspension of the habeas
corpus. He was treated just as Jeff. Davis would have been-as a public enemy stimu-
lating and abetting open acts of rebellion against the Government of the United
States.").
267 Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 925 (reprinting President's military order of May 19,
1863).
268 See GUELZO, supra note 110, at 230, 232. The letter was addressed to Erastus
Corning "and others." Corning, of Albany, New York, was a wealthy railroad man,
head of the state's Democratic Party and recently a member of Congress. See id. at
232-33.
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any zone of military activity, violated various individual rights provi-
sions of the Constitution, such as Article III's rules about treason pros-
ecutions and the jury and grand jury rules in Article III and the Bill of
Rights. 2 6 9 This was a category error, Lincoln explained. Those guar-
antees were meant to operate in "quiet times" of "peace;" they applied
to arrests and prosecutions of individuals or small groups for "ordi-
nary" crimes already committed.270 The Constitution itself, in the
Habeas Suspension Clause, 271 wrote Lincoln, recognized that differ-
ent rules applied in times of "rebellion or invasion" because civil
courts and their processes are often "inadequate" to control the vio-
lent actions by large, organized groups.272 Lincoln showed that Val-
landigham had not committed ordinary crime but had endangered
the "public safety" by "warring upon the military" and "damaging the
army."273 This "gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay
hands upon him."27 4 "Must I shoot the simple-minded soldier boy
who deserts," asked Lincoln rhetorically, "while I must not touch a
hair of a wiley agitator who induces him to desert?"275 According to
Lincoln, his choice to pursue Vallandigham rather than simple-
minded boys influenced by him was "not only constitutional, but,
withal, a great mercy."276 Lincoln's letter to Coming was well received
269 See Letter from Lincoln to Coming, supra note 39, at 347-48. Lincoln's letter
to Coming came about because Corning's Democratic Party committee had
announced a series of resolutions at a public meeting condemning the military
actions against Vallandigham. Although Lincoln and his cabinet were not pleased
with Burnside's aggressiveness, Lincoln deemed it prudent to defend the general's
course publicly. See GUELZO, supra note 110, at 232; REHNQUIST, supra note 258, at
72-73. The government also successfully fended off Vallandigham's habeas chal-
lenges. Lincoln's letter to Coming was preapproved by the cabinet. See id. at 73. For
additional analysis of this episode, see McGINTY, supra note 107, at 182-90; SWISHER,
supra note 107, at 925-30.
270 Letter from Lincoln to Corning, supra note 39, at 347.
271 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
272 Letter from Lincoln to Corning, supra note 39, at 349. The functional reasons
for the Constitution's distinction is that civil courts are slow-moving and at the mercy
of ill-disposed jurors; and moreover, their constitutional rules ban "preventive" deten-
tion and conviction except for "defined crimes [already] committed," proved by sub-
stantial evidence. Id. at 348.
273 Id. at 349. "Public safety" is, of course, a reference to the Habeas Suspension
Clause.
274 Id. Lincoln also defended the constitutionality of his Emancipation Proclama-
tion by invoking concepts underlying the dual-status doctrine. See Letter from Abra-
ham Lincoln to James C. Conkling (Aug. 26, 1863), in 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 39, at 396, 397 ("[T]he constitution invests its com-
mander-in-chief, with the law of war, in the time of war.").
275 Letter from Lincoln to Corning, supra note 39, at 349.
276 Id.
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and helped quiet some of the legitimate public concern about civil
liberties in the North during the war.27 7
Vallandigham wanted the Supreme Court to review the constitu-
tionality of his conviction by military commission. But the lower court
had not ruled on that issue, and a new habeas corpus petition in fed-
eral court could not then be instituted to challenge the trial because
Vallandigham had been sent out of federal custody to the CSA. Val-
landigham's counsel therefore petitioned the Supreme Court to issue
a writ of certiorari to the Judge Advocate General of the Army in
order to bring up to the Court the record of the military commission
trial and judgment. The Supreme Court refused to issue the writ,
holding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
because the case was "not in law or equity" within Article III, nor was
"a military commission a court within the meaning of the 14th Section
of the Judiciary Act of 1789."278
The Court seemed to go out of its way to suggest its view of the
merits and implied quite distinctly that the military detention and trial
were lawful. It treated the Lieber Code as authoritative; stated that
the general who arrested Vallandigham had acted "in conformity"
with the Code; and stated that, as recognized by the Lieber Code, mili-
tary commission jurisdiction was "applicable, not only to war with for-
eign nations, but to a rebellion" also.27 9 It is not surprising, and in
fact was likely intended by at least some of the Justices, that Val-
landigham was read as holding that the arrest, detention, and trial
"[were] not illegal."2 so
277 According to Randall, the Coming letter "is generally regarded as one of [Lin-
coln's] ablest papers." RANDALL, supra note 44, at 184 n.20.
278 Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 251.
279 Id. at 249.
280 Vallandigham in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1864 at 4; see also Mr.
Vallandigham's Case, DAILY AGE (Phila.), Mar. 18, 1864, at 2 ("The question of law, a
very narrow one, might have been disposed of... in a few lines.. . . Not content with
this, however, Judge Wayne gives a long recital of facts [and] all the details of Bum-
side's infamous outrage . .. as if they were the most natural occurrences in the world,
without one word to show that what was done or suffered is matter of censure or
regret."); Vallandigham and the Supreme Court, MACON (Ga.) DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 25,
1864, at 2 (noting with dismay that the decision had been read as a "most important
precedent that would "do much towards suppressing exhibitions of treason"). Other
media sources correctly described the limited nature of the Court's holding and did
not comment on the Court's expansive dicta. See, e.g., The Vallandigham Case, N.Y.
TRIB., Feb. 16, 1864, at 1.
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V. POSTBELLUM SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON WAR ISSUES
The Court continued to hear and decide cases arising from the
war until the end of the century-well over 300 in all. In other words,
it was thirty-five years after Lincoln's assassination and the war's end
when the Court's docket was free of the Civil War. During that
period, the Court had three Chief and twenty-five Associate Justices.
In scores of cases covering a vast range of issues, the Court repeatedly
reaffirmed core tenets of the dual-status doctrine. It did of course
hold some Union war measures unconstitutional, but the number and
scope of those decisions were tiny compared to the victories for the
U.S. government.28' This Part traces the course of the Court's war
decisions in a number of areas.
A. Secession Was Treason Because Allegiance Was Unimpaired
In Texas v. White2 8 2 and several other decisions, the Court consid-
ered the validity of wartime acts of the CSA and seceded states and,
hence, the legality of secession itself. Secession-the attempt to cast
off allegiance to the United StateS283 and establish an independent
nation-was a legal nullity, the Court held; "the State did not cease to
be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union." 284 The
attempt to throw off allegiance to the United States failed; all
residents of the CSA were still bound by the obligations of citizen-
281 One of the most significant acts of Congress held unconstitutional was the war-
time legislation making paper money "legal tender" for all debts public and private.
See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869). One year later, the Court
reversed itself and upheld the legislation. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457 (1870). Because it does not concern individual rights against military actions, the
issue is not addressed in this Article.
282 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
283 See Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 249 (describing the "rebellion" as "when
a part of a country wages war against its legitimate government, seeking to throw off
all allegiance to it, to set up a government of its own").
284 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 726.
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ship. 285 Their rebellion constituted treason. All acts of the CSA were
void and its officers who invaded individual rights were trespassers. 2 6
B. The Laws of War Displace Constitutional Rights of U.S.
Citizen Enemies
In reviewing basic principles concerning legal rights of seceded
states and their inhabitants, the Court in Texas v. White noted the rule
that, during this condition of civil war, the rights of the State [of
Texas] as a member, and of her people as citizens of the Union,
were suspended. The government and the citizens of the State,
refusing to recognize their constitutional obligations, assumed the
character of enemies, and incurred the consequences of
rebellion. 28 7
The leading consequences were the loss of constitutional rights dur-
ing the rebellion and, of course, susceptibility to attack by the military
forces of the Union. In these few words, the Court encapsulated the
core propositions of the Union's war powers theorists. Rebellion
against the United States and its Constitution caused U.S. citizens to
forfeit their right to protection by the Constitution. The corporate
actions of the people of the states through their governments,
embracing and pursuing rebellion, were attributed to and bound all
members of the state, even those whose individual dispositions or
actions did not show support for rebellion. The Court then made
285 See Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 188 (1877) ("The United States, during the
whole contest, never for one moment renounced their claim to supreme jurisdiction
over the whole country, and to the allegiance of every citizen of the republic."); White
v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 651 (1871) ("At no time were the rebellious States out
of the pale of the Union. Their rights under the Constitution were suspended, but
not destroyed. Their constitutional duties and obligations were unaffected and
remained the same. A citizen is still a citizen, though guilty of crime and visited with
punishment. His political rights may be put in abeyance or forfeited.... If he loses
his rights he escapes none of his disabilities and liabilities which before subsisted.").
286 See Hickman v. Jones, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 197, 200-01 (1869) ("The rebellion was
simply an armed resistance to the rightful authority of the sovereign. Such was its
character in its rise, progress, and downfall. The act of the Confederate Congress
creating the tribunal in question was void. It was as if it were not. The court was a
nullity, and could exercise no rightful jurisdiction. The forms of law with which it
clothed its proceedings gave no protection to those who, assuming to be its officers,
were the instruments by which it acted."); United States v. Keehler, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
83, 86 (1869) ("The whole Confederate power must be regarded by us as a usurpation
of unlawful authority, incapable of passing any valid laws . . .
287 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 727.
2010] 1913
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
clear that it did not follow Thaddeus Stevens and other radicals288 to
the view that the states and people had committed political suicide:
the Court emphasized that the forfeiture of rights was a temporary
phenomenon of war-a mere suspension-because secession could
neither break the Union nor destroy the obligations of U.S. citizen-
ship. And so when war ended, Congress and the President would indi-
cate the proper time for constitutional rights to be resumed.
United States v. MilleP'289 was a leading case of comparable impor-
tance to the Prize Cases. Miller's stock in railroad companies was
seized and condemned in a U.S. district court in Michigan under both
the First and Second Confiscation Acts .2 90 His property was confisca-
ble because he lived in Virginia, a rebel state, and served in the Con-
federate military. Miller did not appear in the lower court and these
allegations were considered admitted by default. By writ of error,
Miller later asked the Supreme Court to vacate the judgment because
the Confiscation Acts punished him for the municipal crime of trea-
son by taking his property, but did so without a grand jury indictment
or common law jury trial, as required by the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.291 According to the Court, "[w]ar existing, the United States
were invested with belligerent rights in addition to the sovereign pow-
ers previously held."2 9 2 Since the sections of the Confiscation Acts
used to take Miller's property "were not enacted under the municipal
power of Congress to legislate for the punishment of crimes against
the sovereignty of the United States, [but] on the contrary, [were] an
exercise of the war powers of the government," the Court found it
"clear they are not affected by the restrictions imposed by the fifth
and sixth amendments." 293 Even Justice Stephen Field-a dogged
defender of the alleged rights of rebels294-had to concede in dissent
in Miller that
288 According to Stevens, secession made the rebel states "foreign nations" and
their inhabitants "enemies." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 316-17 (1864).
289 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870).
290 See supra note 105.
291 Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 306.
292 Id. at 304-05.
293 Id.
294 Field wrote a number of majority opinions-which often provoked dissents-
finding that rebels' property rights survived wartime confiscation measures. See, e.g.,
Conrad v. Waples, 96 U.S. 279 (1877); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876). Field
issued written dissents from decisions upholding Union war actions in numerous
cases. See, e.g., Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 731-44 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting);
Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187, 200-02 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting); Mechs.' & Trad-
ers' Bank v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276, 298-308 (1875) (Field, J., dissent-
ing); Sprott v. United Sates, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459, 465-74 (1874) (Field, J.,
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legislation founded upon the war powers of the government, and
directed against the public enemies of the United States, is subject
to different considerations and limitations from those applicable to
legislation founded upon the municipal power of the government
and directed against criminals. Legislation in the former case is
subject to no limitations, except such as are imposed by the law of
nations in the conduct of war. Legislation in the latter case is sub-
ject to all the limitations prescribed by the Constitution for the pro-
tection of the citizen.2 9 5
Miller's holding that the Second Confiscation Act was valid when
applied to property in loyal states of U.S. citizens who received no
actual notice was reaffirmed several times. 296
It is suggested that Miller shows that the U.S. government's war
powers are limited by the customary laws of war.2 9 7 The Court in fact
dissenting); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 634-81 (1870) (Field, J.,
dissenting); Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331, 350-56 (1870) (Field,J., dissent-
ing); Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 314 (Field, J., dissenting). Field voted against the
government but did not write separately in other important war cases. See, e.g., Young
v. United States, 97 U.S. 39 (1877); New Orleans v. S.S. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387
(1874); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
295 Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 315 (Field, J., dissenting); see also KELLY ET AL.,
supra note 44, at 415-16 (discussing the Court's understanding in Miller, shared by
the dissent, that a statute implementing the government's "sovereign right" under
"internal or municipal law" can only be implemented through proceedings consistent
with the individual rights in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, but that constitutional
protections are not applicable when an individual is proceeded against according to a
statute enacted under the "war power" and based on the government's "belligerent
right"). Even Miller's counsel conceded that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were
inapplicable to exercises of the rights of war; counsel contended, though, that their
client was not properly subject to the laws of war at all. See Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at
284-85. Also in 1870, the year Miller was decided, justice Field conceded in another
case "the right of Congress" to proceed against the disloyal as "enemies" under "the
limitations, which the law of nations has imposed on the conduct of war," or as
criminals "amenable to the municipal law," under which Congress may "legislate for
the punishment of crimes," and "subject to limitations, which secure to the accused a
trial by a jury of his peers, and the right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." Tyler, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 354-55 (Field, J., dissenting).
296 See Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 207 (1875) (concerning real estate in
Washington, D.C.); Brown v. Kennedy, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 591, 599 (1872) (concern-
ing a real estate mortgage in Kansas); Tyler, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 345-47 (concerning
real estate in Washington, D.C.); see also Alexandria v. Fairfax, 95 U.S. 774, 777 (1877)
(concerning securities of the city of Alexandria, Virginia, a place under federal con-
trol since spring 1861).
297 David Golove, Military Tribunals, International Law, and the Constitution: A Fran-
ckian-Madisonian Approach, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 363, 387-88 (2003) (seeming
to imply that the Court understood the laws of war as restraints on Congress); cf
Sarah Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 21 (2006) ("[A]ll
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declined to decide that question.2 9 8 In any event, to place Miller in a
proper context, one must remember that during the Civil War, all rel-
evant parties were U.S. citizens within the United States whose default
legal status was to be in allegiance and under the protection of the
laws. If Mr. Miller, for instance, was not an enemy under the law of
nations, then he was a regular U.S. citizen whose property was being
condemned in a federal court in Michigan-and in that case everyone
would agree that he would be protected by constitutional rights. So
Miller's argument that the law of nations did not make him an enemy
was, in a sense, just another way of phrasing his claim that he enjoyed
the rights of a U.S. citizen. And so the law of nations can be seen, in
this boundary-policing sense only, as a constitutional limit on the U.S.
government. But that would not be true in cases involving foreign
enemies, whether inside or outside the United States, and friendly
noncitizens outside the United States, all of whom would by default be
outside the protection of the Constitution.
In The GrayJacket,299 a resident of Alabama argued that his vessel
and cargo were not properly condemned as enemy's property because
the rights of "the rebels," being U.S. citizens, could only "be adjudged
by the municipal laws of their country," not by the harsh law of prize
which applied only to foreigners.3 0 0 The Alabaman asserted that he
had personally remained loyal and had only been trying to remove his
property from "the insurrectionary district" to the Union when he was
Justices on the Court in both Brown and the Prize Cases agreed that the scope of the
President's constitutional warmaking authority was defined by the law of nations.").
In Miller, the President, through subordinates, simply applied Congress's confiscation
statutes; there was no exercise of his independent constitutional powers. The alleg-
edly unconstitutional action was the application of the statute to Miller. It was the
powers of Congress that were challenged. See Miller 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 304 (consid-
ering "the objection ... that the acts of Congress under which these proceedings to
confiscate the stock have been taken are not warranted by the Constitution").
298 The claimant Miller argued, and Justice Field in dissent agreed, that under the
law of nations Miller was not properly considered an enemy, and since Congress was
constitutionally required to conform its statutes to the law of nations, they were
unconstitutional as applied to him. Miller and Justice Field conceded that, if the
confiscation laws were exercises of Congress's belligerent rights and applied to an
enemy, there could be no individual constitutional rights claim. The majority's
rejoinder was that it did not need to decide whether Congress was constitutionally
bound by the law of nations because Miller was in fact a military enemy as defined by
the law of nations. The Court did not, then, suggest that Congress's constitutional
war powers were limited by the law of nations. Instead it avoided the need to decide
that question by showing that the law of nations was not violated.
299 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 342 (1866).
300 Id. at 359 (argument of counsel for claimant).
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captured.30 He had been, "at worst, only an enemy by construction"
due his domicile in a seceded state, but he had shed that "quasienemy
. . . status" as soon as he sailed out of rebel territory intending to
"return[ ] to his allegiance" and reside in a loyal state.3 0 2 In short,
argued his counsel, he should not be treated as "an alien enemy" and
subjected to the law of nations,3 0 3 but was a loyal U.S. citizen whose
property was protected under municipal law. Though not mention-
ing the Constitution expressly, the claimant in effect asserted rights
under it. And the Court dismissively rejected his arguments. By the
law of nations, specifically the law of prize, property of a "hostile coun-
try" is still enemy's property notwithstanding the feelings or status of
the individual owner.304 Belligerent rights of the government under
international law trumped an individual's former municipal rights.
In The William Bagaley,305 the Court also upheld the condemna-
tion as enemy property under the laws of war of the partial interest
that a concededly loyal citizen of the loyal state of Indiana had in a
vessel and cargo owned by an Alabama firm.3 0 6 The Court cited
precedents from international wars holding that contracting with an
"alien enemy" was barred by the law of nations and that lingering in
an enemy nation after a war begins makes a person an enemy and
hence his property confiscable.30 7 In multiple other decisions, the
Court upheld the application of harsh rules of the laws of war to U.S.
citizens domiciled in loyal states.30 8
301 Id. at 361.
302 Id. at 364.
303 Id. at 364-65.
304 Id. at 369-70. The Court held this on many other occasions. See, e.g., United
States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 406, 423 (1874) ("If the owners [of seized ves-
sels] resided on that side of the line of bayonets spoken of in the Prize Cases which
adhered to the Union, then they were not liable to condemnation as prize.. . . But if
their owners resided on the other side of that line, were themselves citizens of and
domiciled in States declared by the President's proclamation to be in insurrection,
then their property captured in naval warfare was lawful prize, and subject to condem-
nation. The loyalty of the owners made no difference in this regard." (footnote
omitted)).
305 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 377 (1866).
306 Id. at 403; see also id. at 397 (argument of claimant's counsel) (arguing that the
claimant's loyalty and residence in Indiana should preclude application of the laws of
war).
307 Id. at 407-08.
308 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546, 552 (1892) (concerning the confisca-
tion of property of resident of Cincinnati, Ohio, who joined rebel army); Mitchell v.
United States, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 350, 351-52 (1874) (holding that the laws of war
voided the contracts of resident of Louisville, Kentucky with residents of CSA); Brown
v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 183 (1872) (holding that the laws of war tolled stat-
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C. Discretion to Choose Sovereign or Belligerent Methods
The Miller Court found that certain provisions of the Second
Confiscation Act were exercises of the war power while others were
enacted under the United States's authority as a "sovereign" to punish
the crimes of its citizens.309 It did not affect the constitutionality of
the Act that both "belligerent" and "sovereign" purposes were con-
tained in a single statute and therefore that different regimes of pro-
cedural rights would apply to proceedings under different
subsections. Contrary to the suggestion of some scholarship, there
was no constitutional difficulty with the U.S. government deciding to
"toggle back and forth" between the exercise of belligerent and sover-
eign rights "according to what best served its military interests. 310
In Lamar v. Browne,311 the Court reiterated that "during the late
war" the United States "could act both as belligerent and sovereign."
The United States's belligerent acts were regulated by the laws of war.
At the same time, "as a sovereign [the United States] might recall
their revolted subjects to allegiance by pardon, and restoration to all
rights, civil as well as political. All this they might do when, where,
and as they chose. It was a matter entirely within their sovereign dis-
cretion." 312 Similarly, in The Hampton,313 the Court held that the
ute of limitations for the benefit of resident of Virginia in suit against residents of
Kansas); see also Mauran v. Ins. Co., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 1, 13-14 (1867) (holding that
the rules of laws of war applied to detriment of Massachusetts insurance firm in con-
troversy arising from seizure of insured vessel by CSA forces).
309 See supra notes 289-96 and accompanying text.
310 Lee, supra note 209, at 69. The government's constitutional power to "toggle"
was understood by some contemporary observers to have been recognized in the Prize
Cases itself. See, e.g., SPEECH OF HENRY CHAMPION DEMING OF CONNECTICUT ON THE
PRESIDENT'S PLAN FOR STATE RENOVATION 10 (Washington, D.C., Gibson Bros. 1864)
(stating in a speech before the House of Representatives his understanding that the
Prize Cases allow the President to "elect to pursue them [rebels] either as enemies or
traitors, by the Constitution or the laws of war. If he elects to pursue them as traitors,
he must pursue them in accordance with the constitutional definition of treason and
by the mode and with the limitation it clearly indicates in the section [of the Constitu-
tion] devoted to that crime. If he elects to pursue them as enemies, there is no limit
and restraint upon his discretion but the laws of war."). Deming further argued that
the Prize Cases had settled the debate that had occurred since the beginning of the
conflict, by rejecting the view "that rebels who adjure the Constitution and wage war
for its destruction are entitled to all the rights which it guaranties, and can only be
pursued by constitutional penalties," and accepting the view of Deming and others
that "the inhabitants of the insurgent States have forfeited all their rights under the
Constitution, and are public enemies in a state of war, with no rights but such as the
law of nations accords to belligerents." Id. at 11-12.
311 92 U.S. 187 (1875).
312 Id. at 195.
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Executive had the discretion to confiscate a Virginia vessel under
either the international laws of war as enemy property or under an
applicable congressional statute which created a "municipal forfei-
ture."314 There was no limit on the government's choice to proceed
as a belligerent or sovereign against one of its citizens, even when, as
here it was not contested that he was "loyal." In The Circassian, the
Court noted that in wartime, international law allows "military force"
to be employed to blockade the enemy's ports, and "when the ene-
mies are rebels, [the government may use] military force and munici-
pal law." 15 Chief Justice Chase, in an opinion delivered on circuit,
stated that the concession of belligerent rights to the rebel army "in
the exercise of political discretion and in the interest of humanity, to
mitigate vindictive passions inflamed by civil conflicts, and prevent the
frightful evils of mutual reprisals and retaliations," "established no
rights except during the war," and rebels were liable for the civil crime
of treason.3 16 The Lieber Code also announced the shifting between
belligerent and sovereign rights was perfectly appropriate, stating that
"[t] reating, in the field, the rebellious enemy according to the law and
usages of war has never prevented the legitimate government from
trying the leaders of the rebellion or chief rebels for high treason, and
from treating them accordingly."317
D. Immunity/Indemnity
An entirely different set of Supreme Court cases, concerning the
liability of U.S. executive officers to civil or criminal penalties for war-
time conduct,318 shows the breadth of the displacement of U.S. citi-
zens' individual constitutional and common law rights by the laws of
war. In two very significant decisions, the Supreme Court held that
the courts of the "enemy"-all the courts in the seceded states-had
no jurisdiction to entertain any civil or criminal charges against fed-
eral soldiers, even apparently when the soldier's actions were allegedly
in violation of the laws of war or otherwise illegal. 3 19
313 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 372 (1866).
314 Id. at 375-76.
315 The Circassian, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 135, 151 (1864) (emphasis added).
316 Shortridge v. Macon, 22 F. Cas. 20, 22 (C.C.D.N.C. 1867) (No. 12,812).
317 Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 154.
318 Recall that no enemy could sue in U.S. courts during the war, so any suits
against U.S. soldiers or officials for wartime conduct would have had to await the end
of hostilities.
319 See Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1879) ("[The late] war, though not
between independent nations, but between different portions of the same nation, was
accompanied by the general incidents of an international war. ... The people of the
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Though they avoided what would have been an avalanche of suits
against them in Confederate courts, thousands of Union soldiers and
federal officials were still harassed in the courts of loyal states, which
did have jurisdiction over them. The practice at the time was to sue
officials in common law tort to attempt to vindicate alleged infringe-
ments of individual rights by the government.320 In the years after the
Civil War, the Court held that soldiers and other government officials
had no civil liability in tort or otherwise for any wartime acts "done in
accordance with the usages of civilized warfare under and by military
authority."321 Just as described above regarding the Miller decision,
loyal States on the one hand, and the people of the Confederate States on the other,
thus became enemies to each other . . .. When, therefore, our armies marched into
the country which acknowledged the authority of the Confederate government, that
is, into the enemy's country, their officers and soldiers were not subject to its laws, nor
amenable to its tribunals for their acts. They were subject only to their own govern-
ment, and only by its laws, administered by its authority, could they be called to
account. . .. [I]t is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a
friendly country, or to be stationed in it by authority of its sovereign or government, is
exempt from its civil and criminal jurisdiction. . . . Much more must this exemption
prevail where a hostile army invades an enemy's country. There would be something
singularly absurd in permitting an officer or soldier of an invading army to be tried by
his enemy, whose country it had invaded. The same reasons for his exemption from
criminal prosecution apply to civil proceedings."); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S.
509, 515 (1878) ("When the armies of the United States were in the territory of insur-
gent States, banded together in hostility to the national government and making war
against it, in other words, when the armies of the United States were in the enemy's
country, the military tribunals [of the United States] had, under the laws of war, and
the authority conferred by [statute], exclusive jurisdiction to try and punish offences
of every grade committed by persons in the military service. Officers and soldiers of
the armies of the Union were not subject during the war to the laws of the enemy, or
amenable to his tribunals for offences committed by them. They were answerable
only to their own government, and only by its laws, as enforced by its armies, could
they be punished.").
320 The common law of tort was used to bring claims even when it was expressly
recognized that individual rights of constitutional dimension were being pursued.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 126-27, 134, 136 (1851); Milli-
gan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380, 381 (C.C.D. Ind. 1871) (No. 9605). The practice of
suing state or local government officials directly under the Constitution would have to
await an 1871 act to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, see Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch.
22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13, and such suits against federal officials were not recognized by
the Supreme Court until Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), implying a federal cause of action for the violation of
certain constitutional rights.
321 Freeland v. Williams, 131 U.S. 405, 416 (1889). Because the United States
"conceded, in the interest of humanity, and to prevent the cruelties of reprisals and
retaliation," that the Confederate forces had "such belligerent rights as belonged
under the law of nations to the armies of independent governments engaged in war
against each other," the same defense to civil liability was available to Confederate
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this rule polices the boundary between the constitutional rights of citi-
zens and the U.S. government's power to displace them by invoking
war powers under the laws of war.
To provide additional protection to U.S. soldiers and officials,
Congress enacted in 1863 the Indemnity Act,32 2 amended and broad-
ened in 1866 and 1867,323 which granted sweeping immunity to fed-
eral soldiers and civilian officials from any civil or criminal liability in
state or federal court for wartime actions relating to trials by military
commission or any "search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment."3 2 4 The
1867 statute also removed federal and state court jurisdiction over
soldiers and officials. Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 605 (1878). In Ford, the Court held
that an "act of war" which was "consistent[ ] with the laws and usages of war," and
done under Confederate military orders, could give rise to no "civil responsibility," at
least where the plaintiff was also a resident of the CSA and hence an enemy entitled
to no protection under "the provisions of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 605-06,
607.
322 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 4, 12 Stat. 755, 756 ("[A]ny order of the
President, or under his authority, made at any time during the existence of the pre-
sent rebellion, shall be a defence in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or
criminal, pending, or to be commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest, or imprison-
ment, made, done, or committed, or acts omitted to be done, under and by virtue of
such order, or under color of any law of Congress .... ).
323 See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 155, 14 Stat. 432, 432 ("[A]ll acts, proclamations,
and orders of the President . .. or acts done by his authority or approval [between July
4, 1861 and July 1, 1866] respecting martial law, military trials by courts-martial or
military commissions, or the arrest, imprisonment and trial of persons charged with
participation in the late rebellion ... or as aiders or abettors thereof, or as guilty of
any disloyal practice in aid thereof, or of any violation of the laws or usages of war, or
of affording aid and comfort to rebels. . . and all proceedings and acts done or had by
courts-martial or military commissions, or arrests and imprisonments made in the
premises ... are hereby approved in all respects, legalized and made valid. . . ."); Act
of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, § 1, 14 Stat. 46, 46 ("[A]ny search, seizure, arrest, or impris-
onment made, or any acts done or omitted to be done during the said rebellion, by
any officer or person, under and by virtue or any order, written or verbal, general or
special, issued by the President or Secretary of War, or by any military officer of the
United States holding the command of the department, district, or place within which
such seizure, search, arrest, or imprisonment was made, done, or committed, or any
acts were so done, or omitted to be done, either by the person or officer to whom the
order was addressed, or for whom it was intended, or by any other person aiding or
assisting him therein, shall be held, and are hereby declared, to come within the
purview [of the immunity provision of the Act of March 3, 1863].").
324 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 81, § 4, 12 Stat. 755, 756. These acts were necessitated
by the thousands of suits filed against federal soldiers and officials and the lawless
conduct of some state judges and legislators in persecuting federal defendants. See
RANDALL, supra note 44, at 186-214. For a discussion of how these statutes and associ-
ated congressional debates illuminate important questions about the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, see Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118
YALE L.J. 600, 639-55 (2008).
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cases challenging such actions by military or civilian officials.32 5 These
protective statutes were drafted so comprehensively as to cover even
grossly excessive actions, including actions that violated the laws of
war. The Supreme Court upheld the statutory immunity and related
removal jurisdiction from constitutional challenges. 3 2 6 The impor-
tance of the Court's holding in these cases should not be underesti-
mated; they blocked almost all ability to judicially vindicate alleged
common law, constitutional, or laws-of-war violations by federal offi-
cials during the war.
E. The Displacement of Constitutional Protection by the Laws of War Was
Not a Theory of Extra-Constitutional Power
The Supreme Court repeatedly confirmed that wartime was not
some strange zone in which the Constitution was somehow simply
"off," to use Professor Currie's unfortunate phrase.32 7 The Court
quite frequently required the executive branch to comply with con-
gressional statutes,328 showing that traditional constitutional relations
between the branches of the federal government were "on" during the
war. Lower executive officials were frequently bound by the Court to
compliance with the international law of prize 329-the law which the
President and Congress had directed the courts to apply to adjudicate
the legality of wartime high-seas seizures. The Court voided a con-
gressional statute because it interfered with the President's constitu-
325 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 14 Stat. at 433.
326 See Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 641 (1884); Beard v. Burts, 95 U.S. 434, 437
(1877); Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 352-54 (1867); see also Crosby v.
Cadwalader, 6 F. Cas. 876, 876 (Strong, CircuitJustice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 1870) (No. 3419)
(applying Act of March 3, 1863, to bar tort suit); RANDALL, supra note 44, at 211
(stating that "the essential provisions of the Indemnity Act were sustained by the high
tribunal" but noting that one minor provision was held to violate the Seventh Amend-
ment). Justices Field and Clifford stated in a dissenting opinion in 1878 that the
Indemnity Acts were unconstitutional; the majority had declined to reach the issue
because it found other infirmities in the civil judgment against U.S. army officers and
because the issue was not properly presented in the bill of exceptions. See Beckwith v.
Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 284 (1878); id. at 292 (Field, J., dissenting).
327 See supra note 163.
328 See, e.g., The Cotton Plant, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 577, 580-81 (1870) (requiring
compliance with statute barring the U.S. Navy from seizing rebel property as prize of
war on any inland waters); The Ouachita Cotton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 521, 531 (1867)
(enforcing statute which allowed the "President" to make exceptions to prohibition
on commercial intercourse between North and South to void licenses given by U.S.
military).
329 See, e.g., The Watchful, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 91, 93 (1867); The Peterhoff, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 28, 50-51 (1866).
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tional power to pardon (as exercised on behalf of former rebels).33o
Lower court decisions condemning rebel property seized on land
through in rem proceedings were reversed if a claimant's right to
demand a jury trial had been violated.331 All of this is inconsistent
with the notion of a general absence of constitutional restraint during
war.
F. Enforcing the Constitutional Rights of Citizens During the War
It might be suggested that all of these precedents from the Civil
War, holding that the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens are dis-
placed by the laws of war when they become military enemies of the
United States, merely show that the courts were less protective back
then of individual rights in general. That theory is wrong, as shown by
two types of Supreme Court decisions, those enforcing or discussing
(1) the individual constitutional rights of loyal U.S. citizens in loyal
states against U.S. government actions, and (2) the individual consti-
tutional rights of citizens in both rebel and loyal states against uncon-
stitutional actions by rebel state governments.
In two important cases, the Court suggested that noncombatant,
loyal citizens in loyal states had enforceable constitutional rights
against certain U.S. military actions during the war. The cases
involved the army's use or destruction of private property for military
reasons and considered when wartime necessity displaced otherwise
applicable protections of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. In
United States v. Russell,3 32 the Court held that "immediate, imminent,
and impending" "public danger" during war allowed U.S. military offi-
cials to "impress [ I] into public service, or . . . appropriate [ ] to the
public use, or . . . destroy[ I without the consent of the owner" the
private property of loyal citizens in loyal states, but that compensation
was required.333 In United States v. Pacific Railroad,33 4 compensation
330 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). For a full discussion of
the case, see Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress's Authority to
Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 87-113 (Vicki C.
Jackson & Judith Resnick eds., 2010).
331 See, e.g., Armstrong's Foundry, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 766, 769 (1867); Union Ins.
Co. v. United States, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 759, 764, 766 (1867).
332 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871).
333 See id. at 627-28. Here a steamboat was temporarily impressed into service to
ferry military supplies. The Takings Clause required compensation, but the remedy
was not against the individual officer. The emergency justified what would otherwise
be a trespass by him. Instead, the Court of Claims had jurisdiction to assess and pay
damages to the owner. Id. at 627-29.
334 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
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was not required because the unavoidable necessity of destroying the
loyal property overrode potentially applicable constitutional rights.3 3 5
In the second type of case, the Court held that the rebel states
never actually left the Union and thus, their conduct was still subject
to U.S. constitutional restrictions, such as the Contracts Clause and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.33 6 Sometimes the
Court simply voided statutes under the rule that "all acts done in aid
of the rebellion were illegal and of no validity," but without specifying
the source of law.3 37 Typical of state statutes struck down were those
taking the property or otherwise discrimination against residents of
loyal states on the ground that they were "alien enemies" to the CSA
and the states in rebellion. When holding illegal the acts of rebel
state governments, the Court was quite clear that it was recognizing
and enforcing "the just rights of citizens under the Constitution."338
335 See id at 228-29. Missouri had been invaded by a large Confederate army, and
to impede its advance on St. Louis, the retreating U.S. Army destroyed several pri-
vately owned railroad bridges. The Court held that the United States was not
required to compensate the owners for "injuries to or destruction of private property
in necessary military operations during the civil war." Id. at 239. "The safety of the
state in such case overrides all considerations of private loss. Salus populi is then, in
truth, suprena lex." Id. at 234. The Court distinguished "claims where property of
loyal citizens is taken for the service of our armies, such as vessels . . . for the transport
of troops and munitions of war." Id. at 239. Citing Russell, the Court confirmed that
the U.S. government compensates the loyal owners in those cases, but indicated that
this practice may "rest upon the general principle ofjustice" rather than "the terms of
the constitutional clause." Id. Despite suggestion to the contrary, see Vladeck, Re-
Rethinking, supra note 209, at 88-89, Pacific Railroad is not a case about "enemy prop-
erty" at all. The case concerned whether the U.S. government was required to com-
pensate loyal U.S. citizens in the loyal state of Missouri when their property was
unavoidably destroyed during military operations. There is no basis in Pacific Railroad
or any other decision for the notion that, but for some special doctrine about enemy
property, the United States could be sued in federal court and required by the Consti-
tution to compensate German owners if the U.S. military "bombed a German Mes-
serschmitt plant during World War II." Id. at 88. The Takings Clause is inapplicable
to enemy aliens' property even when within the United States. See Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 n.9 (1952). A fortiori, lawful military targets in the
enemy's country during war would obviously not be protected by the Constitution
from attack by U.S. forces.
336 See Stevens v. Griffith, 111 U.S. 48, 50-51 (1884); Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454,
462-63 (1878); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1878).
337 Dewing v. Perdicaries, 96 U.S. 193, 195 (1878).
338 Keith, 97 U.S. at 464; see also Stevens, 111 U.S. at 50-51 (enforcing rights of
"citizens of a loyal state" violated by Virginia statute which was "contrary to the clause
of the constitution declaring that 'the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states'").
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A third type of case involved tort suits by loyal citizens for per-
sonal injuries caused by persons acting under CSA civil authority. The
United States had, for reason of humanity, conceded belligerent
rights to the Confederate military forces, and so lawful acts of the
rebel military forces were protected by the combatant's privilege rec-
ognized by the laws of war.339 But the concession of sovereign, bellig-
erent rights to the Confederate military "did not extend to the
pretended government of the Confederacy."340 In Hickman v. Jones,3e
the Court held that because all acts of the civil government of the CSA
were void, a man prosecuted for treason in a CSA court pursuant to
the CSA statute could sue in trespass those civil officers responsible
for prosecuting him.34 2
In a fourth type of case, lower federal courts, including ChiefJus-
tice Chase sitting on circuit, held that courts of seceded states had no
jurisdiction over any residents of loyal states during the war because
by the laws of war and congressional statute no intercourse could be
had between the two warring sections of the country.343
G. Military Occupation of Enemy Territory
One final set of cases, which concern the occupation of captured
CSA territory by the U.S. Army, should be noted. In these cases, the
Court reaffirmed the rule that the war powers of the government can
be directed against enemies, even those who are U.S. citizens,
unrestricted by any alleged constitutional rights.
In New Orleans v. The Steamship Co.,344 a case concerning actions
of the U.S. military occupation government of New Orleans, the Court
declared that "[t] here is no limit to the powers that may be exerted"
when the United States occupies and governs enemy territory, "save
those which are found in the laws and usages of war."343 According to
339 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
340 See Hickman v. Jones, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 197, 200 (1869).
341 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 197.
342 Id. at 201. The plaintiff was not disabled from suing in U.S. courts by reason of
his residence in the CSA because the war had ended. No policy interest would
exclude him either, since he was a loyal citizen seeking redress from CSA officials for
harassing him on account of his loyalty.
343 See, e.g., Livingston v. Jordan, 15 F. Cas. 675, 677 (Chase, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D.S.C. 1869) (No. 8415).
344 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387 (1874).
345 Id. at 393-94; see also HALLECK, supra note 119, at 776 ("[During a military
occupation of enemy territory,] one do[es] not look to the [C]onstitution, or the
political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government . .. nor
for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited.
Such authority, and such rules, are derived directly from the laws of war, as estab-
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the Court, "the laws of war take the place of the Constitution and laws
of the United States as applied in time of peace."3 4 6 With a nod to the
era's categorical rule that the Constitution did not protect foreign
enemies in or outside the United States, the Court noted that this
power to govern civilians in Confederate territory without protecting
individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution existed "as if the ter-
ritory had belonged to a foreign country and had been subjugated in
a foreign war."347 This followed directly from the Court's holding in
the Prize Cases and other decisions that the Civil War was regulated by
the same rules of international law as applied to wars between inde-
pendent nations.
After the war, the Supreme Court repeatedly affirmed the consti-
tutional authority of the President, or his military subordinates, to cre-
ate military courts in conquered territory to hear all manner of civil or
criminal cases during wartime.3 4 8 The lawful life of these military
courts created under the President's war powers extended even
beyond the close of hostilities, lasting until Congress could make
"proper provision for the business before it, as well as that which had
been disposed of."3 4 9 This authority could be exercised in foreign ter-
ritory or in U.S. territory recaptured from an enemy during civil war.
And neither Article III nor individual-rights provisions of the Consti-
lished by the usage of the world . . . ."); 2 WINTHROP, supra note 14, at 1, 21-22
(reciting the doctrine of The Steamship Co. and stating that "the law of war may, in its
exercise, substantially supersede for the time the Constitution and laws of the land").
346 S.S. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 394.
347 Id. at 393-94.
348 See, e.g., Lewis v. Cocks, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 466, 469 (1874) ("The validity of the
Provisional Court [of Louisiana] is not an open one. We have held it valid on more
than one occasion." (citing The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129, 129 (1870));
Mechs.' & Traders' Bank v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276, 297-98 (1887) (hold-
ing that, in occupied territory during wartime, the President or one of his generals
has authority under the laws of war to create civil and criminal courts, the judgments
of which will be valid and binding upon the return of peace); Burke v. Miltenberger,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 519, 524 (1874) (holding that the President has constitutional
authority during war to create and staff a military court to hear civil and criminal
cases in occupied enemy territory); Pennywit v. Eaton, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 382, 384
(1873) (holding that the military governor of occupied enemy territory, appointed by
the President, had authority to establish and staff courts to hear civil cases); Handlin
v. Wickliffe, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 173, 174-75 (1871) (same); The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) at 133 (holding that the provisional court of Louisiana was authorized to hear
all cases arising under U.S. and Louisiana law and "was properly established by the
President in the exercise of his constitutional authority during war" to govern occu-
pied enemy territory).
349 Burke, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 525. The Court also upheld the authority of Con-
gress to transfer cases from military courts to peacetime courts of the United States.
See The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 133.
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tution give any person a right to exempt his judicial case from the
jurisdiction of these military courts.
For example, during the Civil War, Confederate civilians in occu-
pied New Orleans had "no constitutional immunity against subjection
to the judgment"350 of military provost courts, created by the general
commanding the occupied enemy district, "for the hearing and deter-
mination of all causes arising under the laws of the State [of Louisi-
ana] or of the United States." 3 5 1 In this case, Mechanics' and Traders'
Bank v. Union Bank,35 2 the Court held that "the Constitution of the
United States" did not "prevent the creation" and use of the courts
that specifically that the clause of Article III which vests the judicial
power of the United States "has no application to the abnormal condi-
tion of conquered territory in the occupancy of the conquering
army."3 5 3 In Planters'Bank v. Union Bank,3 54 the Court stated, in refer-
ence to the limits on the power over civilians of a Union general occu-
pying rebel territory during the war, that "it must be conceded that he
had power to do all that the laws of war permitted, except so far as he
was restrained by the pledged faith of the government, or by the effect
of Congressional legislation." 35 5
H. Milligan in Context
It is glaringly obvious-based on the Court's decisions in the Prize
Cases and the dozens of other decisions discussed above-that the
Court's sweeping rhetoric about the universality of constitutional
rights in Milligan35 6 cannot be taken at face value.3 5 7 Even in Milligan
itself one sees suggestions that there might be large categories of peo-
ple and places that the Constitution does not protect. The majority's
repeated emphasis that Milligan was not a "resident" of any "of the
rebellious states" hints at the rule that residents of the CSA were ene-
mies with no constitutional rights to protect them against U.S. military
force. Similarly, the Court suggested that military courts could try
350 Mechs.' & Traders'Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 296.
351 Id. at 295.
352 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276.
353 Id. at 294-95 (1874).
354 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 483 (1872).
355 Planters' Bank v. Union Bank, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 483, 495 (1873).
356 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
357 See CLINTON RossITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 36
(expanded ed. 1976) ("[H]owever eloquent and quotable his Uustice Davis, the
author of Milligan] words on the untouchability of the Constitution in time of actual
crisis, they do not now, and did not then, express the realities of American constitu-
tional law.").
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persons in certain categories: "prisoners of war," persons residing in
enemy territory, and persons located in U.S. territory where war had
obstructed ordinary civil processes.3 58 Chief Justice Chase's concur-
ring opinion suggests that the Constitution does not follow the Army
when it marches into enemy territory.359
Why then did the Court only hint at these rules in Milligan when
it boldly pronounced them in so many other decisions? In his writing
about the Civil War and the Court's decisions about individual rights,
John Norton Pomeroy suggested that "there is something exquisitely
absurd in the supposition that a civil, any more than a public, war can
be waged under the protection of the Bill of Rights."3 6 0 Why did the
Court in Milligan write its decision in a way that made it seem that the
Court had crossed the line to the absurd?36' The most likely explana-
tion is that a majority of the Court wished to signal to the Radicals in
Congress that it disapproved of military Reconstruction and the con-
tinued displacement of civil by military courts in the defeated
358 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 118, 123, 131 (1866).
359 Id. at 141 (Chase, C.J., concurring) ("[T]here is no law for the government of
the citizens, the armies or the navy of the United States, within American jurisdiction,
which is not contained in or derived from the Constitution. And wherever our army
or navy may go beyond our territorial limits, neither can go beyond the authority of
the President or the legislation of Congress.").
360 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 379 (Edmund H. Bennett ed., New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
10th rev. ed. 1888).
361 The majority opinion in Milligan could have been written in very different ways
than it was. As ChiefJustice Chase in concurrence and numerous later commentators
have pointed out, the Court could have resolved the case on the narrow ground that
Congress in the 1863 habeas corpus statute had prohibited the military trial of per-
sons situated as Milligan was. Even an opinion reaching out to decide that Congress
lacked power to subject Milligan to military trial could have been written in a much
narrower manner, for instance:
As we held in the Prize Cases, The Circassian, Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, and The
Venice, because the insurrection assumed the character and proportions of
civil war, "all who live[d] in the enemy's territory [we]re public enemies,
without regard to their personal sentiments or conduct; [but] the converse
of the proposition is equally true,-that all who reside[d] inside of our own
territory [we]re to be treated as under the protection of the law. If they
help[ed] the enemy they are criminals, but they cannot be punished without
legal conviction." In loyal states where the courts are open and unob-
structed, the laws of war cannot strip constitutional liberties from civilians
who have not taken up arms, even if, like Milligan, they may plot to do so in
the future.
The language in quotation marks is part of the argument that Milligan's counsel,
former Attorney General Jeremiah Black, delivered in the Supreme Court. See Milli-
gan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 80-81 (argument of counsel).
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South.36 2 That the U.S. military was essentially the only institution
with the capacity and will to defend freed slaves and white Unionists
from the horrific violence meted out by decommissioned rebel
soldiers should, one might think, cause contemporary civil libertarians
to temper their uncritical deification of the Milligan Court. But that
would require an understanding that the vigorous exercise of govern-
ment power is a necessary precondition for the existence of individual
liberty, not, as many today seem to imagine, simply and only a threat
to liberty.363
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to recover important but forgotten
legal rules and theories about the relationship between the Constitu-
tion and the laws of war. The Supreme Court today, while claiming
fidelity to the doctrines of the Civil War era, holds that military ene-
mies of the United States-and noncitizens outside the United States,
at that-have judicially enforceable rights under the Constitution, the
laws of Congress and the international laws of war. That repudiates
core legal doctrines of the Civil War, for instance that by waging war
against the United States, the rebels of the CSA-even though they
were U.S. citizens in the United States-put themselves outside the
protection of the Constitution and laws of the United States and had
the courts closed to their claims; that the U.S. government could
attack them with all the rights and powers allowed against foreign ene-
362 In July 1866, a few months before the opinions in Milligan were released, Con-
gress overrode President's Johnson veto to extend and expand the Freedmen's
Bureau. See Second Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866). Johnson
had (in)famously argued in his veto message that the bill's extension of "militaryjuris-
diction" over civilians, and particularly its "arbitrary tribunals" akin to "court[s]-mar-
tial," violated the Fifth and Sixth amendments, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
916 (1866)-the constitutional provisions at issue in Milligan. Justice Davis, author of
Milligan, conceded privately that his opinion was motivated by a concern that "Con-
gress claims omnipotent power," 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REACTION
1864-88 PART ONE 233 (1971). Davis was clearly not referring to Congress's actions
regarding wartime issues, because all the Justices had agreed in Milligan that an 1863
statute prohibited the trial of the conspirators, see Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 115-17;
id. at 134-35 (Chase, C.J., concurring in the judgment); Davis could only have been
talking about postwar Reconstruction-an issue that had not come before the Court
and which Davis therefore had no business adverting to and prejudicing with com-
ments about Congress's lack of power to allow military trials, see id. at 121-22 (major-
ity opinion).
363 As the Declaration of Independence reminds us, it is to "secure ... rights"-
"among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"-that "governments are
instituted among men." Philip Bobbitt has written eloquently about this. See PHILIP
BoBBrrr, TERROR AND CONSENT 241-46 (2008).
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mies during international wars; and that, in its discretion, the U.S.
government could also or instead choose to prosecute them for
municipal crimes, and only then would constitutional protections be
available. The modern Court repeatedly, by rote almost, acknowl-
edges that some deference and leeway must be accorded to the Presi-
dent and Congress's wartime decisions about how to subdue the
enemy, but always goes on to assert that American constitutional tradi-
tions and precedents, including from the Civil War, positively compel
the Court to intervene on behalf of military enemies. Once one
understands the true constitutional doctrines of the Civil War, the
modem Court's reluctant pose is seen to rest on historical fiction.
This is not to say that every legal rule of the Civil War era should be
applied today. I happen to think that the legal framework of the Civil
War has a lot to recommend it, especially as compared to the serious
problems that seems likely to flow from the current Court's grant of
robust rights to enemies.3 64 But that normative question is not the
task of this Article. I have simply tried to recover and accurately
describe the law of the Civil War as it was understood by contemporar-
ies. It turns out that those doctrines are vastly different than what the
Court and many contemporary academic commentators have led us to
believe.
364 See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Gitmo Detainee Ordered Released, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2010,
at A6 ("A suspected al Qaeda organizer once called 'the highest value detainee' at
Guantanamo Bay was ordered released by a federal judge Monday. Mohamedou
Ould Slahi was accused in the 9/11 Commission report of helping recruit Moham-
med Atta and other members of the al Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany, that took
part in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the U.S.").
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